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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nowadays, everyday life would be inconceivable without electrical energy. It is ubiq-
uitously relevant to the products we use, to the food we consume, and, of course, to
the houses we live in. With permanent and reliable availability it fuels the engine of
modern society. It has influenced our social interactions and opened up new channels of
communication. A lack of supply would, therefore, endanger not only our lifestyle, but
also threaten the basic functionality of society. Over the last century, the relevance of
electricity has drastically increased and its usage has widened. At the same time, sources
for generation have multiplied, starting with mainly fossil fuels in the very beginning,
moving on to nuclear, and recently including more and more renewable sources. Among
these, solar and wind power have experienced the most important upsurge. The increas-
ing share of renewables in energy generation offers great opportunities in many areas.
In the coming years, they will enable increasing political and economic independence
from fossil fuels, and will secure the energy supply in case fuel imports should cease.
Also, since abundant sun and wind are available, renewables will provide an affordable
basis for production as well as a sustainable future. However, the growing presence of
renewables also imposes challenges on the current energy system, on grids and on market
mechanisms, which have all evolved over many years to cater for conventional, central-
ized technologies. The security of supply might suffer, and new concepts to ensure a
reliable grid operation are needed.
While the topic has found its way into almost all disciplines in research, its societal
relevance is proven by its high media coverage. During the liberalization of the electricity
market in Germany in the 1990s, newspapers of record primarily discussed the economic
consequences and daily events related to the expected developments. The focus hereby
was on the future of local utility companies as well as on the larger merger and acquisition
activities of the time (e.g. FAZ, 1999a, 2000a,b; ZEIT, 2000). Simultaneously, political
1
Chapter 1. Introduction 2
and economic discussions on the implementation of the European energy exchanges (such
as the EEX in Leipzig, which emerged in 2002 from two precedents founded in 2000)
provided the basis for public discussions with an emphasis on market-design issues (e.g.
FAZ, 1999c; Welt, 1999). The newly to be organized competition on the electricity
market nurtured observations of the development in legislative and industrial processes
(e.g. FAZ, 1999b, 2000a, 2002b,a). Shortly after this, media attention shifted towards
the sustainability of energy generation and the first nuclear phaseout, which had been
promoted from 1998 onwards by the then red-green government (e.g. taz, 2009; SZ,
1999; FAZ, 2003a,c, 2004c, 2005a). Already in those days, the security of supply found
wide interest and concern in the public. On the one hand, due to the planned nuclear
phaseout an upcoming supply gap was perceived. On the other hand, the coming into
force of the German Renewable Energy Act signalized a dramatic change in the energy
mix (e.g. SZ, 2005; FAZ, 2003b, 2004a,b, 2005a, 2006b). Also, other alternatives for
energy generation, such as the construction of new coal power plants with integrated
heat production (combined heat and power, CHP), made it into public discussion. While
much attention was still focused on the daily developments of utility companies, in
the same period there was just as much a fundamental discussion of the generation
technologies and possible ways to a higher share of the so-called renewables (e.g Welt,
2006; FAZ, 2004b, 2005b, 2006a). In later years, political as well as public discussion in
the field of energy shifted towards the topic of climate change and global warming (e.g.
taz, 2005). While rising electricity prices and their consequences for energy-intensive
industries have been scrutinized during the first amendment to the German Renewable
Energy Act, rising electricity prices for private households gained in public interest
shortly afterwards (e.g. Welt, 2009).
In conclusion, one can say that there was not only enthusiasm about the new political and
technological developments, but also critical reviews, especially concerning the financial
burden resulting from the great number of promotion and subsidy schemes as well as
regulation for “green” energy. While some newspapers still express the fascination that
a future with renewable energy can spark, most German newspapers tend to worry
about rising costs for public transport, the affordability of building refurbishments, and
Germany as a location for energy-intensive industries.
With the goal and the reality of an increasing share of (distributed) renewable energy
generation, many of the recent research efforts in the field concern possible ways of
adequately integrating them into the existing energy system or, alternatively, adapt-
ing the existing system to the requirements of this type of energy. Approaches hereby
can be manifold. They are not only influenced by political decisions on many levels
(international, national, regional), but also by the latest developments in the areas of
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electrical and mechanical engineering (one can think of grids, transformers, and tur-
bines), chemistry (batteries), geophysics (geothermal energy) as well as the information
and communication sciences (grid protocols, smart grids/meters). Above all this, there
are resourceful entrepreneurs, who constantly come up with fresh ideas and business
models that shape the energy landscape.
There are two related solution concepts that have found particular attention, namely
microgrids and virtual power plants. A lot of technical issues concerning their installa-
tion have been examined. Some authors consider a multi-agent system that determines
the timing and the extent of power sales or acquisition “jointly”, according to the pa-
rameters set by the system, i.e. the system is controlled using a multi-agent approach.
These agents have similar or opposing interests, which are solved in negotiations (cf.
Dimeas and Hatziargyriou, 2007). However, it is not clear what the negotiations look
like and which rules they follow. One way to organize such negotiations is by introducing
a market. For microgrids or virtual power plants, it can be called a “local” market due
to its scope. When being implemented in a microgrid, it can be limited geographically,
while its application in a virtual power plant would mean a limit in terms of the number
of participants. The concepts of microgrids and virtual power plants are closely related,
because in both cases a target value for energy production needs to be defined. The
main difference is that in a microgrid, this value is determined from an internal opti-
mization, whereas for a virtual power plant, it is given by the sales volume, which results
from external processes. Especially in Europe, the idea of microgrids has been promoted
by islands with decentralized generation equipment that do not have an external grid
connection and, therefore, do not profit from grid balancing mechanisms. In this “is-
landing mode”, microgrids can thus sustain themselves, which has been recognized as
being an advantageous feature also for areas connected to the general grid. In the case
of grid disturbances, such as black-outs, a microgrid can encapsulate itself and remain
stable (cf. Lasseter et al., 2002; Katiraei et al., 2005; Pecas Lopes et al., 2001, also for
solutions that support such operation). Under normal conditions, it can operate as an
open microgrid, i.e. interchanging as much electricity with the grid on the next higher
level as desired. On the other hand, a virtual power plant is the aggregation of a fleet
of generation devices that are operated to behave like a single large power plant. The
main difference is that a virtual power plant is used to export electricity, for example
for trading. Assuming that sufficient generation capacity is available, a microgrid can,
therefore, be transformed into a virtual power plant by adjusting the target value.
This thesis builds upon the idea of a microgrid which connects households with and
without electricity generation equipment and introduces a local reserve energy auction
market, where such self-produced electricity can be traded. For evaluating and analyzing
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the proposed design, a simulation study and two experimental studies have been con-
ducted. In the present chapter, the regulatory background, information on the current
market framework, and some considerations that led to the chosen design of the local
market are presented.
1.1 Perceived need for local energy markets
The need for local energy markets has previously been expressed in a number of articles.
Hvleplund (2006) refers to the situation in Denmark, where wind turbines produce a
lot of renewable, but fluctuating electricity. So far, during windy hours there was no
other option than to sell the immense surplus electricity at low prices to other countries.
While depressing payoffs of wind-farm operators, it can reduce acceptance of further
fluctuating renewable energy in the long-term, which is counterproductive in the strive
for more green energy and for the achievement of the 20-20-20 goals set by the Euro-
pean Commission (20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, 20% increase in energy
efficiency, 20% increase in renewable energy; (European Commission, 2008; a discussion
can be found in e.g. Vasconcelos, 2008). Therefore, the author suggests introducing a
decentralized market system that mirrors the decentralized nature of energy production
and consumption, as opposed to the current centralized market system that mirrors the
conventional centralized production procedure. In a decentralized system, local gener-
ators and consumers should be able to trade directly and without barriers with each
other, thereby solving the issues related to renewable power fluctuations immediately
in their own market. The reduced impact on the grid system and possible delays in
expensive grid expansions are apparent.
Cardell (2007) even goes a step further. Her main objective is to enable the involve-
ment of distributed resources in the power system. Changes in coordination and oper-
ations seem inevitable. Beyond recognizing the need for local markets, she proposes a
price-based mechanism that could serve to coordinate the distributed power generation
facilities. Her design is similar to the traditional load-based demand side management,
where prices are used to trigger a response in load and thereby shave peak load demand.
These time-of-use tariffs have been discussed in the context of the possibilities that a
smart meter can offer upon roll-out (Siderius et al., 2004; Siderius and Dijkstra, 2006).
However, for balancing, extensive data acquisition and processing is needed. This is
used to calculate the price signals necessary to reach energy balance in an orchestrated
way. The mechanism works via determining the market clearing price from the energy
demand or the occurred difference to the balanced state and then sending it as a signal to
the participating generators, which produce the required amount of energy accordingly.
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Lund and Mu¨nster (2006) model the Danish market for the case of increased investments
into wind power. They find that by embedding it in a system of micro-CHP plants, boil-
ers and heat pumps, the supportable share in total power generation can be significantly
increased. Even more interestingly, using this system intelligently to balance supply and
demand, profits can be raised, yielding a total rate of return for the system of several
hundred percent in their study.
The above mentioned studies show that local markets have been perceived as a necessary
institution for a high share of distributed energy generation. So far, a solid mechanism
for such a market as well as an analysis thereof are missing. This thesis aims at filling
that gap by providing both a market design that fulfills the requirements of decentralized
generation and the needs of the human market participants who run the equipment.
1.2 Regulatory framework for local energy supply and use
in Germany
As already mentioned during the discussion of media coverage in the first section, the
German energy market is highly regulated. Although energy market liberalization is
also known as deregulation, this does not mean that the amount of regulations in the
form of laws, acts, and rulings is really decreasing. In some areas, there is direct public
involvement (such as the system usage fee), in other areas, there is indirect involvement
through legislative provisions (such as unbundling), while in yet other areas, the involve-
ment is limited to the usual antitrust efforts that apply to all sectors equally. In the
following, I shall discuss how the current situation has evolved and what possibilities for
the future result from this.
1.2.1 Historic development and current situation
The energy market liberalization in 1998 was meant to be the first step towards an
internal market in electricity, which was agreed upon in the EC directive 96/92/EC
(European Parliament and Council, 1996). To enable the European market, the formerly
regulated markets of each country first needed to introduce a competitive basis. One
of the cornerstones to achieve this has been the unbundling of vertically integrated
undertakings. This means that enterprises engaged in generation cannot also be involved
in distribution or grid operation. Specifically, the directive requires that the management
and accounting for these activities be separate (Articles 7 and 14). The goal of this
separation is to support competition by ensuring non-discriminating network entry, i.e.
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use of the electricity grid. In Germany, the grid usage conditions are determined by
individual negotiations.
These requirements entailed many changes for the German energy sector. Its foundation
is the amendment of theGerman Energy Industry Law (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz EnWG,
1998, 2005)1, a regulatory framework developed that is favorable for establishing local
markets. Especially the introduction of balance groups in 2001 by a working group of
six associations to enable fair competition on the then recently liberalized electricity
market has supported this idea (BDI - Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V.
et al., 2001). The concept of balance groups was transferred to the Electricity Grid
Access Ordinance (Stromnetzzugangsverordnung StromNZV, 2005), which came into
force in July 2005. The law states that within each control area, one or more grid
users need to create balance groups. These can be utilities, industry, traders, and other
entities. Each balance group needs a balance group responsible party who takes care
of balanced drain and injection of electrical current in every quarter of an hour. Grid
operators on every voltage level are obligated to deliver all data concerning billing and
possible reductions in imbalances immediately. The balance group is created by the
transmission grid operator upon request from a balance group responsible party. The
balance groups can be established along one of the three contract modules referring to
the grid, the end users, and trading.
The grid module has as its primary objective the introduction of grid balance groups
for implementing federal regulation (StromNZV, 2005). These special balance groups
are used for managing energy losses due to grid operation and for the transmission of
energy that is fed-in from renewable sources. The most important task in these balance
groups is to capture deviations of actual consumption from forecast consumption with
the help of standardized load profiles.
The end user module regulates the distribution of energy. This way, the balance group
responsible party can distribute energy from his own power plants or contracted power
plants to end users within the control area of the transmission grid operator. He can
also import energy from other balance groups or abroad. Note that this is completely
independent from the grid in the sense of the unbundling regulation and rather refers
to the accounting purposes necessary for distribution.
The trading module enables trading with other balance groups domestically, abroad,
and at the stock exchange.
Beyond the creation of balance groups, the transmission grid operator compensates any
irregularities that may occur. These may, for example, be due to the usual stochastic
1Please note that all laws are cited with the date they came into force. The dates they were agreed
upon can be found in the bibliography.
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imbalances of demand and supply irrespective of schedules or due to malfunctioning of
power plants within a certain balance group. In order to prevent a black-out, the balance
group responsible party receives help from the transmission grid operator. Compensation
takes the form of reserve energy, which is procured centrally via the reserve energy
market. The need to implement such a central market stems from the coming into
force of the second EnWG and the StromNZV in July 2005. With only few guidelines
given in these laws, further regulation has been necessary and falls within the remit
of the Federal Network Agency (“Bundesnetzagentur”). Hereby, Ruling Chamber 6
(“Beschlusskammer 6”) decides upon the details. An overview of the rulings that are
relevant for balance groups or (local) reserve energy markets can be seen in Tables 1.1
and 1.2. These and all other rulings including their attachments can also be found on
the website of the German Federal Network Agency (www.bundesnetzagentur.de).
The most important variables that have been determined are the timing and the proce-
dure of the tendering process, including minimum bid sizes and increments, as well as the
specifications about information to be published before and after the bidding. Besides
the details of the market, also associated issues concerning the forecasting methods, the
usage of reserve energy, the data exchange between the individual parties, and the billing
have been sorted. In particular, the average price of each measuring period is billed to
the balance group responsible party according to usage, which means that everyone pays
the same price per kWh.
From the tables, one can also see the developments that have taken place. Although
a common reserve energy market was already introduced in 2006, it took almost four
more years before all transmission grid operators actually procured their reserve energy
via that market (see Table 1.2, BK6-08-111). Once this had been achieved, the prevail-
ing market rules were adjusted to ease the bidding process, while keeping in mind the
interdependence of the reserve energy markets with other energy markets, such as the
intraday and the day-ahead market.
In a long process involving many stakeholders, the German Federal Network Agency
has worked towards an improvement of the billing procedures for balance groups by
determining in more detail who has to provide which data at what point in time. This
has been a result of the on-going complaints especially from grid users who asked for more
detailed and binding specifications concerning data exchange, deadlines, data formats,
as well as contract-related regulations (see Table 1.1, BK6-07-002).
Since 2012, the balance groups and reserve energy markets seem to be working well and
remain free of complaints. This is at least the conclusion one can draw when looking at
the rulings. In fact, a remarkably large portion of the rulings in 2013 and 2014 concern
problems with grid access, especially for offshore wind farms.
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1.2.2 Identification of regulatory amendment possibilities
The aforementioned balance groups can be seen as the current administrative groundwork
for local energy markets. The idea here is that a balanced group does not need the
services of the transmission grid operator and thereby might be able to save money as
well as help renewable energy sources reach a wider diffusion. This also makes sense in
terms of the cost of learning, as distributed resources are mainly locally operated. This
means that operators, such as city utilities, are re-empowered and given a greater degree
of self-determination.
Although one could argue that the local procurement of reserve energy does not com-
ply with the unbundling regulation, it is actually an expansion of the procurement of
compensation energy for grid losses, which all grid operators with more than 100,000
customers already need to organize for themselves (StromNZV, 2005, §10; BK6-08-006).
From a legislative point of view, only utilities with a similar size should be required to
establish a local market. This also means that the additional administrative burden can
be well estimated, as experience with the operation of compensation energy markets has
already been accumulated. However, this should not suggest that only local utilities are
eligible as local market operators. Other players, such as locally owned energy service
companies, can serve the same purpose.
Recent studies have brought forward similar ideas. Corn et al. (2014), for example,
suggest implementing an internal market in balance groups, where the balance group
responsible party can control producers and consumers of energy to keep his group in
balance. For this purpose, the producers and consumers are assumed to submit flexible
offers that cover a certain period of time during which the cheapest are called whenever
necessary. A related concept is presented in Ridder et al. (2011), who analyze several
business cases to better integrate decentralized energy. They also follow the idea of
clustering consumers and producers who trade their demand and supply first among
themselves and subsequently (if no match can be found) on a higher level market.
The United Kingdom recently has also taken a step in that direction. The Department
of Energy and Climate Change has launched the “Community Energy” strategy2, which
aims for communities to take on more responsibility in energy usage and procurement.
There is a £15 million fund (approximately e19) open for rural communities and a £10
million fund (approximately e12.7) for non-rural communities. Energy projects can
take many forms, such as the installation of equipment for renewable energy, building
insulation, the use of smart technologies, and collective purchases of energy. But most
2https://www.gov.uk/community-energy
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importantly, this strategy is also meant to facilitate local trading of energy, supporting
the ideas delivered in this thesis.
1.3 Markets and other ways to keep the system balanced
The dilemma with electricity from renewables is that it is not always produced when it
is needed. Photovoltaics provide electricity when it is sunny, meaning that other sources
need to be tapped during evening and night hours. Wind turbines produce energy when
it is windy - a weather condition which cannot reliably be predicted until one or two days
ahead - and therefore without balancing mechanisms, are not useful as a main energy
source. Altogether, productivity of many renewable energy sources depends on external
conditions, cannot be controlled for and, therefore, needs compensation mechanisms.
1.3.1 Options to balance fluctuations
One possibility would be the extensive use of storage. Scenarios include load management
at the generation site or within the grid, load shaving at the consumers’ sites, as well as
frequency control and integration of renewables. In the course of an enhanced diffusion
of electric vehicles with large storage batteries, flexible storage could be handled in a
distributed way and could offer an additional advantage of electric fleets (Raths et al.,
2013). For stand-alone applications, however, due to the currently high investment costs
for such batteries, only the employment as primary reserve energy is profitable, at least
at the current price level for (reserve) energy (e.g. Ohler and Chartouni, 2007). Lund
et al. (2012) even completely oppose the use of electrical storage due to economic reasons
and rather promote the application of system solutions including several technologies
that can adjust their production or consumption.
Hydropower would be an optimal option, but capacities in Germany are not sufficient
for this purpose and it is uncertain in how far they can be extended, mainly in terms of
geographical possibilities, but also in terms of social acceptance (cf. debates at Rursee,
North-Rhine Westphalia, rettet-den-rursee.de). However, a promising study has been
conducted in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. While considering ecological, technical, and eco-
nomic constraints, it has been found that the existing 68 MW can be extended by
another 25 to 32 MW. On the one hand, this includes retrofitting existing plants and,
on the other hand, building new plants at suitable sites (Heimerl et al., 2010). The
main potential is, however, in small hydro power plants, which are also subsidized by
the Renewable Energy Act.
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1.3.2 Market design of the general reserve energy market
Before examining the possible design of a local market, it is useful to understand how the
superordinate reserve energy market works. Since all analyses in this thesis have been
developed and conducted within the context of the German legislation, and therefore,
the German reserve energy market, this section only deals with the German design. It
should be noted though that all European markets have similar properties and that all
need to comply with the regulation put forward by the Union for the Co-ordination of
Transmission of Electricity (2004).
The general reserve market uses a multi-unit auction design with discriminatory pricing.
This means that in each separate auction, several units of the same (identical) good are
procured and remunerated with varying prices. Each bidder submits a vector of bids,
stating his willingness to supply a certain amount of energy at a certain price. Payment
occurs according to the individual bid (pay-as-bid rule). The unique design in the
German market is that two bids are submitted, one stating the energy price and one
stating the capacity price. Winning bidders are determined according to a merit order
rule. They are, thus, sorted in decreasing order of their capacity bids until the required
amount of capacity is procured. Once their services are needed, they are called up in
decreasing order of their energy bid. This bears some opportunity for strategic bidding,
as a relatively low capacity bid combined with a high energy bid can bring income
without the need to actually deliver, i.e. without incurring other costs than opportunity
costs for withholding capacity. More information on this issue can be found on the joint
website of the Transmission Grid Operators (www.regelleistung.net) and in Chapter 2.
Fortunately, the number of suppliers participating in the markets rose. As of July
2014, twenty suppliers completed the prequalification process for primary reserve, 27 for
secondary reserve, and 38 for minute reserve. The situation was much denser in the past,
with evidence that the four big German players (E.ON, RWE, EnBW, and Vattenfall)
were able to exert their market power in the minute reserve market. Growitsch et al.
(2010) found that these four dominate the market in all products (different time slots,
positive and negative reserve) with a combined market share of 69% to 94%, respectively.
The then only 24 fringe suppliers sharing a quarter of the revenues of the entire market
had no means to exert market power. An indication for the fact that the four big players
could abuse their position has been found in the frequency with which they gained higher
revenues than the fringe players. Due to a change in the data policy, which prohibits
the publication of information that can be used to trace back the identity of the bidders,
there are no recent studies available on this issue.
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A general criticism of the reserve energy market is that entry barriers are high, which
induces low levels of liquidity in the markets. Before 2007, all transmission grid opera-
tors procured their own reserve energy, each using a separate platform. This made the
markets nontransparent and prone to collusion as well as other strategic behavior, for
example resulting from different market closing times (cf. Swider and Weber, 2003). Al-
though the situation has improved since then, the qualification procedure is still deemed
to be complicated, taking too much time and therefore being very costly.
1.3.3 Properties of local energy markets
To date, the local energy market is a theoretical construct. Nevertheless, it has some
definite characteristics that result from the specific technologies and their users. The
predominant attribute is the involvement of households, i.e. end customers without
much expertise in the field of energy or trading. Rules need to be very clear-cut and
understandable to create something comparable to an “energy-eBay”.
The participants can be described as “prosumers”, which is a combination of producer
and consumer. The term was coined by Toffler (1980), who predicts a sharp decrease
in importance of the markets as we know them. A reason for this is that people are
no longer willing to pay for products and services which they can easily produce them-
selves with or without guidance. Ritzer and Jurgenson (2010) claim that this is not a
recent phenomenon, but had started to develop in the 1950s and 1960s with the rise of
shopping malls and fast-food restaurants. Here, the consumer is actively involved in the
production process by taking over certain tasks, such as filling up his glass with a soft
drink. This is, of course, a very early and different form of what we are observing today.
Since the start of Web 2.0, prosumption has experienced a great spurt. Prosumers have
become more independent from producers - who used to be required for the necessary
infrastructure - and are beginning to see themselves on the same level.
Related concepts are discussed in Sauter and Watson (2007). They describe the fact
that consumers also produce energy as “co-construction”, “co-production”, and “co-
provision”. The latter term was also coined during the 1980s, when the American
government had to sharply cut back fiscal spending. With an upcoming discussion
about privatization, it became clear that several tasks and services that had formerly
been carried out by governmental agencies now had to be delivered by individuals or
groups of citizens in the sense of co-provision or co-production (Ferris, 1984; Mattson,
1986; Brudney, 1987). Humphreys and Grayson (2008) add “co-creation” to the list
and argue that there is potential for a fundamental change in the organization of the
economy, much along the lines of Toffler (1980), but with a critical view on capitalism.
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There are also technically-oriented definitions of the “prosumer”. Kanchev et al. (2011)
describe a prosumer as a home application that produces power during some hours of
the day and consumes power during others. The home application then consists of a
number of individual entities, such as solar panels, storage systems, and controllable
loads. While Karnouskos (2011) sees the residential prosumer as the most important
stakeholder in a smart grid and related markets, he also points out the commercial
prosumer. According to his definition, these are large facilities, such as factories, that
both produce and consume energy. Once a local energy market is operational, these
larger players can be allocated to one of the markets for collaboration.
The market described in this thesis is defined by a possibly small number of participants,
which can be expected to grow in the case of profitability, with a natural limit in the
size of the balance group. This becomes even more prevalent if investment costs can
be recouped quickly. However, the market’s appeal also depends on the development of
household energy prices, as it is certainly not profitable to use the equipment for reserve
energy only. The main use should remain the self-supply of energy for the individual
household. Legislation and incentive programs can also have a great influence. They
make investment more attractive by offering advantageous financing conditions and often
direct remuneration. In 2009, the self-consumption rule was introduced to the German
Renewable Energy Act (EEG, 2009, §33, 2). This made externally purchased energy
non-competitive, and also rendered storage more attractive. Since 2012, this special
compensation is no longer available, because grid parity of solar power has been reached,
and PV owners would otherwise be paid to consume energy (EEG, 2012). Instead, the
EEG 2012 introduced the market premium scheme in §33g, which is meant to incentivize
prosumers to sell their self-produced energy directly to a third party, for example at the
energy exchange (EEX) or in a local market. Since August 2014, the feed-in tariffs
have been drastically cut back (EEG, 2014), such that one should start thinking about
new ways to incentivize investments in distributed renewable energy generation. A
local market that offers some remuneration for self-produced energy might be a suitable
instrument. Beyond the financial incentive, the political support inherent in such a
market (or any other support mechanism) enhances a positive attitude towards specific
technologies, making their adoption more likely.
Entry barriers should be constructed to be low, especially when compared to the super-
ordinate reserve energy market. This is given by short lines of communication, which
ensure that the qualification procedure will take less time and be less complicated. In
fact, the balance group responsible party could develop standard procedures that are
easy to check on a supra-regional basis. As reserve providers are thought to be mainly
private households, short catalogs could mention technologies and manufacturers that
are generally eligible for balancing. In some cases, additional information technology
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might be needed to fulfill communication needs, especially for calling the reserve energy
when needed. This can be solved by providing a list of standard equipment that needs
to be installed before market participation can be allowed. With proceeding roll-out of
smart meters, some of the information and communication needs can be readily provided
with a minor software update. Additionally, a business case could develop for contract-
ing or at least retailing equipment, especially when the balance group responsible party
is a utility having considerable experience in customer support and service.
Substitutes for the locally procured reserve energy are the reserves from the superor-
dinate reserve energy market. As these are expected to be more expensive, they can
be disregarded in the analysis. Should they become competitive, it might be of eco-
logical interest to give priority to distributed resources by law. This could be done in
an amendment to the existing law for feed-in of energy from renewable resources, which
would then need to be expanded to reserve energy (on this issue, cf. Chapter 2, modeling
part). Although significant interdependencies can be expected to arise between the lo-
cal reserve energy market (especially upon a widespread roll-out) and the superordinate
reserve energy market, these impacts are not part of the current analysis. Their evalu-
ation requires a joint model of the superordinate market and the local market, which is
beyond the interest and the scope of this thesis, as it also needs to incorporate strategic
behavior and market positioning issues of energy companies. So far, these companies
have not played a significant role in the analysis of a suitable local market for household
producers.
1.3.4 Auction design for a local market
While the auction design for our particular market is explained at length in Chapters
2 and 4, some general issues and considerations leading to the choices made should be
already introduced here.
For multi-unit or divisible good auctions, there exist multiple pricing mechanisms, which
all have their particular advantages and disadvantages. The most common ones are
uniform and discriminatory pricing. While bidders receive exactly what they bid under
discriminatory pricing, uniform pricing ensures that most receive a higher payment than
what they bid. The disadvantages are apparent, however: Bidding stops being cost-
revealing, which means that not necessarily the least cost-intensive and most efficient
plants win the auction. In the context of ameliorating the incentive situation for small-
scale power production within households, this might be just a minor drawback.
In order to generate some profit for the suppliers on the one hand, but induce them to
bid sincerely on the other hand, the Vickrey auction design has been proposed. For the
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multi-unit case, this means that the bidder is paid the last bids that would have been
accepted if he had not taken part in the auction (Berninghaus et al., 2006). This is
often described as the lowest losing bid(s), which is not correct, as this is not supposed
to be a unit-price auction with a pay-out table. An alternative with similar properties is
the Ausubel auction (Ausubel, 2004). However, both auction designs might not be very
well understood. Even for the relatively straightforward second-price auction, it has
been found that bidders do not bid according to their (theoretically) dominant strategy,
because it is too difficult for them to see what this strategy might be (Kagel and Levin,
1993). In addition, being paid a price that differs with a non-constant value from the
amount bid, even if this value is positive, might lead to distrust against the bidding
system and a lower rate of acceptance impacting the participation in reserve provision.
Drawing together the evidence, we find that the optimal auction would be a discrim-
inatory first-price auction. In comparison to the uniform-price auction design it also
has the advantage of reducing the possibility of collusion, as price manipulation can be
more easily detected. For further discussion of the pricing rules, please also consult the
literature review in Chapter 2.
In the superordinate reserve energy procurement auctions, bidders do not only bid with
a certain amount of capacity, but also with two types of prices. These are used to
remunerate the opportunity cost of reserving capacity on the one hand and, in the
case of being called up, to remunerate the cost of producing energy. In this case, the
opportunity cost is just the cost of not selling energy somewhere else for sure (for example
at the spot market) minus the cost of production plus the cost of keeping the plant on
standby to be quickly operational when the reserve is actually needed.
A household has a similar cost structure except that it would not necessarily sell the
energy on a different market, but might use it itself. The opportunity cost is thus de-
termined by the availability of energy or the amount of discomfort a household might
experience when giving up some of the energy that was meant to be used within the
household. The second component differs with the technology in use, but also with its
respective efficiency. For battery storage systems, this would be wear-out cost and, if
connected to a distributed generation device in the same household, energy production
cost from this device, otherwise procurement cost of external energy to be stored. Be-
yond this, the battery can also be used for primary reserve, which is the most expensive
reserve category. Considerable gains can, thus, be expected in this form of application.
For a CHP unit, wear-out costs, as well as maintenance cost, also applies, while energy
production cost is determined from fuel prices. The size of the CHP unit is typically
about 1 kW electrical capacity.
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Using a PV system for reserve energy entails some risk, as energy production at a
particular point in time is uncertain. To prevent consequences for the system, high
penalties should apply for violating the reserve contract. This means that a risk-averse
PV owner should only participate in the market when he also possesses a storage system.
The bid for power from such a system would, therefore, encompass not only the usual
wear-out and maintenance costs, but also a risk premium in case the battery needs to
be used, as battery power is more expensive. A risk-neutral PV owner can bid without
a risk premium when weather forecasts are favorable. A very important difference when
trying to determine the efficient market outcome is that it is not necessary or required
to find those units that incur the lowest generating costs, but to find those bidders to
whom it is the least costly to provide energy at a certain point in time. The objective is,
thus, not to save as much fuel as possible, but to support some level of comfort, which
is valued very highly by consumers (cf. Siderius and Dijkstra, 2006). The ecological
impact does not suffer from this, as all technologies in use are energy-efficient and/or
renewable, and are to be supported by their additional use as reserve energy providers.
Furthermore, the technologies that can be and are applied in households have very
unequal cost structures. It might, therefore, be useful to have separate auctions for
each technology in order to foster fair competition. The downside is, of course, that the
already low expected number of participants drops even further. However, if the bidding
process is not adjusted to the individual technology, returns might not cover costs any
longer, let alone give an appropriate profit premium. Comparing this to the current
incentive scheme for solar panels in the Renewable Energy Act, it can be expected to
be well-received by households. This is also supported by the survey that we did after
conducting the experiments (results can be found in Chapter 5).
Also, the policy of information disclosure can have a significant impact on the efficiency
and effectiveness of a market. For the local reserve energy market, a similar approach
as for the grid loss energy market can be recommended.
Concluding, the general goal of this thesis is to find the optimal auction design for a local
reserve energy market. This can be broken down into more specific research questions
on the respective impacts of
• the amount of feedback information,
• the amount of competition,
• and the number of bids that can be submitted
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on the auction outcome and on the bidding behavior. As mentioned before, the focus
is always on small prosumers, i.e. private households with their own generation equip-
ment, and the research questions are to be answered in the context of their specific
characteristics.
1.4 Impact on parties involved
The introduction of local markets would have important consequences for several stake-
holders. The main stakeholders are the government, private households, the transmission
grid operators, the distribution grid operators, and utilities or energy service companies.
The government plays a crucial role in establishing the market, determining its condi-
tions, and mediating the interactions. If the market works fine, it might make sense
to reduce the subsidies to rely more and more on competitive forces. However, it is
necessary to always control for the financial reliability that consumers experience with
the set-up. If this cannot be achieved with a pure market mechanism, some form of
intervention might be required.
In general, however, local energy markets are a way to empower consumers and to make
household investments in distributed generation more attractive. Economic benefits
should not be overstated, though. Selling reserve energy does not mean great fortunes
can be earned. It is only meant to support the maintenance of a device that has already
been bought and to make an investment in such a device more attractive upfront by
offering different, additional uses.
For balance group responsible parties, the biggest change would happen. Of course, it
is much easier to have reserve energy procured by a third party. Nevertheless, there
might be some real economic benefits in procuring it locally. So far, utilities and energy
service companies were only able to offer contracting models for generation equipment,
with which they could participate in the superordinate reserve energy markets. Also,
even here application has been very limited and mainly been available for industrial
consumers, such as hospitals3. This is because investment costs are still very high and
each customer needs to undergo an individual application procedure. With a general
framework and easy-to-use catalogs, as presented above, these costs can be significantly
reduced.
Beyond their activities as balance group responsible parties in their grid subsidiaries,
which is also the traditional core business for utilities, the operation of district heating
3cf. Stadtwerke Du¨sseldorf, program for emergency units “Notstrom ef-
fizient”, more information can be found on their website: http://www.swd-
ag.de/geschaeftskunden/contracting/contracting produkte/minutenreserve.php
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grids and heat supply as well as supply of electricity and gas are likely to be affected.
This is due to the expected growth in diffusion of distributed generation, which implies
extended home energy production. Their role as energy suppliers could be reduced to
providing electricity for heat pumps and gas for combined heat and power generators
only. Another traditional field of activity is customer support, service, and advice. As
demand for assistance in finding the right combination of energy saving measures and
distributed generation possibilities or arrangements can be expected, this would also be
an area of growth for utilities.
Focusing on the role as distribution grid operator only, they become decisive in local
markets. As balance group responsible parties, they gain from not calling on control
energy from the superordinate market, which is expensive. Furthermore, they need to
send the signal for starting production of reserve energy. The communication between
the generation devices and the auctioning process could be done by the grid operator
himself or by an independent service company, subcontracted to the grid operator, much
like the way metering is done nowadays.
The responsibility and the trade volume that are taken over by balance groups are at
the same time subtracted from the superordinated reserve energy market. This means
that transmission grid operators lose part of their influence. When local markets are
used to counterbalance wind power parks, as suggested by Lund and Mu¨nster (2006),
grid expansions might be reduced, which further diminishes the role transmission grid
operators play in the energy system.
1.5 Contributions
In this doctoral thesis, a local market for reserve energy is proposed and evaluated. It can
complement the existing market and help to better integrate decentralized generation.
Hereby, the general idea of a multi-agent system persists, i.e. there are independent
agents that try to maximize their individual payoffs. Germany, which has a leading
position in the advancement of renewable energy, seems to be an appropriate model
setting. In the following chapters, all of which are based on journal articles that have
already been either published or submitted for review, distinct aspects of a local mar-
ket are considered. Using the simulation study and two laboratory experiments, the
optimal amount of information provision and the optimal number of bids have been
analyzed. The underlying auction mechanism embraces the specific characteristics of a
small market as well as the needs of household-producers, a group that is also known as
prosumers.
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The first paper, “An Auction Mechanism for Local Reserve Energy Markets”, explains
the basic theoretical framework and the underlying design choices made. The focus
is hereby on creating a market that is accessible and easy to understand for private
households. Using a simple agent-based simulation program, the theoretical predictions
of the proposed market are evaluated. The contribution of this paper is therefore twofold.
On the one hand, it adds to the theoretical literature on energy market design by offering
an auction design that takes into account a number of features specific to energy as a good
and the prosumer as a market participant. On the other hand, it adds to the literature
on agent-based energy market simulation, which has been dominated by technically-
driven simulation platforms that model generation units in detail, but lack a sound
economic basis. In this paper, the opposite approach has been taken by modeling the
market and the behavior of the bidders in detail, but disregarding technological features
of the equipment in use. Bidders can submit partially differentiable bid functions and
react to the given information by adjusting this function. The findings suggest that the
lack of information has a long-term effect on the market. With limited information, the
convergence to the cost level not only takes longer, but also ceases on a higher price
level. This price is then sustained indefinitely.
The effect of information is further addressed in the second paper, “The Role of Infor-
mation Feedback in Local Reserve Energy Auction Markets”. Beyond the direct effect
on prices, more insight is given on the issue of learning in repeated auctions. There
already exist a number of theoretical and experimental studies in this field, but their
application has so far been limited to single-unit first price auctions. This paper adds to
the literature by dealing with this topic in the context of divisible good auctions. Using
existing theories, most of the bidding behavior can be accurately predicted. However,
the learning direction theory can only be partially confirmed for the divisible good auc-
tion. It offers good insights into the general movements of bids, but there seem to be
other forces or strategies at work as well. At least with information displayed, behavior
can also be explained by signaling efforts and anchoring on published prices. Despite the
substantial amount of rounds and even with extensive feedback, no signs of successful
collusion can be detected.
While building upon the same idea and the same basic theoretical framework, the third
paper, “Multiple vs. Single Bids in Reserve Energy Auctions: An Experimental Analy-
sis”, is broader in scope and derives results that are in principle applicable to all divisible
good auctions. The theoretical framework is adapted in such a way that it allows for
discrete bids. This results not only from its contribution to the auction literature, but
also from the observation that in most real-world auctions rules often require minimum
bid sizes. Even in an experimental setting, the submission of continuous bid functions is
hardly possible. Given the complexity of deriving the necessary parameters, participants
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cannot be expected to adjust entire bidding functions in a way to increase their pay-offs.
When decisions cannot be properly linked to outcomes, an experiment risks producing
unreliable results, which do not help to give insights into theories or to understand hu-
man behavior. Theoretical considerations suggest that bidders should submit only one
bid to maximize their profit, also given the opportunity of submitting multiple bids.
Nevertheless, in most cases, bidders take the opportunity and submit two non-identical
bids. Markets which allow multiple bids are less volatile, but offer lower profits for
bidders.
The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• modeling and analysis of an innovative local reserve energy market
• economically motivated agent-based energy market simulation
• experimental evaluation of the effect of the number of discrete bids on the auction
outcome
• experimental confirmation of the learning direction theory in the context of divis-
ible good auctions
• identification of the role of signaling and anchoring in the same context
1.6 Limitations
The major limitation lies in the auction design itself. It needs to be kept simple to be
easily conveyable to non-expert consumers. Therefore, there might be room for welfare-
enhancement through adjusting the process. Moreover, there is political pressure to
extend the district heating network in Germany. The envisaged goal is a coverage of 60%
of households. This leaves only 40% as possible locations for micro-CHP, because the
heating demand of all other households would be fulfilled. Micro-CHP is important for
balancing, because the engines can be turned on whenever necessary. From an ecological
point of view, there is not necessarily a difference: District heating often uses the heat
from large CHP plants. Furthermore, it should be obvious that a strong preference for
local generation might be welfare distorting. This is because competition can only occur
within very limited frames, which means that since it is not necessarily the plant with
the lowest overall cost producing energy, this decreases global efficiency. On the other
hand, with large power plants there are also economies of scale, which are foregone when
switching to smaller, decentralized generation plants.
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A further limitation may be found in the way the experiments were conducted. Par-
ticipants were mainly students, who might not represent the attitudes and preferences
of the actual market participants, i.e. homeowners with decentralized generation equip-
ment. It is therefore possible that these would have reacted differently (this issue is
also discussed in Chapter 5). In general, an experiment can only be used to examine
certain features of a market. A real-world implementation of the proposed auction might
therefore produce different results and encounter issues not thought of before.
These limitations can also be understood as further scope for research in several disci-
plines. With empirical models, the diffusion of the technologies used for local generation
and the acceptance of homeowners can be analyzed. This can be extended by an es-
timation of the chances for a local market and the possible number of participants in
different regions. Hereby, also the effects of restrictions due to district heating can be
evaluated. In a simulation using standard or historic load profiles and the feed-in of
the (potential) participants in a region, it can be evaluated whether there is a sufficient
match of demand and supply. In terms of the necessary infrastructure to implement a
local market in a specific area, much can be learned from recent smart grid efforts. It
would therefore be interesting to put the local market to practice in a field test. In this
context, communication protocols and other safety critical aspects can be examined.
While doing so, it is also important to protect the data privacy of the participants.
1.7 Structure of the dissertation
In the following, three essays are presented, each of which has either been published by
or submitted for review by high quality journals.
Chapter 2 is based on a paper published in 2013 in Decision Support Systems, 56:1,
168-179. It describes the auction design in more detail and tests it in an agent-based
simulation. This way, several degrees of information can be investigated for many bidders
over a longer period of time. I find that when no information is provided, the market
outcome remains on a higher level indefinitely. To further examine the validity of this
finding and to find out how human bidders react to the proposed design, I conducted
several experiments.
Chapter 3 is based on a paper published in the FCNWorking Paper Series (FCN Working
Paper No. 15/2013, revised May 2014 ). It deals with the same question as Chapter 2,
i.e. how information feedback makes a difference, but with human bidders instead of
simulated agents.
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A more fundamental design question is answered in Chapter 4, which evaluates the
impact of allowing bidders to submit one or two bids in a divisible good auction. The
chapter is based on a paper published in the FCN Working Paper Series (FCN Working
Paper No. 8/2013, revised November 2013 ).
Chapter 5 provides some insights into socio-demographic differences in bidding and
evaluates the chances of a local market in a real-world setting.
Please note that some of the chapters have individual appendices, which are referred to
in the chapter and might be necessary for understanding some of the details within that
specific chapter. At the end of this thesis, there is also a general Appendix. It contains
the material used for conducting the experiments, i.e. both versions of the instructions
and the questionnaire. These are not essential for understanding the individual chapters,
but should be provided for completeness.

Chapter 2
An Auction Design for Local
Reserve Energy Markets
Abstract
In this paper we develop an auction mechanism that is designed for a local energy market.
It aims to enable regionally or virtually restricted trading of ancillary services, which
enhances the position of the balance group responsible party beyond that of simple ac-
counting. Furthermore, it makes local market participants somewhat more independent
from the transmission grid operator, but at the same time provides incentives for in-
vestments in distributed generation technologies. A wider spread of these technologies
can help to save CO2 emissions, while at the same time a part of them can also be used
to counter the fluctuations of energy from volatile renewable sources, such as wind and
solar power. Because of their relatively high margins and small share in total produc-
tion, ancillary services are well-suited for a remuneration scheme. Participants in the
auction are, thus, private households, which impose specific design characteristics on
the auction. Most importantly, it needs to be transparent and easy to understand, as
homeowners will typically not have the insights of a professional trader as well as lack a
similar position and motivation. Also, the confinement to a single balance group, i.e. a
local market, means that especially in the beginning of the trading only a small number
of bidders can be expected. Therefore, competition will initially be limited, so that the
auction design needs to be adapted accordingly. In order to test the performance of
the proposed auction market design under varying information policies, a simple agent-
based simulation program has been developed. We find that the theoretical predictions
hold and that competition quickly leads to price convergence.
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2.1 Introduction
In recent years ancillary services in electricity markets and especially such providing
reserve energy have received increasing attention. This is due to several facts. First
of all, the increase of the share of unpredictably fluctuating renewable energy in total
energy production has led to a higher demand for reserve capacities to buffer those
fluctuations. Secondly, new technological and societal developments have started to
offer new ways of meeting this demand. Smaller and larger consumers can offer some of
their loads and capacities to external control or even offer load adjustments at certain
times of the day themselves. They can further participate in virtual power plants (VPPs)
to sell power produced in large numbers of small-scale, distributed home devices, such
as micro combined-heat-and-power (CHP) plants or photovoltaics. So far, this has been
limited to the trade of real power. Balancing energy market mechanisms have only been
examined in pilot projects with microgrids, i.e. only under these special circumstances
has household energy been used as reserve energy.
The purpose of this paper is to show how in current circumstances decentralized gener-
ation can be used beneficially for a regional energy system with an appropriate auction
design. In particular, this paper aims at determining a valid auction mechanism that
suits a local reserve energy market with all its special needs and characteristics, as dis-
cussed below. Once this mechanism is defined, it needs to be evaluated as to how bidders
in such a market behave over time. The details with respect to how this mechanism can
eventually be implemented optimally are side issues and will, therefore, only be treated
briefly.
Keeping in mind the characteristics of bidders in a local energy auction, the problem
that needs to be solved is, thus, to find an adequate and reliable remuneration for each
provider of reserve capacity and energy. At the same time, the auction mechanism
needs to be as simple and easily understandable as possible in order not to turn down
potential participants, while reducing opportunities for strategic behavior to a minimum.
Moreover, transaction costs in a market with such small quantities need to be low in order
to leave room for at least a minimal profit. The analysis of an auction for such a matter
entails many parts. Electricity auctions are a specific type of auction because the good
is perfectly divisible and non-storable, which means transactions need to happen in real
time or at least at a predefined point of time in the future. This type of auction can be
compared to the treasury auction, which has received considerable scientific attention in
the past. So far, game-theoretic analyses of reserve auctions with the properties needed
in a local market are very limited.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2.2, the literature on
theoretical analysis, electricity auctions, and reserve energy auctions is reviewed. In
Section 2.3, the market is briefly described as a preparation of the auction model, which
is explained in the same section. It is presented for both the asymmetric and the sym-
metric case and solved accordingly. Section 2.4 introduces the simulation and theoretical
considerations of the strategies implemented, and the results of the simulation. Section
2.5 explains the technical backgrounds of the simulations well as the results obtained.
Section 2.6 provides a conclusion and some suggestions for future research.
2.2 Literature review
The liberalization of the electricity sector has fueled the desire to analyze markets and
the behavior of market participants. Due to the complex nature of the good itself, each
individual market and the interaction of several markets for different energy products
have set strong limitations on analytical methods. Therefore, simulations have very
quickly gained acceptance in this field.
Many different kinds of electricity market models are possible. Ventosa et al. (2005) clas-
sify them as optimization models, equilibrium models, and simulation models, whereby
simulation models can either be derived from equilibrium models or formulated as agent-
based models. The main difference between these two is the static nature of the approach
in the first case and the dynamic approach in the second. Sensfuß et al. (2007) categorize
these agent-based models as tools to analyze market power and market design, agent
decisions and learning, and the interdependence of short-term and long-term decisions.
At least for wholesale electricity markets, Weidlich and Veit (2008) offer a very differ-
ent way of distinguishing agent-based models, namely with regard to their algorithms.
According to the authors, these may be model-based adaptation algorithms, genetic
algorithms, and algorithms applying the reinforcement learning approach by Erev and
Roth (1998).
From an economic point of view, the major problem with most of the recent electricity
market modeling is the overemphasis on detailed modeling of generation equipment
(Contreras et al., 2001; Martini et al., 2001) or individual agents representing several
interest groups (Praca et al., 2003; Vale et al., 2009), whereas a sound market model
has rarely been analyzed. Two exceptions are the analysis of Wilson’s design (1997) by
Otero-Novas et al. (2000) and the comparison of uniform-price to discriminatory-price
auctions by Bower and Bunn (2001).
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The remaining part of this section is used to review the literature on auction design in
general and for our local market in particular. Especially research on treasury auctions
and its accommodation of a small number of bidders or diverse technologies, as well as
the literature on electricity and ancillary services auctions is of interest.
From a theoretical point of view, a reserve energy auction is a multi-unit (or share auc-
tion, i.e. an auction of a divisible good, with equivalent characteristics; Wilson, 1979) as
well as a multi-part auction. In the multi-unit part it resembles a treasury auction, which
is an auction of a divisible good. A very important topic in this field is whether uni-
form pricing or discriminatory pricing, whereof the Ausubel auction (Ausubel, 2004) is
treated as a special case, yields more favorable outcomes. A downside of uniform pricing
is that bidders have an incentive to understate their demand for the second and following
units in order to win those at lower prices in case of a demand auction. Transferred to
a procurement auction like the one at hand, this means that bidders understate their
supply, thereby creating an artificial scarcity, and are able to extract price premiums
(Ausubel and Cramton, 2002; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1998). Back and Zender
(1993) describe this mechanism as “collusive”, meaning that each bidder colludes with
himself while trying to maximize his profit. Even more important is that this does not
change with the number of bidders, i.e. no real competition may emerge. Discrimina-
tory pricing does not exhibit these downsides, but helps to limit market power (Hudson,
2000), which is especially prevalent in local markets. A disadvantage, however, is that
revenues for the auctioneer are generally lower in discriminatory auctions (Wang and
Zender, 2007). Put differently, one could say that “competition needs to be bought with
higher prices” (i.e. bids). Furthermore, Rassenti et al. (2003) find that price volatility
is reduced in discriminatory price auctions, which is an important feature for markets
with household participation, as fluctuating prices can easily alienate this kind of par-
ticipant and thereby reduce participation rates. Haghighat et al. (2008), however, find
no differences between the two auction formats under imperfect competition, i.e., for
example, when bidders can exercise market power or are able to collude.
The model primarily meant for treasury auctions in Wang and Zender (2007) represents,
in principle, a situation very similar to the one at hand. Besides simply equating demand
and supply, the authors also allow for non-competitive bids, which reduce the quantity
available. The size of this reduction, however, is not endogenous but random. Further-
more, their model uses common values with private signals, which is very straightforward
for financial goods that are acquired in the hope that they will increase in value, de-
termined by subsequent trading, which affects all holders of such items equally in a
common market. This is very different for an energy auction, which comprises several
differentiated units and technologies and, therefore, exhibits private values, or rather
cost.
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Burke and Auslander (2009) specifically consider a residential electricity auction. While
the design is directed at acquiring electricity by residential bidders and should, therefore,
entail consumer behavior, it needs only one bid, composed of the maximum quantity
desired and the maximum price to be paid. The mechanism then determines how much
each bidder can obtain and what price he will need to pay. This is done by using uniform
pricing and soft budget constraints, meaning that allocated quantities are reduced for
increased prices, but the overall amount being paid remains the same.
Chao and Wilson (2002) suggest an auction design with a robust incentive mechanism.
Similar to the design currently in use, they require two bids, one for capacity and the
other for energy. The capacity bids are used to construct a merit order in which the
units are called. Upon being called, they are remunerated with the real-time spot price,
which is thus outside their range of influence. As this seems to be a promising approach
to limiting gaming in the auction process, the basic idea of independence between energy
price and bid will be followed in the model presented in Section 2.3.
Swider and Weber (2007) analyze the bidding behavior in the German minute reserve
auction market, using a decision-theoretical framework. They are among the first to
analyze the bidding behavior in the actual market as it occurs in reality. In particular,
they address the difficulty of defining a probability density function for the price and
thereby the expected price itself, by deriving it from historic time series. However, their
investigation can only be applied to a limited extent to a local market, as they look at
the behavior of one individual bidder and describe the rest of the market by a probability
function. In a small market, this generalization cannot be justified due to the lack of
statistical validity.
Another approach with a similar goal is presented in the work by Block et al. (2007).
They describe a scenario of a microgrid where households can act as energy consumers
and producers in an alternating fashion. For this purpose, they introduce a combinatorial
double auction. While it is efficient and welfare-maximizing in theory, they do not
examine possible gaming strategies or cooperation inherent in the auction design that
the bidders might pursue. Also, it is not sensible to use this design in situations with
only one buyer.
Hao (2000) focuses on simple electricity auctions. While his design allows the usage of
probabilities of other bidders bidding less or more, in our case it is too simple to be
applied, as it uses fixed MWh blocks combined with a single price bid. The auction is
then cleared at the price of the last accepted bid. As concluded in the paper itself, this
leads to untruthful bidding and overstatement of costs.
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Bernard et al. (1998) compare the outcomes of several uniform auction designs with
varying numbers of bidders. Similar to the theoretical result derived in our paper later
on, they find empirical evidence for growing supply reduction with growing group sizes.
Unfortunately, their design does not allow the drawing of final conclusions from this
phenomenon, as it could also be a result of the information given to bidders, namely that
not all of their capacity will be used under all circumstances. The auction form chosen
was apparently less significant, which hints at the fact that it might be transferable to
other forms than those examined by the authors, including pay-as-bid auctions.
However, none of the work presented deals with small, local markets. Therefore, this
paper can be seen as an extension to Chao and Wilson’s design (2002), but with discrimi-
natory pricing instead of uniform pricing and allowing for endogenous demand reduction
of the central buyer. From a mechanism design point of view, our work most closely
relates to Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender (2007), who were inspired by
the treasury auctions. From the authors cited here, they are the only ones considering
continuous bidding functions, while all others focus on discrete bids. In both papers,
they chose a theoretical approach, such that their reflections on bidding behavior in
discriminatory price auctions give important insights into expected outcomes in our lo-
cal market. The uniqueness of our auction design lies more within the application and
the adjustment to the local energy market. Furthermore, the approach of using historic
prices in the simulation is inspired by Swider and Weber (2007), with bidders adjusting
their strategies accordingly. The market and the auction design are presented in the
following section. For a better overview of the auction designs examined in previous
studies, a table has been produced with a selection of the cited literature. It can be
found in the Appendix to this chapter, Part A.
2.3 Auction design
2.3.1 Getting to know the market
In an electricity grid it is paramount to always have exactly as much power input as
consumption. If this is not sustained, blackouts or other major distortions will occur.
While commercial energy providers do their best to forecast the demand of the consumers
they supply, it can never be perfectly predicted. At the same time, supply from most
renewable energy sources (such as wind and solar power) as well as the possibility of
power plant outages contributes to unforeseen fluctuations in the power grid. This is the
reason why reserve energy for balancing purposes is such a crucial element of the energy
system. Most countries have a regime distinguishing between several qualities of reserve
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energy (cf. Singh, 1999, for an extensive discussion of the ancillary services market in
California). They are activated in hierarchical order in different degrees of automation,
after different time spans, and depending on whether there is an energy shortage or
surplus. This poses corresponding requirements on the availability of reserve energy and
technological infrastructure. In a local market, we assume that the different kinds of
reserve energy can all be met by using different types of technologies. For the highest
quality batteries seem appropriate as they can almost instantly provide the necessary
energy.
Currently, the dimensioning of the capacity needed depends on the forecasts submitted
as schedules to the transmission system operator (TSO). It is responsible for the large,
transnationally interconnected grids on the highest voltage levels. These grids absorb
energy produced by large power stations and transmit as well as distribute it over long
distances. The schedules are produced on a lower level by the balance group responsible
parties with the help of the commercial suppliers active in their balance group. The
lower voltage levels encompass the medium and low voltage grids, where smaller power
plants can feed in their energy, and larger and smaller customers extract their demand.
Taking Germany as an example, there are four TSOs, but more than 600 balance group
responsible parties, who all report to the TSO that supervises their geographical re-
gion. Within each balance group, supply needs to equal demand. The balance group
responsible party needs to arrange for this by forecasting loads, adjusting supply, and
submitting the schedules to its TSO. Using these, the exact amount of capacity needed
and the implementation are determined using the regulations put forward by the Euro-
pean Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) (Union for
the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity, 2004). This means that the demand
for reserve capacity is known in advance and perfectly inelastic. On the contrary, the
amount of reserve energy that actually needs to be supplied is uncertain and depends on
stochastic events. This is why the central auction requires a three-part bid consisting of
a capacity price, an energy price, and the amount of capacity offered. The reserve energy
is then not used by the TSOs themselves, but again by the balance group responsible
parties in their balance group. Due to the stochastic nature of electricity demand and
partly also of the supply an exact match is never possible. The balance group responsible
party is, therefore, billed by the TSO according to the share of reserve energy it uses in
the area that it supervises. Typically, a balance group responsible party is either a local
utility, a large industrial consumer with own energy supply or a trader at the energy
exchange, or a combination of the aforementioned. It should be noted that due to the
unbundling process the balance group responsible party in the function described here
does not possess any generation capacity itself, but is just an administrative entity.
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In the current market regime, it is very difficult for households to participate in the re-
serve energy market. The barriers to enter the central market are high and the threshold
capacities for the lowest quality are still 5 MW, which most households cannot easily
spare. The only way they are affected by the market is through the costs of the reserve
energy that are transferred to them by their energy provider as part of their regular bill.
The local market that is proposed in this paper makes the balance group responsible
party more independent. Via an online auction platform it can itself ask private house-
holds or small businesses that dispose of decentralized generation units (or flexible loads,
which is analogous and, therefore, not explicitly treated here) to submit bids to cover its
reserve energy needs. Those that win the auction need to reserve the allocated capacity
and are automatically called when needed. The auction takes place weekly for the fol-
lowing week for each hour of the day. For renewable sources, it is assumed that reliable
forecasts are available. Note that for micro-CHP plants and batteries, this uncertainty
is not relevant. As these have higher unit costs, the market price is likely to be driven
by these technologies, providing for a risk premium for participants with solar panels.
The advantages of a local market for reserve energy are reduced grid losses and reduced
market power of the large providers in the central market. Due to the implemented
reserve price from the control area level of the TSOs, prices are always lower or equal to
the current level. Furthermore, local trading of reserve energy is a necessary complement
to trading of real power by private households.
2.3.2 Pricing mechanism
The buyer of reserve energy is, thus, the local balance group responsible party with
total demand Q. Q is measured in kW (kilowatt) as only the capacity to be reserved
is known. Sellers are market participants that bid within an auction. In this case
they are households that dispose of devices that are capable of energy production or
provision. These would typically be single- or multi-family homes with solar panels,
micro-CHP plants, or storage batteries. Furthermore, small businesses with similar
equipment that does not exceed 50 kW of installed capacity might also be included.
Note that this threshold is not arbitrary, but specified in the EU Directive 2004/8/EC
(European Parliament and Council, 2004) and is also the upper threshold for the highest
remuneration (disregarding the option of heat-driven operation, which has been treated
differently since the latest amendment, cf. KWK, 2012) for electricity from CHP plants
according to the German CHP Act, where §7, Art. 4 (KWK, 2008) regulates that for
an installed capacity of 50 kWel, a subsidy of 5.11 Euro-ct per kWh is paid.
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There are n bidders. Each bidder i ∈ I, with I being the set of potential bidders, can
submit a set of offers qi(p), which consists of an arbitrary number of (li + 1) bids.
A bid xi,k is composed of a price pi,k [e/kW] and the amount of capacity to be reserved
qi,k [kW]. Index k with k ∈ 0, 1, ..., l hereby denotes the rank of an individual bid among
all bids submitted by bidder i. Each bidder may submit li of these bids altogether
plus a mandatory nil-offer (0;0). This gives the above-mentioned total number of bids
qi(p) =
(
xi,0, xi,1, ..., xi,l
)
.
The bids are ranked with xi,0 being the lowest offer and xi,max (= xi,l) being the highest
offer. A continuous set of offers thereby constitutes an offer function. Each bidder
knows his cost as a function of quantity ci(q). Per bidder and auction only one contract
is concluded and the successful bid is denoted by x∗i . The balance group responsible
party can further buy the amount qR at price pR from the transmission grid operator.
Obviously, it does not make sense for the buyer to procure reserve energy in the local
market if it costs significantly more than in the global market. Article 29 (3) of the
European Council Directive 90/531/EEC (Council of the European Communities, 1990)
sets the price difference up to which offers can be regarded as equivalent to 3%, giving
preference to local offers.
Let p be the vector of prices that the balance group responsible party faces due to the
submitted sets of offers and let q be the corresponding quantity vector, as emerging from
the bids xi. The total costs for the grid operator are, thus,
Y (p, qR) : R
n+1 → R with Y (p, qR) = pT q + qRpR. (2.1)
Successful bids and the capacity to be reserved via the TSO can be determined by
solving the minimization problem min
p,qR
[Y (p, qR)]. The sum of the power bought from
bidders and the grid operator must be at least as much as total demand Q, where Q is
defined as the capacity that needs to be reserved times the time slot considered, which
is one hour:
∑
i qi ≥ Q. Q can either be determined in a separate optimization problem
or might be defined in some future amendment to the current ENTSO-E procedures.
Both possibilities will not be discussed further at this point and, therefore, Q will be
viewed as externally given, i.e. fixed and inelastic. Furthermore, the price constraint
in acknowledgment of the EU Council Directive 90/531/EEC needs to be obeyed: pi ≤
1.03pR.
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The solution to this optimization problem describes the pricing mechanism. The com-
plete optimization problem is, thus,
min
p,qR
(Y (p, qR))
s.t.
∑
i
qi −Q ≥ 0
1.03pR − pi ≥ 0 i ∈ I.
(2.2)
From here, the solution (p∗; q∗R) follows with p
∗ =
(
p∗1, p∗2, ..., p∗n
)
, whereas the suc-
cessful bid of bidder i is given as x∗i = [p
∗
i , q
∗
i (p
∗
i )]. The bidder’s profit, taking into
account his cost function ci(q), is πi = q
∗
i p
∗
i − ci(q∗i ).
In case of discrete bids qi(p), a situation of ties may emerge. This situation arises with
price equality of several quantities offered and when each quantity as such is sufficient
to fulfill the constraint, i.e. each quantity is at least as large as the missing amount up
to total demand. In this case, the bid with higher quantity is preferred. If prices as well
as quantities among bidders are equal, the winner is determined randomly with equal
probabilities.
The information flow starts with the determination of the required quantity according
to UCTE requirements. The balance group responsible party can then publish the
beginning and the end of the auction as well as invite participants to submit bids. After
determining their free capacity and evaluating the competition to optimize their bids,
these may then send their offers. From the prices and quantities the balance group
responsible party can estimate whether it is able to procure enough reserve energy at a
reasonable price. If there is not enough reserve energy offered, or if prices exceed those
on the global market, i.e. the market at the transmission grid level, it should be able
to register its residual needs with the TSO. Such a mechanism is currently not available
in the market, but should require only a small change in the current regulation. At
the same time, successful bidders are informed about the quantities they are obliged to
reserve and prepare to be called.
2.3.3 Bidder’s strategy
2.3.3.1 Asymmetric case
In principle, each bidder tries to maximize his expected profit. The expected profits
are the sum of all bids less the respective costs weighted by the respective probability
of winning. Costs are hereby a very general term and do not only include technology-
related costs like fuel expenses, but also opportunity costs that rise with quantity as
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some of the available capacity might be needed for consumption within the household.
In this sense the cost variable is equivalent to an individual reservation price. In the
discrete case the expected profit can be expressed as
Ed(πi) =
∑
k
(Pr(qi,k)(pi,k − ci(qi,k))qi,k)
with
∑
k
Pr(qi,k) = 1.
(2.3)
In the continuous case, the probabilities are expressed by a function f(q), giving the
following formula for expected profit:
Ec(πi) =
qi,l∫
0
f(q)(pi(q)− ci(q))qdq (2.4)
Note that in both cases, pi(q) = q
−1
i (p). The problem is that unlike in Hao (2000)
the probability is not dependent on a simple figure, but on a function or at least the
association of price and quantity. Therefore, it cannot be assumed to exhibit continuity
and is intractable analytically ex ante. In the current setting, there is thus no easy way
to work with it.
To complete the analysis of the auction and the expected profit to be gained from
it, the energy that is actually being called and remunerated separately should also be
considered. As the necessary reserve energy per time slot cannot be known a priori, it
can only be embraced in stochastic terms. The reserve energy being called, wi, is, thus,
a function of the capacity reserved.
In order to prevent gaming and market power, it is advisable to ensure equal chances for
each participant in the calling process, much unlike the current procedure of arranging
a merit order. In other words, the process needs to ensure that the probability of being
called exhibits a uniform distribution. Let the expected value thereof be γ. The expected
profit of an individual bidder then becomes
E(πi) =
qi,l∫
0
(q · pi +
tf∫
ts
γqdtpW − c− cW )f(q)dq, (2.5)
where cW is the additional cost that is incurred for generating the power called. Under
the condition that pW is greater than cW , risk-averse bidders should not add this addi-
tional stochastic profit to their certain profit during the strategy-planning phase at the
auction stage. This means that they would never understate their costs for reserving
capacity to increase their chances of winning the auction in the expectation of making
up for it by being called and receiving additional payment for delivering energy.
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Summing over all q∗i , total costs of the balance group responsible party become
Y = pT q + pRqR +
tf∫
ts
γQpWdt (2.6)
for each time slot, where pW [e/kWh] is the constant energy price for reserve energy
called. As this energy price as well as Q, the total capacity to be reserved, and γ, the
expected value of the portion of power actually called, are all independent from the
bid sets (pi, q(pi)), the solution of the optimization problem remains identical to the
solution from eq. (2.2). It can clearly be seen that the price and the amount of energy
being called do not influence the pricing mechanism. Please also note that this structure
makes the auction mechanism very robust, as truthful bidding is the dominant strategy.
2.3.3.2 Symmetric case
In the case of a symmetric market, the bid functions of all bidders are identical, i.e.
q1 = q2 = ... = qn. This could happen when all bidders have identical technologies, for
example when solar panels are especially popular in a city quarter. Furthermore, the
symmetric case gives a first benchmark for the behavior in an asymmetric market.
The total costs of the buyer are, thus,
Yξ = npξqξ + qRpR
s.t. pξ = p1 = p2 = ... = pn
qξ = q1 = ... = qn = qξ(pξ),
(2.7)
i.e., the price received by each bidder is pξ and the corresponding power offered is qξ.
From this, the optimization problem can be written as:
min
p,qR
(npξqξ + qRpR)
s.t. nqξ −Q ≥ 0
1.03pR − pi ≥ 0 i ∈ I.
(2.8)
As competition rises, a transition phase begins. During this phase, bidding is accord-
ing to the Cournot equilibrium, where quantities are endogenously determined while
understating capacities. As soon as capacities significantly outrange total demand, a
situation of perfect competition is reached. This motivates bidders eventually to bid
their marginal (economic) costs ci(q).
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In order to find out the point up to which it makes sense for the bidder not to deviate
from the collusive bid, i.e. from which point onwards convergence to competitive bidding
can be assumed one needs to compare bidder j’s profit under each bidding regime:
πi =
Q
n
(pR − c). (2.9)
When deviating, the profit becomes
πj = qj(pR − c− ε). (2.10)
Letting pR − c = m and rearranging terms, one obtains from πi = πj that
ε =
qjn−Q
qjn
m. (2.11)
Note that qj , Q, and m are all fixed. The only changing parameter is, thus, n, i.e. the
number of bidders participating in the auction. For a growing number of participants, ε
grows as well. This is in line with theoretical considerations of market movements, as it
says that the greater the competition, the faster prices drop to marginal costs. This is
because once someone has deviated, the other bidders will follow in the coming round
until equilibrium is reached and everyone bids marginal costs. This already implies
that m or rather p needs to be updated for every round, meaning pj,t = pj,t−1 − ε or,
reformulating
pj,t =
qjn−Q
qjn
c+
Q
qjn
pj,t+1
until pj,t+z = c.
(2.12)
Note that ε is the upper limit of the amount by which the price should be reduced.
If it were a little more, the bidder would be better off sticking to the old price and
strategy. In order to get the strategy working, a much smaller amount of reduction
might suffice. However, this is only true for the symmetric case. For the asymmetric
case, the undercutting will stop as soon as the most costly generators bid their marginal
costs. Therefore, less cost-intensive generators can sustain a higher profit forever, at
least if total demand Q cannot be met by them alone. This higher profit margin equals
the marginal costs of expensive generators less the marginal costs of cheaper generators.
If, however, demand can be met by the reduced number of less cost-intensive generators,
more cost-intensive generators are driven out of the market, as competition continues
until the price has reached marginal costs of less expensive generators, at least as long
as there are no regulatory measures to prevent such an outcome. This also means that
none of the bidders has an incentive to underbid costs, who might have a motivation
in a commercial setting, for example to secure a higher market share. In the household
setting at hand, and with such limited capacities, strategic actions in terms of marketing
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activities are not relevant.
The calculation of the expected profit of the individual including energy called is anal-
ogous to the asymmetric case.
2.4 Simulation of an asymmetric market
In the previous section we have seen the derivation of the strategy for symmetric bidders,
which can be used as a reference value now. For an asymmetric market, however, an
analytical solution is very hard to find, as we cannot construct the probability of winning
in the auction. This leaves us with the option of simulation. In the case presented here,
a learning strategy has been formulated and translated into an algorithm as presented in
the coming paragraphs. The formulation of probability expectations is not necessary for
the current investigation, but will be handled later on in the course of the still ongoing
research project, which is running till the end of 2012 and investigates behavior of energy
consumers using experimental methods.
The second part is the cognition and strategy formulation of the bidders. The basic
bidding curves are characterized as partially differentiable functions of the form
p(q) = k(a0 + a1q + a2e
bq). (2.13)
This means that bidding curves of several shapes can be implemented, i.e. they may be
linear, constant, or exponential. They might be limited by the real world boundaries,
such as the corresponding cost functions, but are meant to be monotonically increasing
in principle. The mathematically redundant coefficients k and kc are used for reasons of
practicality, i.e. to be able to easily shift the curves upwards or downwards if required
by the implemented strategy. The cost functions are modeled accordingly and exhibit
the same properties:
c(q) = kc(ac0 + ac1q + ac2e
bcq). (2.14)
An example cost curve and bidding curves for the first 30 rounds of the “no information”
case (see explanations further below) are shown in Figure 2.1. The cost curve is the
lowest curve in the diagram, and the squares are the accepted bids.
After each auction round, the bidder is informed about his winning bid. The quantity
is a point between zero and the maximum quantity bid, while the price is determined
from the bid function. This means that in the following round, the bidder can react to
the outcome and either increase his price (i.e. shift his bid function upwards) to increase
his profit margin or lower his price (i.e. shift his bid function downwards) to increase
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Figure 2.1: Example cost curve and bidding curves with price convergence over 30
rounds
chances of selling a higher quantity. His action space is thereby limited by the given
cost function, which represents a lower limit. This algorithm is modeled according to
the learning direction theory of Selten and Stoecker (1986). Hailu and Schilizzi (2004)
also showed that there is no significant difference in outcome when applying a more
complicated learning algorithm, like the reinforcement algorithm by Roth and Erev
(1995); Erev and Roth (1998), which is why we can comfortably stick to the simpler
algorithm.
Furthermore, bidders can differ in a number of ways: First of all, they own equipment
of various sizes in the range from 3 kW to 50 kW, which is randomly distributed with a
mean of 9 kW and a standard deviation of 6.3 kW. To illustrate this, bidding curves of
all bidders in the market are shown in Figure 2.2; squares are again accepted bids. Each
bidding curve stops at the maximum capacity. Secondly, their bidding curves as well
as cost curves may be steeper or flatter, also randomly generated with the coefficients
introduced in equations (2.13) and (2.14) above. Moreover, fixed and variable prices
vary across bidders, reflecting ample technologies. The strategy used by all bidders is to
increase or decrease their bids by some percentage points, depending on whether they
Figure 2.2: Bidding curves of all bidders in the 25th round of the “no information”
case
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are satisfied with the outcome or not. The boundary is hereby set to 25 % of each
bidder’s individually available capacity.
Three main scenarios are scrutinized, varying in the information provided to the bidders.
In each scenario, 24 bidders participate in the market during 365 rounds. The idea is to
test several plausible scenarios that are based on different information policies, but also
on how this information is processed, i.e. how the bidder lets himself be influenced (in
terms of bids for the coming round) by the information provided. Information policies
are inspired by Ausubel (2004), who suggests a no-bid information, an aggregate bid
information, and a full bid information policy. As Ray and Cashman (1999) report,
different degrees of information provision make sense from a regulatory point of view,
especially in markets where perfect competition cannot be guaranteed and market power
might be an issue. In an early phase of the market introduction scarce information can,
thus, spur competition and disencourage collusion, which is why regulators employed
this strategy in New South Wales (Australia) when restructuring the electricity market
(Ray, 1997). This leads us to the following scenarios subject to our analysis:
1. Total supply and aggregated price curve of accepted bids;
2. All accepted bids;
3. No information.
In each scenario, the bidder’s bid may or may not be accepted. In the case where it
is not accepted, the bidder will adapt his strategy as long as he can still generate a
profit, i.e. as long as he is not bidding his cost curve. In the case where it is accepted,
the bidder might be content with the outcome and not change anything. However,
he might also want to gain more profit by increasing the capacity sold. In this case,
strategy adaptation might happen under the condition that the previous profit margin
is maintained, but stretched to more units.
Together with the cost function, the information can be used to find the most profitable
response to the actions of the other bidders. This also means that the implemented
strategies do not necessarily force the bidder to lower prices, but may also push him to
increase prices when competition allows it.
The aggregated price curve is constructed by summing up the inverse of all submitted
bid functions, whereas total supply is a vertical curve at the quantity desired. From the
intersection the market price, i.e. the highest price paid per kW in this market, can be
determined:
n∑
i=1
p−1i (q)−Q = 0. (2.15)
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At the same time, p∗ solves the inverse of the above-mentioned equation and is the
highest price any bidder can obtain and beyond which chances of winning dramatically
decrease. It is, therefore, most sensible for a bidder to bid flat at this price to achieve
the highest profit margins while assuring the maximal sales volume. In case his sales
volume drops too low, he can choose to adapt his strategy by bidding just below the
market price. At any point in time, he will not bid more than the reserve price because
the balance group responsible party would never accept such a bid and he will bid his
cost curve whenever the flat bid would not cover the expenses for a certain amount of
energy reserved. His bid function, thus, looks like:
pi(q) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
pR βp
∗ ≥ pR ≥ ci(q)
βp∗ pR ≥ βp∗ ≥ ci(q)
ci(q) βp
∗ < ci(q).
(2.16)
Note that β is equal to one as long as the bidder is satisfied with the quantity sold. If
it drops too low, β becomes a discount factor for the bid function, which is randomly
chosen from a normal distribution with a mean of 0.98 and a standard deviation of 0.01.
It has an upper limit, as risk-averse bidders will not become more expensive.
When the information provided is very detailed, the bidder can look at the individual
price/quantity-pairs and might, for example, adjust his curve to intersect all the winning
points or to lie just below them. Otherwise, he might simply identify the point that is
most profitable to him and adjust his bid curve to have this profit margin for all possible
quantities. As this kind of extensive information supports a variety of strategies, we
exemplarily implement two possible reactions. In the first, as mentioned above, the
most profitable winning point is identified and the bid is adjusted to ensure the same
amount of profit for all quantities larger than the one in this point. Below this limiting
quantity, bids are flat on the price in the optimal point. The most profitable bid
x˜s = [ps, qs] (2.17)
is, thus, determined from:
max
x˜k
(ps − ci(qs))qs. (2.18)
His bidding curve is then:
p˜i(q) =
⎧⎨
⎩
(ps−c(qs))qs
q + c(q) q > qs
ps q ≤ qs.
(2.19)
In other words, he bids his costs plus the most suitable relative profit margin for large
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quantities and the optimal price for low quantities. In case he does not sell enough with
these bids, he can shift his bid functions downwards with the same randomly distributed
discount factor β as in the previous section.
In the second reaction, bids are flat at the most profitable point until they hit the cost
curve.
p˜i(q) = ps (2.20)
This can be regarded as an easier strategy from the point of view of the household
bidder and has also been put forward by Wang and Zender (2007), among others, as an
equilibrium strategy. Discounts are assumed to be given by β again. As bidding above
the reserve price does not make any sense, we can summarize the bid curves for both
alternatives as follows:
pi(q) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
pR βp˜i(q) ≥ pR ≥ ci(q)
βp˜i(q) pR ≥ βp˜i(q) ≥ ci(q)
ci(q) βp˜i(q) < ci(q).
(2.21)
In the “no information” case, the bidder does not receive any information on what
happened during the auctioning process and what the outcomes of the other bidders
were. He has only the feedback if at all and how much he was able to sell from his
capacity offered. This input added he can decide whether he is happy with his personal
result or whether he would like to sell more. If he concludes that the quantity sold
should be increased, he needs to lower the price. He does so in a similar manner as in
the first and in the second case, i.e. by pushing down his bid curve with the discount
factor β. However, he does not change the shape of his original bid curve determined in
equation (2.13).
2.5 Simulation set-up and results
2.5.1 Set-up
The simulation program has been implemented on an object-oriented basis in MATLAB,
version R2011b, using the MATLAB optimization toolbox. It has been run on a Win-
dows 7 machine with a dual-core processor, taking a runtime of about 30 to 60 minutes.
Each bidder behaves as an independent agent trying to maximize his own profit. He is
modeled using the bid function (equation (2.13)) and the cost function (equation (2.14))
developed in Section 2.4. The exact values of the parameters in the functions are deter-
mined by a random number generator that draws values from a given distribution. The
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Figure 2.3: Flowchart of bidding algorithm and price determination algorithm
mean values and the standard deviations of the distributions for each parameter can be
seen in Table 2.1. The capacities, for example, are set between 3 kW to 50 kW, and
are randomly drawn from a distribution with a mean of 9 kW and a standard deviation
of 6.3 kW. The so-constructed normal distribution is now cut off at 3 kW at the lower
end and 50 kW at the upper end. Capacities of each bidder are illustrated in Figure
2.4, with the dark horizontal line describing the mean of the sample and the lighter hor-
izontal lines describing the confidence interval of one standard deviation in the sample.
Please note that the theoretical mean and standard deviation and the sample mean and
standard deviation do not exactly coincide because of the small sample size and, more
importantly, because of the imposed upper and lower bounds when drawing the sample.
The slope is determined in a similar way with a mean of -0.8 and a standard deviation of
0.04. For computational reasons, the limits here are set at +15 and -15. Fixed costs are
described by the product of k and a0. The start price (y-intercept) of the bid function
is constructed by analogy. The resulting configuration has been produced automatically
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Table 2.1: Parameter values in the simulation
Variable Mean μ Standard deviation σ Min value Max value
k 8 k10 0 k ∗ 3
a0 0.3
a0
10 -15 15
a1 -0.8
a1
20 -15 15
a2 5
a2
20 -15 15
b 0.1 b10 -15 15
ac0 -0.1
ac0
10 -5 5
ac1 ∗ (qmax/lqmax) 1 ac110 -5 5
ac2 2
ac2
10 -5 5
bc ∗ (qmax/lqmax)0.7 0.2 bc10 -5 5
qmin 0 - - -
qmax 9 qmax ∗ 710 3 50
at the beginning of the first simulation. To allow comparisons across treatments it has
then been saved and served as input for all other simulations as well.
Depending on the strategy used by a bidder he adjusts original bidding curves according
to equations (2.16), (2.19), and (2.21) after the first auction round.
The simulated auction round proceeds as follows: After all bidding agents have “sub-
mitted”, i.e. formed their bidding curves, the resulting optimization problem is solved
according to equation (2.2). This classical nonlinear programming (NLP) problem repre-
sents, thus, the role of the balance group responsible party. For determining the outcome
of the pricing mechanism, an SQP Solver with an active-set method is applied.
The outcome of this optimization is then used as an input for the following auction round.
This can be in the form of the aggregated price curve of accepted bids, individual price-
quantity pairs, or only the information of how much of the own capacity has been sold.
Bidding agents use this feedback to evaluate their bidding curve of the preceding round
Figure 2.4: Overview of capacities of all bidders
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and adjust it, if necessary, in the current round according to the strategies described
before.
This procedure is repeated 365 times to cover an entire year. Output at each stage is a
table with the adjusted parameters of the bidding curve of each bidder, individual profits
gained, and expenditures of the balance group responsible party. Figure 2.3 shows the
flowchart of the algorithm for determining the bid in general (left-hand side) and the
function for determining the price of a bid in case full information is provided (right-
hand side). The code for this part of the simulation can be found in the Appendix to
this chapter, Part B.
2.5.2 Results
The results clearly show that the information policy in a local reserve energy market
makes a difference. Generally speaking, the more information is provided, the fiercer
the competition becomes.
In the “all accepted bids” case, market equilibrium is reached after only about ten
rounds. Even in case the convergence process were to take longer in a real-world setting,
the swiftness is remarkable and promises a reliable market. When assuming flat bid
functions, convergence stretches over 100 auction rounds before equilibrium is reached.
However, even this is rather quick and proves the robustness of the mechanism. The
equilibrium price is only slightly higher in the second case (0.16 cents), which can be
regarded as non-significant.
In the “no information” case, where bidders have only their individual feedback, com-
petition is significantly reduced. Although bidding is according to individual bid curves
that maintain their shape during the entire process, market equilibrium takes more than
180 rounds to be reached. Compared to the full information case above, the market is
Figure 2.5: Expenditures of the balance group responsible party (left plot) and
highest, average, and lowest price received (right plot) in “all accepted bids”
information setting with flat bids
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Figure 2.6: Expenditures of the balance group responsible party (left plot) and
highest, average, and lowest price received (right plot) in “all accepted bids”
information setting with individual bid functions
less efficient, and thus suffers from the typical market failure. Also, the equilibrium price
is twice as high forever, providing a substantially higher profit for the households in the
long run.
The case “total supply and aggregated price curve” gives a result that lies in between the
informational extremes of the two other cases. When thinking about what information is
given to the bidders and how they can react to it, this is not surprising. After 215 rounds,
market equilibrium is reached with an equilibrium price of about the same amount as
in the “all accepted bids” case with individual bid functions that are only flat on the
first part. Interestingly, it is below the “all accepted bids” case with flat bids, but not
significantly. The slow speed of convergence can be explained by the single point that
is provided to the bidders on the one hand, and the lowering of the price in response to
dissatisfaction on the other hand. Even when lowering the price in one round, the market
price is still likely to remain less significantly changed. With this higher reference point,
bidders can go back to the higher price in the next round, thus hindering the market
dynamics.
Figure 2.7: Expenditures of the balance group responsible party (left plot) and
highest, average, and lowest price received (right plot) in a no information setting
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Figure 2.8: Expenditures of the balance group responsible party (left plot) and
highest, average, and lowest price received (right plot) in aggregated information setting
The information policy chosen for such a market thus depends on what authorities would
like to achieve. For energy markets, this is of special interest, as regulators usually try
to achieve explicit goals with their guidelines. Considerable profits can attract more
participants in the market and thereby support liquidity and competition, calling for a
policy with very limited information. If, however, the objective is to run the market as
efficiently as possible from the beginning, in order to benefit from low reserve energy
prices immediately, a broader information policy should be put into place. These results
are also illustrated in Figures 2.5 - 2.8. More detailed output data is available from the
authors upon request.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper a new auction model for a local reserve energy market has been introduced
and tested in a simulation. It has been designed to accommodate the special needs of
non-expert bidders such as private households. This model can be used to revolutionize
the reserve energy market, as a balance group responsible party is given the chance
to self-supply reserve energy. Thereby it serves several purposes as it helps to further
integrate decentralized and renewable energy penetration, but can also help to lower the
costs for reserve energy by cutting back the market power of the currently dominating,
large-scale utility companies. Final energy consumers can profit from this twice because
they are the ones providing the energy and getting paid for it as well as having to pay
a lower energy bill, once the market provides cheaper reserve energy. At the same time
the mechanism supports the remuneration and subsidy schemes for decentralized and
renewable energy that are already in place. In the long run, when promotion schemes
eventually expire, it can serve as a long-lasting incentive scheme for investments in the
designated technologies. This is supported by both the results from the theoretical
investigation of the symmetric case and the simulation of the asymmetric case. We
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found that the information policy in the market has a significant influence on the speed of
convergence and also a small effect on the equilibrium market price that is finally reached.
In the extreme treatment with no information provided, the effect on the equilibrium
price becomes substantial and, even more importantly, is sustained indefinitely, which
emphasizes the importance of the design choice.
The advantage of such a market-based incentive scheme is that it eliminates itself when
it is no longer needed. This can happen under two circumstances. Firstly, as soon as
further investments in the supported technologies do not enhance total welfare anymore
and secondly, as soon as the slope of the learning curves for the respective technologies
has reached its minimum alongside with the unit costs of the technologies, such that
the acquisition happens without the need of subsidies. Furthermore, the concept can be
used in a microgrid to solve the issue of remuneration of ancillary services. If a barter
economy is desired in such circumstances, bids can easily be translated into amounts of
energy that may be consumed at a later point in time.
Beyond energy markets the design can also be applied in other small, possibly local
markets, for example those known in the financial sector, i.e. cloud financing or crowd
funding. These are characterized by a rather non-professional environment (usually no
banks or other financial institutions participate) and aim to gather a certain, prede-
termined amount of financial resources. Whether an explicit reservation price makes
sense in those circumstances remains to be determined. An implicit reservation price
is, however, certainly given by the prevailing conditions of the official financial sector.
Moreover, competition is likely to be much more quantity-based, as market participants
might like to invest a certain amount and only fine-tune according to the prices on the
market.
Subsequent research will need to examine how actual human bidders react to the pro-
posed design and whether theoretical predictions as well as simulation results hold. To
this end, we plan to conduct a laboratory experiment as an empirical test of the validity
of the design. This is also supposed to investigate the importance of the auction format
on truth-revealing behavior in this context. Field tests can further validate these find-
ings and enable the investigation of practical issues. Finally, it would also be interesting
to examine some other parameters than those chosen alongside the possibility of market
entry and mechanisms to prevent collusion.
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Appendix
Part A - Literature overview
Table 2.2: Overview of literature with related auction mechanisms
Reference Method Type of auction Major finding Comments
Ausubel
and Cram-
ton (2002)
Mathematical
proofs
Multi-unit auc-
tion with dis-
criminatory and
uniform pricing
Bidders have an incen-
tive to understate demand
in uniform price auctions
with private values
-
Back and
Zender
(1993)
Theoretical
model/ mathe-
matical proofs
Divisible good
auction; sealed-
bid uniform
pricing vs. dis-
criminatory
pricing
Sellers’ revenue is lower
in uniform-price auctions
because of self-enforcing
collusive strategies (very
steep demand curves)
-
Bernard
et al.
(1998)
Laboratory ex-
periments
Uniform-price
auction with last-
accepted offer
and first-rejected
offer pricing
Group size has a much
greater impact on prices
and efficiency than auction
type
Single
buyer; two,
four or
six sellers;
reservation
price
Burke and
Auslander
(2009)
Theoretical/
mathematical
proofs
Divisible good
auction with
uniform pricing
Pricing mechanism for au-
tomatic real-time electric-
ity pricing
Residential
electricity
auction
Chao and
Wilson
(2002)
Mathematical
proofs
Uniform price
multi-unit auc-
tion
Incentive compatible
mechanism by using
capacity bids only for re-
serving capacity and using
the marginal energy price
for energy called (i.e. the
last unit of energy actually
needed determines the
energy price for all energy
called)
Procurement
auction for
reserve
energy
Engelbrecht-
Wiggans
and Kahn
(1998)
Theoretical
model/ mathe-
matical proofs
Multi-unit auc-
tion with uniform
pricing
Equilibria in uniform price
auctions
-
Haghighat
et al. (2008)
Mathematical
model/proofs
and simula-
tions
Discriminatory
and uniform
pricing multi-unit
auction
Theoretically, no differ-
ence between both designs
concerning profits, market
clearing price and bidding
strategies; with transmis-
sion constraints, profits are
influenced by the pricing
mechanism
-
Continued on next page
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Table 2.2 – continued from previous page
Reference Method Type of auction Major finding Comments
Hao (2000) Mathematical
model and
numerical
examples
Multi-unit auc-
tion with fixed
MWh blocks and
one-part price
bids
No true cost bidding under
uniform pricing
Electricity
auction
Hudson
(2000)
Comprehensive
market simula-
tion of energy
and ancil-
lary services
markets
Multi- unit auc-
tion with uniform
and discrimina-
tory pricing
Discriminatory pricing
limits market power in
periods of high demand
through higher price
visibility
Energy and
ancillary
services
markets
Rassenti
et al.
(2003)
Laboratory ex-
periment
Multi-unit pro-
curement auction
with uniform and
discriminatory
pricing
Discriminatory pricing
raises prices and bidders
submit higher offer curves;
price variance is lower;
discriminatory pricing
leads to “tacit collusion”,
bidders coordinate on the
highest observed offers of
the previous round
Electricity
trading
with sim-
ulation
of typical
trading
days
Swider
and Weber
(2007)
Theoretical
model and
empirical ap-
plication in
MATLAB
Multi-unit auc-
tion with discrim-
inatory pricing
Estimation of the profit-
maximizing bid in a dis-
criminatory auction by de-
riving the probability of ac-
ceptance
Procurement
auction for
power
systems
reserve
Wang and
Zender
(2007)
Theoretical
model/ mathe-
matical proofs
Divisible good
auction (uniform
and discrimi-
natory pricing,
symmetric and
asymmetric
information,
risk-neutral
and risk-averse
bidders)
There is a continuum of
equilibria, but with a re-
serve price of zero, it can
be reduced to only one; For
risk-averse symmetric bid-
ders, the auctioneer’s rev-
enue in a discriminatory
auction is strictly greater
than in a uniform-price
auction; only risk-neutral
bidders submit completely
flat bid schedules; in divis-
ible good auctions there is
almost always some degree
of demand reduction; auc-
tioneer’s revenue is strictly
increasing in the precision
of public information
-
Chapter 2. An Auction Design for Local Reserve Energy Markets 52
Part B - MATLAB code for the pricing function when detailed infor-
mation is available:
function bid_price = flatAndConstProfit(BID, transferred_q)
% Function bid_price
% Determines the price of a bid in case full information is provided
% Parameters: BID: Instance of Bidder Class
% transferred_q: argument of pricing function
% Author: Christiane Rosen
% Date: 05.07.2012
% Revision: 10.08.2012
theoretical_Profit =
BID.stored_Target_Bid(1,1) - BID.cost_Function(1,BID.costfactor_a0,
BID.costfactor_a1,BID.costfactor_a2,BID.costfactor_b,
BID.stored_Target_Bid(1,2));
theoretical_Profit =
BID.discount_Factor * theoretical_Profit * BID.stored_Target_Bid(1,2);
if (transferred_q < BID.stored_Target_Bid(1,2))
bid_price = BID.discount_Factor * BID.stored_Target_Bid(1,1);
else
bid_price =
theoretical_Profit ./ (transferred_q) + BID.cost_Function(1,
BID.costfactor_a0,BID.costfactor_a1,BID.costfactor_a2,BID.costfactor_b,
transferred_q);
end
if (bid_price > BID.reserve_price)
bid_price = BID.reserve_price;
end
if (bid_price <
BID.cost_Function(1,BID.costfactor_a0,BID.costfactor_a1,
BID.costfactor_a2,BID.costfactor_b,transferred_q))
bid_price =
BID.cost_Function(1,BID.costfactor_a0,BID.costfactor_a1,
BID.costfactor_a2,BID.costfactor_b,transferred_q);
end
end
Chapter 3
The Role of Information
Feedback in Local Reserve
Energy Auction Markets
Abstract
In any auction market, the amount of information provided to its participants is one
of the most important design choices. It is the basis for decisions and supports the
learning process. While there is little research available on learning in multi-unit or
divisible good auctions, some important theories have been developed in the context of
first-price auctions. These approaches also have been validated experimentally in single-
unit auctions (e.g. Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2002). While single-unit first-price auctions
have the advantage of being mathematically tractable, their practical use is limited to
certain domains (e.g. on-site art auctions). Multi-unit or divisible good auctions, on
the other hand, are employed in a number of important practical applications, such as
Treasury bond, energy, (radio) spectrum auctions and other public tenders. A natural
and necessary extension to the current literature is, therefore, to examine the effect
of price feedback in divisible good auctions. We contribute to this field of research by
conducting such a laboratory experiment with an energy market framing. Two treatment
variables are investigated in a two by two design: the strength of competition and, more
importantly, the amount of information provided.
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3.1 Introduction
One of the key topics in economic research is analyzing and understanding markets. A
number of today’s markets rely on auction mechanisms in addition to or instead of in-
dividual bargaining and trading. Some of very important examples of such applications
are Treasury bond auctions, radio spectrum auctions, and energy markets, whereof the
latter have recently gained increasing scientific attention. Although they are public ten-
ders from very different fields, these markets share a common property, namely there are
either multiple, identical goods or the good is perfectly divisible, resulting in almost the
same theoretical properties. Research in this area has made some considerable progress
in recent years with notable theoretical and empirical findings emerging. Some issues,
however, have still not been studied in detail. One of these is learning and the impact
of feedback in divisible good or multi-unit auctions. Feedback, i.e. information on the
results of individual behavior, is the crucial factor that enables learning and fosters
convergence to the theoretically predicted (equilibrium) behavior. In a market environ-
ment, this means that determining the amount of information provision is an important
design variable. To date, research on feedback has mainly focused on general learning
theories and theories applied to first-price auctions. However, many real-world markets,
especially those mentioned in the beginning, are not set up as first-price auctions, but
as multi-unit or divisible good auctions. In order to be able to use theoretical and
experimental results from existing approaches on learning behavior in these important
markets, it is essential to verify their applicability to the relevant auction types.
Experiments offer a structured way of investigating individual behavior. By manipu-
lating relevant variables, they help to identify dynamics resulting from processes taking
place internally within a subject, and externally as interaction with other players. Along
the same lines, markets are highly influenced by scenarios that are driven by the cogni-
tion and the explicit or implicit communication (such as signaling) of its participants.
In order to answer the question of how feedback impacts divisible good markets, we
conduct an experiment with an energy market framing.
In the context of energy markets, there are recurring concerns about transparency and
collusion. As will be discussed further below, the amount of information provided within
(and possibly outside) the market can support or hinder such undesired market phenom-
ena. We have shown in an agent-based simulation study (Rosen and Madlener, 2013a),
that this can also have long-term effects on the market outcome. Building upon these
results, and in order to further evaluate them, in this paper we examine the reserve en-
ergy market, i.e. a divisible good auction, experimentally. In a computerized laboratory,
human bidders can interact with each other and thereby experience market dynamics.
The goal of the current research is to find out how feedback information impacts this
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process. To this end, we analyze four treatments differing in the amount of informa-
tion provided and the competitive strength of the market, i.e. the number of market
participants.
To our knowledge, information has so far not been studied as a treatment variable in
divisible good auctions. In the context of electricity auctions, its role in policy decisions
has been established theoretically by Ray and Cashman (1999). With this study we
contribute to the literature on divisible good auctions and procurement auctions, while
examining a topic of practical relevance for the transformation of the energy system.
We proceed as follows: Section 3.2 gives an overview of relevant related research. Sec-
tion 3.3 introduces the experimental market, derives some theoretical benchmarks, and
explains the experimental procedure. Section 3.4 presents the results obtained and
provides some in-depth discussion, especially of the findings concerning the learning
direction theory. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Related work
As already mentioned, in previous research we have analyzed the short and long-term
influences of information in several degrees or aggregation types in an agent-based sim-
ulation (Rosen and Madlener, 2013a). The result is that with very detailed information,
the equilibrium market price is lowest and reached very early. When no information on
the behavior of other bidders is provided, but only feedback on the individual success,
the convergence process takes more than twice the time and the equilibrium market
price remains on a higher level indefinitely. We will later see whether this holds in an
experimental setting with human bidders as well.
Starting with the general role information has played in experiments, let us turn to
Nikiforakis (2010), who evaluates the effect of framing of information. For this purpose,
he conducts an experiment in the context of public goods. In each treatment, he provides
the same information in a different format. First, he only shows the contributions of
each individual, then the earnings of each individual (with equal endowments being the
endowment less the contribution plus the share of the public good) and then both the
contributions and the earnings. He finds that the information format has an influence on
the behavior of individuals. When earnings are displayed, participants tend to punish
peers more harshly.
Danz et al. (2012) examine a two-player game under varying extents of information
provision. In the baseline treatment they give full information, whereas in the other two
treatments information is withheld either on previous performance or on the opponent’s
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payoff. They find that a lack of already one of the two types of information leads to less
strategic behavior. Furthermore, performance-related feedback is essential for learning
during the course of the experiment and also enhances strategic behavior over time.
Weber (2003) challenges common learning theories and claims that learning also takes
place when no feedback is provided. He proves this idea in an experiment of a repeated
game with and without priming. Primes are meant to induce participants to think about
strategic aspects of the game. Convergence to equilibrium outcomes can be observed
in all treatments, which means that learning takes place in all cases. It is, of course,
most distinctive in the control treatment with feedback, but shows the same direction
in all other treatments. Priming did not have an unambiguous effect in the sense that
stronger priming would lead to faster learning.
The main relevance of feedback is explained by its impact on learning processes that
can ultimately drive individual behavior in a specific direction. In addition to, or as a
result from, experiments, several theories have been developed that try to explain the
behavioral pattern both qualitatively and quantitatively. Learning processes in auctions
and other games have been analyzed theoretically and experimentally. For auctions, the
main research subject has been single-unit first-price auctions. For this specific type of
auction, Ockenfels and Selten (2005) develop the impulse balance theory. It states that
bids are a reaction to impulses experienced from feedback after an auction round, given
that more rounds are to follow. In an experiment, they can confirm this with a repeated
sealed-bid first-price auction, where bids are lower when feedback on losing bids is given
compared to situations where it is not provided. The extent of these bid movements can
be explained by their theory. The bidding patterns are a result of the different weights
attached to downward and upward impulses.
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002) explain the observed bid movements with signaling
between the bidders. They conduct an experiment on competition in first-price procure-
ment auctions, which is repeated 10 times and offers a different amount of information
for each treatment. The authors implement a full information feedback, a semi-full in-
formation feedback, and a no information feedback treatment. In the first treatment,
bidders are informed about all bids that have been submitted, in the second only about
the winning bids, and in the third only about their own payoff. They find that when
all (winning and losing) bids are announced, bids remain on a much higher level than
is predicted by theory. In the other two treatments, bids converged to the theoretical
prediction. The authors explain this with signaling, which only makes sense when it
can be observed by other bidders. This kind of transparency is exclusively guaranteed
in the full information treatment. In comparison to an earlier publication (Dufwenberg
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and Gneezy, 2000), the authors further find that with three and four competitors, bids
always approach the Nash equilibrium.
Isaac and Walker (1985) consider a discriminative sealed-bid auction where bidders have
unit demand. They implement a full information and a limited information treatment,
where the full information treatment displays all submitted bids including the identi-
fication number of the bidder. In the limited information feedback case, bidders only
obtain the winning bid with the identification number. Prices in the limited informa-
tion treatment are greater than those in the full information treatment, but efficiency
is not affected. Also, all prices are higher than predicted in equilibrium for risk-neutral
bidders.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) interpret bid movements as attempts to evade
regret. To this end, they differentiate between two types of regret that can be observed
in a first-price sealed-bid auction. When a bidder wins an auction and learns that the
second-highest bid was substantially lower, he can suffer from “money-left-on-the-table”
regret, because he has paid too much for the item. On the other hand, if he does not
win, but learns that the highest bid was still smaller than his valuation, he can suffer
from “missed-opportunity-to-win” regret. They show that in the case of the first type
of regret, bids decrease when the second highest bids are displayed. For the second type
of regret, bids increase when winning bids are displayed.
Neugebauer and Selten (2006) investigate both the learning direction theory and the
impulse balance theory experimentally. The goal is to study the effect of information in
a first-price sealed-bid auction with single demand. They find that information feedback
in the form of achieved prices leads to overbidding in first-price auctions. Results could
be correctly predicted by the learning direction theory in qualitative terms and by the
impulse balance theory in quantitative terms.
Neugebauer and Perote (2008) extend these findings and find evidence for anchoring
on the side of the bidders. In addition to the treatments with information, they also
introduce a treatment where absolutely no feedback is provided. They find that this
results in average bids below the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium, while feedback leads to
overbidding. They explain this with anchoring of the bidders on the published market
prices.
When talking about feedback (information) in the context of auctions, one should keep
in mind that depending on the auction format, different degrees of information are per
se provided to the bidders. Comparing two standard formats, the English (open cry)
and the Dutch (descending clock) auction, it becomes obvious that in the former type all
bidders hear all bids, whereas in the latter only the final price is called out. This means
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that although there is a lack of experimental studies examining the effect of feedback
in multi-unit and divisible good auctions, existing studies which investigate different
auction formats can offer some limited insights into the learning pattern when multiple
items are bought or sold at the same time.
One of the first studies of this kind is Plott and Smith (1978), who implicitly examine
two kinds of information treatment due to the choice of auction design. In their open-cry
auction they inform bidders only about the highest and the lowest bid of the previous
round and total quantity available. In contrast, in their posted-bid market all bids from
the previous (but not the current) round are known. However, the authors assume this
informational difference to be minor. They establish that the open-cry design leads to
overbidding, whereas the posted-offer design leads to underbidding. One should also
note that bidders in their multi-unit auction have single-unit demand, whereas in the
posted-offer market several units are traded at the same time.
Cox et al. (1984) study the impact of information in a discriminatory-price sealed-bid
auction, where bidders each demand a single unit. They compare the auction outcome
when the highest rejected bid and the highest accepted bid are displayed to the auction
outcome when this information is not displayed. In both cases, they observe underbid-
ding relative to the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium. Underbidding was enhanced when
information was blocked, which resulted in 60% of the bidders bidding too low, whereas
when the relevant information was available, only 48% bid too low.
Kagel and Levin (2001) explore the effect of feedback in a multi-unit auction. They use
computer bidders with single demand that follow the dominant strategy (i.e. bid their
value). They restrict human bidders to bidding the same or lower on the second unit
and examine (among others) a clock auction with and without feedback, i.e. the clock
pauses as soon as one of the computer rivals drops out in the feedback treatment. They
find significant behavioral differences when feedback is missing, as bidders have better
chances to adjust their behavior when information flows continuously. The clock auction
without feedback, therefore, has very similar outcomes to the sealed bid auction, where
intermediate information gathering is hindered.
In addition to their earlier publication, Kagel and Levin (2005) examine the behavior
of bidders in multi-unit auctions with a sealed-bid and an ascending-bid (open-cry) de-
sign. Here, they used the same information feedback throughout the entire experiment,
namely all bids, ranked according to price, highlighting the winning bids. As in their
earlier experiment, they let computers with single-demand compete against individual
human bidders with demand for multiple units. They find that bidders are closer to
the predicted behavior in the open-cry design, confirming the finding of Ockenfels and
Selten (2005) that feedback reduces overbidding.
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Table 3.1: Overview of studies on multi-unit and divisible good auctions
Study Auction format Treatment
Cox et al. (1984) sealed-bid auction with and
without information on re-
jected bids
discriminatory pricing
Cummings et al.
(2004)
sealed-bid auction with revision
rounds
discriminatory pricing (uniform
pricing only in 2 initial rounds)
Engelmann and
Grimm (2009)
open and sealed bid uniform pricing, discriminatory
pricing, Vickrey, Ausubel
Kagel and Levin
(2001)
ascending-bid clock auction
with and without feedback,
sealed-bid auction
uniform pricing and dynamic
Vickrey auction
Kagel and Levin
(2005)
ascending-bid clock auction vs.
sealed-bid auction
uniform pricing
Plott and Smith
(1978)
oral and sealed-bid (posted-
offer)
discriminatory pricing
Note: all studies used independent private values
Engelmann and Grimm (2009) also look into different pricing rules and auction design
in the field of multi-unit auctions. They conduct an experiment with two units and two
bidders, where bidders can either observe drop-out prices or bids, depending on whether
the auction format is open or sealed-bid. The pricing rules are based on uniform and
discriminatory pricing as well as the Ausubel and the Vickrey auction. Auctioneer’s
revenue is then less dependent on the pricing rule, but more on whether it is open or
sealed-bid, hinting again at a behavioral impact of the implicit information provision.
Cummings et al. (2004) find some evidence for the learning direction theory in the
context of multi-unit auctions. They examine several types of auctions to determine
the design best suited for the Georgia irrigation reduction auction. The most important
similarity is that it is also a procurement auction, as farmers sell their permits. A very
significant difference, however, is that the buyer (auctioneer) does not buy a prespecified
amount or number of permits, but has a fixed budget. Valuation has a common and
a private element and their market is much larger than ours (9 to 42 participants).
To our knowledge, they are the only ones that applied an information treatment to an
experiment on multi-unit auctions. However, the authors do not implement repeated
bidding, but allow bidders to revise their offers upon knowledge of the competing bids.
This continues until no one wants to change his offer any more or until the auctioneer
chooses to terminate the auction. Cummings et al. observe that after participants receive
a provisional acceptance, they often increase prices. On the other hand, when not being
accepted in a round, they decrease prices again. In a couple of additional sessions with
a smaller number of bidders, the experiment was repeated while not announcing the
cut-off price, but only the ID numbers of accepted permits. However, as each bidder
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holds three different permits, they are able to deduce the approximate cut-off price
nonetheless and game with their offers. It is important to note that when revision
rounds are announced before the start of the auction, incentives are quite different to
those in repeated bidding auctions. This means that the results from Cummings et al.
(2004) cannot fully be transferred to our case either way.
Table 3.1 summarizes the existing studies in the field of multi-unit and divisible good
auctions. An in-depth analysis of the role of information in divisible good auctions is
still missing in the literature. Therefore, we want to fill this gap with our study, while
creating a very reliable, and at the same time very innovative market design in the
context of reserve energy.
3.3 Methodological approach
In this section, the experimental market is introduced, theoretical predictions for the
outcome of the experiments are derived, and the experimental procedure is defined.
Here, we present a local solution for trading. It is meant to enable private households
with generation equipment to sell their self-produced energy “in the neighborhood”. An
alternative to such an auction market would be a decentralized market with bilateral
trading. Moreno and Wooders (2002), however, show that such an organization can lead
to inefficient market dynamics and produce delays in trading. This becomes even more
severe in a small market, where the number of bidders has a significant impact on the
matching process, which is the necessary starting point for a trade (Wooders, 1998).
3.3.1 The experimental market
The market under consideration consists of several bidders who try to sell their goods
to a single buyer, the auctioneer. Production costs follow a step-function, i.e. there
are quantity chunks that cause different and increasing types of costs. The bidder can
choose to sell his entire capacity or only part of it. His bid consists of the quantity
he offers and the price he asks per unit. The auction is repeated for several identical
rounds. This repetition influences the bidding behavior over time. We do not only wish
to analyze its development, but also how price information can alter it. To this end, we
conduct an experiment with two feedback conditions. Feedback on the success of one’s
own bid is always given, i.e. bidders always know whether their bid got accepted or not.
In addition, for the treatment with more extensive feedback, prices of all accepted bids
are displayed. This information can foster the learning process, but might also trigger
other effects like anchoring or signaling, which are discussed in the results section (3.4.3).
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Low competition
(3 bidders)
High competition
(6 bidders)
Information
No information
Treatment 1
(30 participants)
Treatment 2
(30 participants)
Treatment 3
(30 participants)
Treatment 4
(30 participants)
Figure 3.1: Overview of experimental treatments
It is also a way to test the observation put forward by Ray and Cashman (1999) that a
lower degree of information can help to foster competition in an imperfect market that
might otherwise give rise to market power. The central idea hereby is that scarce in-
formation hampers collusion, such that high prices cannot be sustained. This might be
especially important with low levels of competition. To further examine this, we intro-
duce a second treatment variable, namely competition. By manipulating the number of
direct competitors, it allows us to estimate the relative size of the impact of competition
and information. An overview of the resulting treatment combinations can be seen in
Figure 3.1.
For the experiment, participants were asked to imagine they lived in a household with
typical decentralized, small-scale energy generation and storage equipment, for example
photovoltaics, micro-combined heat and power, or storage batteries. Having different
technical properties, the resulting differences in cost structures are obvious. Available
capacities were presented as a portfolio of three quantities at different (production) costs
(see Table 3.2). Each first, second, and third price and quantity pair were drawn from
the same distribution. For reasons of fairness, the portfolios were then constructed in a
way that ensured the most similar total amount of available capacity for each bidder.
Participants could determine the amount of capacity (in kW) they wanted to offer and
the price (per kW) they wanted to receive in each auction round. The amount could be
freely chosen as long as it was not larger than the sum of their capacities. For any smaller
amount, the function determining the profit assumed that the amount produced by the
technology with the lowest costs was sold first, thereby maximizing the individual’s
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profit. The average costs of the quantity offered were at the same time the minimum
price limiting the possible bids from below. This procedure prevented losses on the side
of the participants during the entire session. There was also a maximum, or reservation,
price for the bids, which was set at 100 ECU (experimental currency units). Above this
price, bids were not accepted by the system, i.e. participants faced an error message
asking them to observe the reservation price. For the auction process, this upper limit
was non-binding. If a bidder decided not to participate in an auction round, he or she
could simply enter an amount of 0. The bidding groups, i.e. the competitive field,
as well as individual price and quantity schedules remained fixed during the auction
rounds. Bidders had no knowledge of the portfolio of their competitors, except that it
was “similar”.
The auctioneer was a single buyer with fixed demand, which was not made public. In
each auction round, bids were ranked according to price and accepted until the auc-
tioneer’s demand was at least fulfilled. Marginal bids were completely accepted without
rationing. The reason for this is that the technical equipment in households cannot freely
set their operating point, such that they could not react to a rationed quantity. Being
framed as a reserve energy market1, this procedure also ensures some safety margins.
Furthermore, market participants are assumed to be small (household) producers with a
generation capacity of up to 50 kW. With this lack of market power, they would, there-
fore, not be able to abuse the situation in a real-world setting. Details of the auction
mechanism can be found in the Appendix to this chapter.
The information provided to the participants was always direct feedback on their bids,
i.e. whether their bid had won, and the resulting profit for the current round. In
the information treatment prices of all accepted bids, ranked from lowest to highest,
were additionally displayed. The no information treatment did not offer such a display.
Bidders were not made aware of their informational status. Nevertheless, when asked
what kind of feedback to expect, participants got the true answer corresponding to the
treatment they took part in.
3.3.2 Theoretical benchmark and expected results
In each experimental auction market, there are n bidders and each bidder i disposes of
a total quantity Ki =
∑
j κi,j with
∑
iKi =
Q
α . Hereby, α is the ratio of demand to
1Reserve energy is used to counter fluctuations in the energy grid, i.e. to balance stochastic demand
and supply. Generators to fulfill this task are determined on the reserve energy market and remain on
stand-by until needed. Without sufficient reserve energy, the energy grid could collapse, resulting in a
blackout.
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supply. Bidder i’s total cost are described by the following function:
Ci(κi) =
∑
j
κi,j · ci,j with ci,j < ci,j+1 (3.1)
with ci,j being the marginal cost of each quantity chunk j for bidder i (with 1 ≤ j ≤
3, j ∈ N). For the concrete form this takes in the experiment, please refer to Table 3.2.
Due to the chosen allocation rule without rationing, it is always optimal to offer the
entire quantity that can be produced at costs that are at or below the stated (bid) price.
In the presented auction market, neither profit nor the allocation probability can be
positively influenced by offering only part of a chunk. A bid should be optimally be
constructed in such a way that it entails one, two, or all three parts of the quantity
portfolio, as long as these chunks are entirely offered and not partially. Ceteris paribus,
the latter would inevitably lead to reduced profits on some of the units. And again, a
change in allocation probabilities cannot be reached by such behavior, at least not when
assuming symmetric behavior of all bidders.
To create a competitive setting, we would usually set demand at 50% of supply. Due to
our chosen allocation rule, where marginal bids are fully accepted, we here chose to set
demand at 40% of supply. Note that this does not impact the (theoretical) equilibrium
price. For analyzing possible bidding behavior, we assume κi,1 = κi,2 = κi,3 =
1
3Ki with
associated unit costs of ci,1 < ci,2 < ci,3. The costs that are actually incurred by the
bidder result from the units accepted during the auction κ˜, multiplied with the costs of
the affected quantity chunk, leading to Ci(κ˜) = κ˜i,1 · ci,1 + κ˜i,2 · ci,2 + κ˜i,3 · ci,3.
While a quantity bid of qi = κi,1 + κi,2 + κi,3 with a price bid of pi ≥ ci,3 is optimal,
there exist several other sensible bidding possibilities:
qi = κi,1
with pi ≥ ci,1
or
qi = κi,1 + κi,2
with pi ≥ ci,2
(3.2)
Assuming all bidders behave symmetrically, the lower bound for the expected profit
when offering the entire quantity is:
πi ≥ 2
n
(κi,1 + κi,2 + κi,3) · ci,3. (3.3)
2
n is the probability for symmetric bidders of being allocated.
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Although the optimal bid is straightforward and a rational bidder should not deviate
from it, competitive pressure might lead price decreases. Once the price drops below
ci,3, bidders cannot afford to offer their entire capacity anymore and need to move on to
bidding only qi = κi,1+κi,2 at a price of pi ≥ ci,2. Such strong competition is more likely
to emerge when price information is displayed and when more bidders compete against
each other, i.e. in the high competition scenario. Assuming symmetric behavior again,
demand is still fulfilled and the allocation probability remains the same. The welfare
advantage of this is that more expensive units are not offered anymore, which makes
the result more efficient than when the entire quantity portfolio is sold. The predictions
are, thus:
• P1: With price information displayed, more bidders will offer a lower
quantity (qi = κi,1 + κi,2) to remain profitable.
• P2: With higher competition, more bidders will offer a lower quantity
(qi = κi,1 + κi,2) to remain profitable.
From the literature, we can form some further expectations. The learning direction
theory (Selten and Stoecker, 1986) suggests that bidders react to the success or non-
success of their actions by increasing or decreasing their bidding price. Even though they
can manipulate a second variable, namely the quantity, in a divisible good auction, the
principle of price adjustments should still hold. However, we expect it to be distorted
by additional information about the prices of their competitors, which can be used
as anchors (Neugebauer and Perote, 2008). Resulting from these considerations, the
predictions for the presented experiment are, in short:
• P3: Over the rounds, price movements will be according to the learning
direction theory.
– P3a: This is more pronounced when no price information is displayed.
• P4: When price information is displayed, bidders will use them as an-
chors.
3.3.3 Experimental design and procedure
The experiment was conducted in four sessions with 120 participants in total, meaning
30 in the four treatments and sessions. The low competition sessions accommodated
ten bidding groups of three bidders each, and the high competition sessions five bidding
groups of six bidders. Bidding groups describe the competitors in one market, i.e. they
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comprise all sellers that bid competitively to one auctioneer. Both competition scenarios
were constructed with and without feedback (hereafter: information and no information
treatment). Most participants were students with either an engineering or a business
economics background, or both. Each subject could only participate once, which was
checked by with the help of the recruitment system ORSEE (Online Recruitment System
for Economic Experiments), developed by Greiner (2003).
Upon arrival, participants were asked to draw their seating number from a randomized
stack. This ensured random seating, especially preventing people knowing each other -
who can be assumed to have higher incentives for and lower barriers to collaboration -
from cheating. They were seated at terminals that are protected by dividers on three
sides. In addition to random participant seating, the distribution of the group IDs on the
terminals was also randomized, such that bidding group members would not sit close to
each other. At no point in time did participants know their competitive situation or who
was part of their bidding group. Print-outs of the instructions were handed out and read
aloud giving ample time for questions. To ensure that everyone really understood the
auction mechanism and the resulting bidding possibilities, the first four screens consisted
of test questions that had to be answered individually. Only when every participant had
answered all questions correctly did the experiment start. To prevent any anchoring
effect, prices and quantities for the quiz differed from the prices and quantities in the
experiment with a factor of at least 20.
Participants received 10 Euros as a base pay and an additional variable pay, which
was equal to their total profit, summed over all 20 auction rounds, divided by 1000,
and rounded to the nearest Euro. Final payouts ranged from 15 to 22 Euros. The
experiment took about 90 minutes and has been programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007), a common toolbox for laboratory experiments.
Table 3.2 shows the capacity portfolio of the bidders. For the high competition scenario,
each bidder type was assigned to two participants.
Table 3.2: Cost and quantity portfolios per bidder
Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3
Quantity Cost Quantity Cost Quantity Cost
10 6 12 6 14 7
16 10 14 12 16 12
23 15 18 15 17 15
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3.4 Results
In this section we first look at the development of quantity bids, auctioneer’s expendi-
tures, price bids, and bidders’ profits. Thereafter, we test whether the predictions of the
learning direction theory hold or whether alternative bidding patterns can be observed.
In the end, we discuss the results obtained. The data analysis is done with the help
of the software MATLAB. Specifically, we conduct Kruskal-Wallis tests and regression
analyses. The latter are done both non-parametrically with a Mann-Kendall test and
parametrically with a linear regression. The Mann-Kendall test reports a qualitative re-
sult for the general trend, which can be quantified with a linear regression, also because
the measurement points can be regarded as being equidistant, i.e. there occurs the same
amount of learning for every round.
3.4.1 Data analysis
In the experiment, results show that, with no information, capacity withholding de-
creases. This is irrespective of the accepted capacity, or, from the point of view of the
seller, the amount sold, but only takes into account the sum of the bid quantities.
Capacities offered in the market slightly increased over time, especially in the low com-
petition treatment without information (see Figure 3.2). The Mann-Kendall test and
the linear regression support this with p = 3.26e−18 and a coefficient of 0.52 in the
no information treatment. The trend is a little less strong, but still highly significant
in the information treatment with p = 3.44e−6 and a coefficient of 0.31. In the high
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Figure 3.2: Development of mean capacities (comp. = competition; info = informa-
tion)
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Table 3.3: Capacities: Descriptive statistics (upper part) and Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA
(lower part)
Treatment Mean St.dev. Range
Low comp.
Info 33.2 kW 11.7 2 to 49 kW
No Info 37.3 kW 10.6 4 to 49 kW
High comp.
Info 27.3 kW 10.3 1 to 49 kW
No Info 34.8 kW 13.0 0 to 49 kW
Source SS df MS Chi-sq Prob>Chi-sq
Low comp.
Columns 4.03e6 1 4.03e6 34.01 5.48e−9
Error 1.38e8 1,198 1.15e5
Total 1.42e8 1,199
High comp.
Columns 1.43e7 1 1.43e7 121.36 3.19e−28
Error 1.27e8 1,198 1.06e6
Total 1.41e8 1,199
competition scenario, neither test can reveal a statistically significant trend for the in-
formation treatment. The no information treatment, on the other hand, shows a similar
trend as in the low competition scenario with p = 2.69e−9 and a coefficient of 0.34.
As suggested by P1, capacity bids were generally on a higher level when no feedback
was provided. Mean, standard deviation, and range of the obtained values can be seen
in Table 3.3. The very low values of 1 or 2 in the range column might have been en-
tered by mistake, because they are clearly outliers. The 0-bid, on the other hand, results
from non-participation. The differences between the information and the no information
treatment were statistically significant at the 1% level (see Table 3.3). If higher quanti-
ties can be translated as higher levels of competition (with less capacity withholding),
then less information does indeed support the competitive situation as suggested by Ray
and Cashman (1999). In contrast, we argue that the higher capacity bids observed in
the no information treatments hint at reduced competition when price information is
not available. With competitive pressure, higher-cost generators are driven out of the
market, which reduces the total capacity offered (see also P2). What appears to be in-
creased capacity withholding is, therefore, actually increased efficiency. This effect can
be observed when comparing the information with the no information treatments, but
also when comparing the low and the high competition scenarios.
The development of the auctioneer’s expenditure can be seen in Figure 3.3. Table
3.4 shows mean, standard deviation, and range. Although the mean values and the
developments of both low competition treatments look very similar, the Kruskal-Wallis
test (see Table 3.4) does not confirm this, i.e. treatments produce results that are
significantly different. For the range, some extreme values can be observed. It should be
noted, however, that these values only occurred during the first rounds; in later rounds,
some convergence took place, but full convergence could never be reached.
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Table 3.4: Auctioneer’s expenditure: Descriptive statistics (upper part) and Kruskal-
Wallis ANOVA (lower part)
Treatment Mean St.dev. Range
Low comp.
Info 18.3 ECU/kW 8.7 9.0 to 51.6 ECU/kW
No Info 18.3 ECU/kW 6.1 9.5 to 52.3 ECU/kW
High comp.
Info 13.7 ECU/kW 3.9 9.6 to 37.3 ECU/kW
No Info 15.6 ECU/kW 2.5 12.3 to 25.8 ECU/kW
Source SS df MS Chi-sq Prob>Chi-sq
Low comp.
Columns 2.28e5 1 2.28e5 17.04 3.67e−5
Error 5.11e6 398 1.28e4
Total 5.33e6 399
High comp.
Columns 2.31e5 1 2.31e5 68.93 1.02e−16
Error 4.36e5 198 2,200.6
Total 6.67e5 199
While the general impact of information on auctioneer’s expenditure is not clear, the
no information treatments do show a lower standard deviation. This could mean that
bidders stick to a certain strategy when they do not obtain market information. Whether
this strategy is closer to the theoretically predicted behavior is ambiguous. The effect of
competition, on the other hand, becomes very obvious: The low competition scenarios
resulted in significantly higher (at the 1% level) expenditures per unit than the high
competition scenarios. This result is not surprising, but shows that the mechanism works
in the anticipated way. Transferred to the scenario analyzed in Rosen and Madlener
(2013a), which emphasizes the use of such a mechanism as an incentive scheme for
renewable energy, the necessary goal of attracting market participants in an early phase
with little competition is accomplished.
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Figure 3.3: Development of weighted auctioneer’s expenditures (in ECU/kW)
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Figure 3.4: Development of prices (in ECU)
Prices develop very similar in all treatments except for the high competition informa-
tion treatment (see Figure 3.4). The no information treatments seem to have a slight
tendency to produce higher values than the information treatments, as can be seen in
Table 3.5. In the low competition treatments, means are again very close to each other,
but the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA (Table 3.5) shows that they do not come from the same
distribution, i.e. the differences between the treatments are significant.
In the high competition case, the mean values change considerably. Here, the samples
obviously do not come from the same distribution, as the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table
3.5) confirms. Both treatments in the low competition scenario do not seem to follow
any clear trend. The Mann-Kendall test is non-significant with p = 0.9804 for the
information treatment and p = 0.5157 for the no information treatment. This means
that sellers seem to have submitted on average the same prices in every round. Quite
Table 3.5: Prices: Descriptive statistics (upper part) and Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA
(lower part)
Treatment Mean St.dev. Range
Low comp.
Info 19.0 ECU/kW 11.5 7 to 100 ECU/kW
No Info 19.1 ECU/kW 10.4 7 to 100 ECU/kW
High comp.
Info 15.7 ECU/kW 13.4 6 to 100 ECU/kW
No Info 18.1 ECU/kW 11.6 7 to 100 ECU/kW
Source SS df MS Chi-sq Prob>Chi-sq
Low comp.
Columns 3.41e6 1 3.41e6 28.56 9.10e8
Error 1.40e8 1,198 1.17e5
Total 1.43e8 1,199
High comp.
Columns 3.22e7 1 3.22e7 272.85 2.71e−61
Error 1.09e8 1,198 0.91e5
Total 1.41e8 1,199
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to the contrary, the high competition information treatment exhibits a rather strong
positive trend with the Mann-Kendall p = 0.0064 and a regression coefficient of 0.20,
while the high competition no information treatment follows a negative trend with the
Mann-Kendall p = -8.36e−6 and a regression coefficient of -0.27.
Over the rounds, the development of bidders’ profits mirrors that of prices to some ex-
tent. The difference between low competition and high competition scenarios, however,
is more pronounced. The values are summarized in Table 3.6. For better comparabil-
ity, we also calculated the capacity-weighted profits (Table 3.7). Mean values here are
relatively low, because we do not discriminate between bidders that won an auction but
did not make any profit, and bidders that did not win an auction and therefore made no
profit by definition. It becomes apparent that the differences between the competitive
scenarios are larger than those between the information treatments. When implementing
such a mechanism in a real-world setting, it is, thus, more important to attract partici-
pants than to give thought about the information to be provided. The three peaks that
can be observed for the high competition information treatment in rounds 11, 15, and
20 (Figure 3.5) are outliers that result from three individual bidders who were lucky or
able to game the system with bidding prices close to or at the reservation price, while
offering their entire capacity.
In the low competition information treatment, (capacity-weighted) profits follow a neg-
ative trend with a coefficient of -0.11 (significant at the 10% level, but not in the Mann-
Kendall test: p = 0.8940). The slightly negative trend in the low competition no infor-
mation treatment is not significant in either test (Mann-Kendall: p = 0.1250). The high
competition information treatment shows the opposite trend, i.e. a positive develop-
ment with p = 6.00e−5 (Mann-Kendall) and a coefficient of 0.09. The high competition
Table 3.6: Profits: Descriptive statistics (upper part) and Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA
(lower part)
Treatment Mean St.dev. Range
Low comp.
Info 210.9 ECU 356.9 0 to 3450 ECU
No Info 209.8 ECU 365.8 0 to 4155 ECU
High comp.
Info 92.4 ECU 241.0 0 to 3890 ECU
No Info 111.7 ECU 135.1 0 to 1744 ECU
Source SS df MS Chi-sq Prob>Chi-sq
Low comp.
Columns 8.54e5 1 8.54e5 7.22 0.0072
Error 1.41e8 1,198 1.18e5
Total 1.42e8 1,199
High comp.
Columns 1.15e6 1 1.15e6 9.77 0.0018
Error 1.40e8 1,198 1.17e5
Total 1.41e8 1,199
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Figure 3.5: Development of capacity-weighted profits (in ECU/kW)
Table 3.7: Capacity-weighted profits: Descriptive statistics
Treatment Mean St.dev. Range
Low comp. Info 6.2 ECU/kW 9.2 0 to 78.4 ECU/kW
No Info 5.4 ECU/kW 8.0 0 to 88.4 ECU/kW
High comp. Info 3.4 ECU/kW 5.7 0 to 88.4 ECU/kW
No Info 3.5 ECU/kW 5.2 0 to 91.8 ECU/kW
no information treatment, however, exhibits again a negative, but non-significant trend
with p = -0.5254 and a coefficient of -0.09.
In all variables examined here, differences are significant between the two informational
treatments. We have seen that without information feedback, capacities withholding
decreases, i.e. more generators enter the market. However, this also means that efficiency
suffers because more expensive units are offered. At the same time, and as a result of the
inclusion of higher-cost generators, prices increase, and therefore also the auctioneer’s
expenditures. Profits, however, are not necessarily positively influenced by a lack of
information, only by decreasing intensity in the competitive situation.
3.4.2 Testing for the learning direction theory
After receiving feedback from a round, a bidder can be in two different states: He can
either be successful with his last bid or unsuccessful. In the following round, he has the
opportunity to react to this state by manipulating his bid price. It can be increased, kept
equal, or decreased. The learning direction theory Selten and Stoecker (1986) suggests
that bidders will decrease their bid price when their bid has not been accepted, whereas
they increase their bid price when their bid has been accepted.
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We evaluated this for all our treatments. In addition to the two states defined by the
learning direction theory (“Strategy 1”), we also consider all other possible combinations
for completeness. These can be clustered into doing nothing, i.e. remaining with the
same bid (“Strategy 2”) and bidding contrary to the predictions of the learning direction
theory (“Strategy 3”). Some of these combinations result from sensible behavior in the
market. One of these is keeping the bid price equal although the preceding bid has been
successful. Such behavior makes sense when bidders are aware that the competitive
situation does not allow an increase in the price or when the market approaches its
steady-state (which is again a result of competitive forces). Another one is the counter-
intuitive behavior when the bid price is lowered although the bidder has been successful.
This would again be a result of competitive forces when bidders perceive their bid price
as being the marginal bid price, which might not be allocated again in the following
round. Obviously, such behavior only makes sense when the average market price is
known, i.e. in the information treatment. We, thus, have the following six possible
types of behavior:
• Strategy 1: Following the learning direction theory
– 1a: no success, bid lowered
– 1b: success, bid increased
• Strategy 2: Remain with the previous bid
– 2a: success, bid equal
– 2b: no success, bid equal
• Strategy 3: Bid contrary to the learning direction theory
– 3a: no success, bid increased
– 3b: success, bid lowered
Table 3.8 summarizes the bid movements observed over all rounds and treatments. One
can see that most moves in bidding behavior conform to the learning direction theory
in all four treatments. Nevertheless, some important differences can be observed when
comparing the results in more detail. First of all, while increasing the bid price after a
successful bid is the behavior most often observed in all cases, it occurs much more often
in the low competition scenario. This means that higher competition affects not only the
level of bid prices, but also directly impacts the bid movements. Secondly, the learning
direction theory does not suggest that bidders lower their bids after a successful round.
However, this behavior occurs in substantial numbers when information on competing
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Table 3.8: Results for bid movements (in %)
Low comp. Low comp. High comp. High comp.
info no info info no info
Strategy 1a 19.6 24.4 15.6 30.0
Strategy 1b 35.1 38.4 28.8 34.4
Strategy 2a 29.1 30.7 37.2 27.4
Strategy 2b 1.8 1.2 3.7 2.1
Strategy 3a 1.2 0.2 0.2 2.3
Strategy 3b 13.2 5.1 14.6 3.9
prices is provided. This supports the notion of Neugebauer and Perote (2008) that
bidders anchor on published bid prices. More generally, the numbers reveal that bid
prices are indeed kept equal, and increasingly so in the later rounds. It is unclear whether
this constitutes a steady-state of the market, because logic would dictate unsuccessful
bid prices to be kept equal as well. This, however, cannot be observed, indicating that
bidders are still profitable enough to have options and prices have not reached marginal
cost. It might, therefore, be inspired by a feeling of “never change a winning horse”,
rather than rational reasoning.
3.4.3 Discussion
The results can be explained by two diverging trends: On the one hand, competitive
forces move prices downward over time. On the other hand, bidders tried to gradually
approach higher prices wherever possible. In the information treatment, they used the
published prices and oriented their own bids towards the upper end. In the no informa-
tion treatment, they concluded the market prices from their own accepted or rejected
bids. Furthermore, they seem to have applied different strategies in the two treatments.
When prices were displayed, two thirds of the participants reported to have included
this information in their decision process to react with their own price bid appropriately.
This is evidence for the anchoring effect observed by Neugebauer and Perote (2008), and
explains why no clear trend can be observed in the data. Although more bidders an-
chored on the higher accepted bids (20% - 30%), some anchored on the lower accepted
bids (7% - 17%), suggesting a continuous replication of the preceding prices. While in
the no information treatment prices are also an important decision variable, quantity-
driven considerations are relatively more important than in the information treatment.
The high competition information treatment was the only one where bidders became
very competitive. Some stated that they tried to drive others out of the market, or were
bidding in a specific way just to hinder others from gaining higher profits, even if their
own profits were suffering. Others tried to bring down prices until their competitors
were not able to offer sufficient supply at the prevailing price level. At this point, they
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would step in and offer a large amount at very high prices to maximize their own profits
(this behavior can explain the peaks observed in Figure 3.5). This means that the suc-
cessful gaming described in the last section is not a result of collusion, but of individual
bidders who patiently drove down market prices (and thereby quantities) over a couple
of rounds until demand was not fulfilled anymore to be able to enter the market with
their entire capacity at a very high price. Since their competitors offered too little, this
high bid had to be accepted, rewarding them with exorbitant profits.
Even though several bidders strictly oriented their bidding prices towards the upper
end of the accepted price scale, explicit attempts at collusion were unsuccessful. The
bidders do not seem to have understood the signals their competitors were trying to send
to the market (a few participants were very frustrated by this and complained after the
experiment that their colleagues were “too stupid”). As we do not display losing bids,
this result is in line with Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002), who found that signaling only
happens when all submitted bids are displayed. It should be noted that, in general,
bidders in the high competition information treatment understood very quickly that
they had to reduce their quantity offers to stay profitable.
In Section 3.3, we theoretically derived that price information as well as higher compe-
tition lead to lower quantities being offered (P1 and P2). Both predictions are equally
supported. When combined, the effect is amplified, i.e. the lowest quantity offers can
be found for the high competition information treatment.
From the learning direction theory, we also predicted the price movements and estab-
lished that they should follow the learning direction theory even more, when no infor-
mation is displayed (P3 and P3a). This information can lead to distortions, because
the bidders might use them as anchors (P4). We find support for all predictions. As
mentioned above, P3 and P3a only mirror the results to some extent, because about one
third up to one half of the bid movements cannot be explained by the learning direction
theory. As put forward in P4, this is especially true for the information treatments,
where bidders indeed use published prices as anchors.
3.5 Conclusion
We examined the impact of information on a divisible good auction market experimen-
tally and compared the results to the theoretical predictions derived from the assumption
of symmetric bidding behavior and the learning direction theory. For this purpose, we
defined an information treatment, where bidders could observe all winning bids after each
auction round, and a no information treatment, where such feedback was not available.
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Both treatments were tested in a high and a low competition scenario, which differed
in the number of competitors. In both competition scenarios, quantities submitted were
larger in the no information treatment. The same is true for the auctioneer’s expen-
diture, which is higher for no information. This effect is enhanced for a lower level of
competition, which means that holding back information seems to hinder competition,
as anticipated. Although there was no large absolute difference for prices in the low
competition case, it was still statistically significant. In the high competition case, the
no information treatment produced much higher prices. However, these prices follow
a negative trend, i.e. they decrease again over the rounds. In the high competition
information treatment, the opposite can be observed, meaning they increase over the
rounds. The results for profits are contradictory in the sense that the two competitive
settings produce different outcomes. In the low competition scenario, profits were lower
for the no information treatment, while they were higher in the high competition no
information scenario.
Overall, our predictions can be confirmed. Price information leads to more competition,
such that bidders need to reduce their quantity bids to remain profitable. The same
effect is reached by a higher level of competition. When combined, the effects enhance
one another, which results in even smaller quantity and price bids.
The predictions of the learning direction theory hold for most moves in the bids. How-
ever, we also observed bids which cannot be explained by the learning direction theory,
but seem to result from habitual behavior. Furthermore, there is evidence for anchor-
ing on published prices, which might be a counteracting force for the bid movements.
Although there were also attempts at signaling and collusion, these have never been
successful.
Further research should validate the current findings with respect to their robustness.
This concerns the pricing and the rationing rule as well as the auction format.
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Appendix
Auction mechanism
There is a set I of n potential bidders, with n ∈
{
3; 6
}
, depending on the treatment.
Each bidder i ∈ I can submit one bid bi(p), which is composed of a price pi and a
quantity qi. These bids are ranked according to price, with bi;1 being the lowest offer
and bi;kmax being the highest offer, kmax being either 3 or 6. Each bidder knows his costs
as a function of quantity, ci(q). Costs follow a discrete step function and are drawn from
a common distribution, as are available quantities.
In the following, we ignore the source of the bid, i.e. neglect the i. Let p be the
vector of prices that the auctioneer faces due to the submitted sets of offers p =(
p1; p2; ...; pkmax
)
. Further, let q =
(
q(p1); q(p2); ...; q(pkmax)
)
be the corre-
sponding quantity vector, as emerging from the bids bi;k ranked according to price.
Considering the reservation price pR enforced in the auction, total expenditure of the
auctioneer becomes:
min
p
∑
i
xiqipi
s.t.
∑
i
qi ≥ Qs
with s =
⎧⎨
⎩0 if
∑
i qi < Q
1 otherwise
xi ∈ {0, 1} with xi =
⎧⎨
⎩0 if bid i is accepted1 otherwise
pR ≥ pi
(A.1)
Chapter 4
Multiple vs. Single Bids in
Reserve Energy Auctions: An
Experimental Analysis
Abstract
In this paper we report on an experimental examination of the comparison between mul-
tiple and single bids in a discriminatory-price procurement auction of divisible goods.
Having been inspired by reserve energy trading, sellers with a portfolio comprising several
cost-quantity pairs bid into a market with a single buyer. Depending on the treatment,
they are allowed to submit either one or two bids constructed from their endowments.
The allocation rule has no rationing, i.e. marginal bids are completely accepted, which
is sensible for a reserve energy market. We specify both a low and a high competition
scenario to evaluate the effects of competitive forces on both bidding regimes. We find
that multiple bids have a calming effect on the market, reducing volatility substantially.
However, this comes at the cost of lower profits for bidders, whereas auctioneer’s revenue
is maximized. At the same time, supply reduction, which is equivalent to demand re-
duction in demand auctions, is less pronounced in the multiple-bid setting, but increases
over time and with competition.
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4.1 Introduction
Markets are the enabling components of economies: With a diversity of different func-
tions and designs they facilitate trading, and some designs are known to be very efficient.
In particular, this applies to the field of auctions, whereof multi-unit and divisible good
auctions have proven especially useful in public tenders, such as radio spectrum, Trea-
sury bond, or energy auctions. In these types of auctions, an important design feature
is the number of bids that can be submitted. While demand as well as supply is of-
ten associated with continuous cost or valuation functions, real-world bidding systems
usually impose constraints on the number of bids that can be entered. The transforma-
tion of continuous cost curves into discrete bids can lead to the obvious problem of not
being able to map the underlying preferences or information exactly, and engaging in
price/quantity trade-offs that might not be optimal. One can expect that the problem
becomes more severe as fewer bids can be submitted. Eventually, inefficiencies and mar-
ket failures can emerge. An example for this transformation problem can be found in
the context of the Treasury bond auctions of the European Central Bank. The number
of possible bids (price-quantity pairs) is limited to ten (European Central Bank, 2006,
p.26) in the variable-rate tender, but most bidders submit no more than one to three
bids (Nyborg et al., 2009). In reserve energy auctions, the number of bids is limited
by the amount of prequalified capacity divided by the minimum quantity required for
each bid. Despite its practical salience, the majority of studies in the field of divisible
good auctions focuses on single bids or continuous bid schedules. The theoretical and
practical complexity of these auctions lies in the reciprocal effects of price and quantity,
i.e. price and quantity bids need to be traded off against each other, while real-world
auction rules, such as the ones just presented, require certain minimum quantities for
administrative or other reasons. Tenorio (1997, 1999) and Kremer and Nyborg (2004)
have analyzed the impact of discrete bids theoretically, but so far its practical validity
has not been examined experimentally for a divisible good auction. In empirical studies,
supply reduction has been observed. It can be described as “intra-subject collusion”
with the goal of achieving higher prices (Back and Zender, 1993).
In markets with non-professional bidders such as private households, the problem be-
comes even more severe as these bidders lack the experience and often also the capabil-
ities of determining an appropriate bid. Anecdotal evidence for this can be found with
one of the most popular online auction websites, eBay, which offered the possibility of
a multi-unit auction for several years. When launching the website it was introduced
under the name “Power Auction”, being renamed “Multi-Auction” in July 2005, with
adjusted rules that were closer to the single-unit auctions, and that allowed bidders to
enter one bid consisting of the number of items they wanted to purchase and the price
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they were willing to pay for each item. As, even in its revised form, the auction seems
to have caused confusion among bidders and led to undesired outcomes, it is no longer
available (cf. eBay archives).
In this paper, we present an experiment on the effect of the number of permissible bids on
bidding behavior (in terms of price and quantity), efficiency, and revenue. It is framed in
an energy market context, but results are very broad and can be transferred to any other
auction with similar properties. A relevant field hereby is, for instance, the financial
sector with Treasury bond auctions, foreign currency auctions, or cloud financing. In
our case, however, we focus on procurement auctions where bidders are sellers into a
market with a single buyer. Due to technical reasons, we employ a non-rationing rule.
A bid hereby consists of the quantity the bidder wants to sell and the price he wants
to receive per unit sold. We find that when multiple bids can be submitted, individual
profits fluctuate much less than in the single-bid case, while auctioneer’s revenue is
maximized.
We proceed as follows: Section 4.2 gives an overview of the relevant literature, focusing
essentially on experimental and theoretical research on divisible good, single- and multi-
bid auctions. Section 4.3 uses this input to provide some theoretical predictions of the
experimental results. Section 4.4 explains the experimental procedure, while section 4.5
presents the results obtained. Section 4.6 concludes our findings and their implications.
4.2 Related research
In previous research, mainly three types of bidding regimes are used (Table 4.1). In
theoretical studies, continuously differentiable bid functions are the most popular ones,
but they are not used exclusively. Elmaghraby (2005) and Alvarez and Mazon (2007)
both deliberately decide to use discrete bids in their models, because they better reflect
the current auctioning practice in the field of electricity and Treasury bond auctions.
In empirical studies, bid schedules in several variations are very common for the same
reason. Bidding rules in divisible good auctions often allow for multiple bids to be
submitted, and models need to take this into account to be applicable to the available
data. Two notable exceptions are Tenorio (1997, 1999) and Kremer and Nyborg (2004),
who study the effect of discreteness on the auction outcome. In experimental studies,
usually a discrete number of bids is allowed, constituting either a single bid or a bid
schedule. To our knowledge, their respective effect on the auction outcome, however,
has not been studied yet.
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The issue with bids in multi-unit or divisible good auctions is that price and quantity
influence each other as well as the auction outcome. One of the first to analyze this
reciprocal relationship was Smith (1966). He points to the possibility that upon avail-
ability of these decision variables, bidders will reduce them both in a demand auction to
increase their profit (i.e. in case of a procurement auction they will reduce the quantity
and increase the price). The problem of differences in multiple bids versus single bids
was only addressed much later by Scott and Wolf (1979). In their setting, multiple price-
bids increase bidders’ expected utility gained from the auction and thereby dominate
single price-bids.
Previous research in divisible good auctions has either focused on bids for discrete units
or on continuous bid schedules. Theoretically, this has been examined by Back and
Zender (1993), for example. Experimental research on this topic, but with discrete
prices and quantities, has been published in 2013 by Morales-Camargo et al. (for further
examples see Table 4.1). The latter find that the mean number of distinct bids submitted
was 3.76, which is substantially less than the maximum number of bids, with more bids
submitted in the uniform-price auctions than in the discriminatory-price auctions. Bids
could be submitted in the form of quantity indications in a predetermined price schedule.
Also, they found that most bidders bid in sum for not less than the entire quantity
available.
A very similar approach is taken by Sade et al. (2006), who also examine an auction mar-
ket inspired by Treasury bond auctions with uniform and discriminatory pricing. In their
experiment, bidders were allowed to submit four bids, each being a quantity at a prede-
fined price. The sum of the bids was not allowed to exceed the total quantity available.
While the theory they applied predicts flat bids in discriminatory auctions, the authors
find that 36% of the bidders submit several different price/quantity pairs. They also find
a much smaller standard deviation in the demand schedules in the discriminatory-price
auction than in the standard uniform-price auction. However, the standard deviation
and the skewness are higher than predicted by theory, because bidders did not submit
completely flat demands.
In an energy context, Rassenti et al. (1994) conduct an experiment for gas pipeline
networks, where bidders are allowed to submit two price-quantity pairs as bids. They,
however, do not report how these bids may be constructed or what variance can be
observed over several auction rounds.
In an empirical study with data from the Norwegian Treasury bond auction, Bjonnes
(2001) finds that the smaller the quantity demanded by the bidder, the fewer bids he
submits. Bjonnes divides all bidders into three categories, the first being large (institu-
tional) bidders, the second medium-sized bidders and the last small bidders. He finds
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Table 4.1: Review of bidding regimes in the literature
Study Bidding regimes Type of study
Alvarez and Mazon (2007) Discrete bids Theoretical/simulation
Ausubel and Cramton (2002) Continuous bid function Theoretical
Back and Zender (1993) Continuous bid function Theoretical
Back and Zender (2001) Continuous bid function Theoretical
Bourjade (2009) Continuous bid function Theoretical
Burke and Auslander (2009) One bid with soft Theoretical
budget constraint
Denton et al. (2001) Bid schedule Experimental
Elmaghraby (2005) Discrete bids Theoretical
Federico and Rahman (2003) Continuous bid function Theoretical
Hortacsu and McAdams (2010) Bid schedule Empirical
(step function)
Kang and Puller (2008) Price grid / discrete and Empirical
continuous bid functions
Kastl (2011) Bid schedule Empirical
(step function)
Rassenti et al. (1994) 2 discrete bids allowed Experimental
Rassenti et al. (2003) Bid schedule Experimental
(step function)
Rosen and Madlener (2013a) Continuous bid function Theoretical
Rostek et al. (2010) Continuous bid function Theoretical
Sade et al. (2006) 4 discrete bids allowed Experimental
Scott and Wolf (1979) Discrete bids Empirical
(single vs. multiple)
Sefton and Zhang (2009) Multiple discrete Experimental
bids allowed
Smith (1966) One bid Theoretical
Tenorio (1997) Discrete bids Theoretical
Tenorio (1999) Discrete bids Theoretical
Wang and Zender (2007) Bid schedule Theoretical
(piece-wise differentiable)
that the latter only submit 2.2 bids on average, whereas larger bidders submit up to 7.5
bids on average.
On the theoretical side, Kremer and Nyborg (2004) relax the common assumption of
continuous demand functions and introduce discrete bids into a model to analyze under-
pricing. They conclude that due to an increased price competition on marginal units,
underpricing vanishes when supply is either uncertain or larger than individual demand.
It can be assumed that non-rationing has a similar effect, because it eases competition
on marginal units.
Kastl (2011) has a similar approach and starts his analysis with a standard uniform-
pricing model for a divisible good auction. He then introduces a model for step functions,
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which he applies to the Czech Treasury bond auction. He also establishes a close link
between divisible good auctions with discrete bids and multi-unit auctions. His findings
suggest that it makes a difference whether one assumes a model with discrete or contin-
uous bidding for analyzing data, but that bidder’s profits are not necessarily improved
with continuous bidding.
Tenorio (1999) shows that for divisible good auctions with “lumpy bids”, i.e. bids
that do not follow a continuous bid function, expected revenue is higher the bigger the
chunks (in terms of quantity) are that need to be bid for. Lumpiness hereby refers to
the discreteness of several units, or alternatively “pieces” of the good demanded at the
same price, which is often required by the auction rules through the enforcement of
minimum quantities. This implies that when only one bid for the entire quantity can
be placed, expected auctioneer’s revenue reaches its maximum. An explanation for this
would be the perceived risk by bidders of experiencing rationing, which is obviated by
more aggressive price bidding. Equivalently, when bidders bid for shares of an object
rather than for the whole object, their expected payoffs are larger.
Tenorio (1997) also shows that the above-mentioned phenomena are even more severe
in uniform-price auctions than in discriminatory-price auctions, supporting our choice
of design. The negative effects on efficiency caused by an altered distribution of units
are evident.
Grimm et al. (2008) examine divisible good auctions experimentally, but their focus is
very different from that of the aforementioned studies: They evaluate the impact of
rationing on bidder behavior. The results, however, cannot be compared to ours in
any way, as Grimm et al. use a mechanism where the seller announces a price and
bidders can only react with a quantity bid without being able to actually influence the
price. This means that the quantity is not necessarily sold completely, resulting in an
inefficient market outcome. They do, however, find that a mechanism without rationing
is incentive-compatible.
Another experiment on divisible good auctions was performed by Sefton and Zhang
(2009). They use uniform pricing, and focus on the impact of communication, i.e. cheap
talk. In their set-up, bidders could submit as many price-quantity pairs as they wished
until the sum of the quantity bids hit the pre-announced boundary. They find that for
the standard allocation rule with rationing, bidders most easily coordinated their actions
when communication was allowed.
A direct comparison of single and multiple bids has so far been missing in the literature.
We would like to add to the literature by analyzing the respective effects on bidding
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prices and quantities. In the following, we introduce the auction mechanism with the
non-rationing rule and its application in our experiment.
4.3 Market structure and theoretical benchmarks
The auction rules are directly linked to the investigated market framework, but can
occur in very similar forms in other markets like cloud financing, and even in fresh fish
and timber markets. We consider a local market for reserve energy, where households
can offer the energy they produce with their own equipment (e.g. photovoltaics, micro-
combined heat and power generators, micro-wind turbines, or batteries). This means
that real-world bidders are small relative to market size and, therefore, cannot signif-
icantly impact the market. Additionally, the size and the technical properties of their
generating equipment do not allow for arbitrary adjustments in the amounts to be pro-
duced. This is why we cannot implement a rationing rule, but accept bids completely.
Constituting a safety mechanism in the electricity grid, the single buyer is obliged to
procure a minimum quantity. By accepting entire bids without rationing, he can, thus,
also enlarge his safety margin. The market is meant to complement the existing cen-
tralized reserve energy market by helping to better integrate decentralized units, such
as those installed in private homes.1 The price level of the centralized market also gives
an implicit reservation price.
Otherwise, prices in the market should emerge from the underlying costs. This means
that although the local reserve energy market offers a great opportunity to gain some
money on the side, investments into generation equipment should not happen with the
sole purpose of participating in it. The operating hours in combination with the dispatch
probabilities are unlikely to cover costs. Equipment should therefore serve as supply for
own consumption as a primary task. This also means that at times, there is some amount
of spare capacity that a household is happy to sell, while any exceeding amount decreases
its level of comfort. A household might still be willing to sell this amount, but needs to
ask a higher price for this additional quantity to balance its total utility. Furthermore,
there might be several different technologies installed, which have different production
costs. We represent this increasing cost function with a portfolio with three different
quantities and costs. As we allow bidders to submit up to two bids in the multi-bid
1This is not only necessary to ensure a safe grid operation, but also security of supply in the light
of recent efforts for the energy turnaround. With decreasing levels of acceptance of nuclear power
and limited capacities in coal- and gas-fired power plants, the renewable and decentralized generation
is required to sustain previous levels of comfort and reliability in electricity supply. However, so far
the existing market is not meant to be replaced, but remains as a perfect substitute for decentralized
procurement. Further information on the underlying market framework and its functioning can be found
in Rosen and Madlener (2013a).
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case, the three chunks are necessary to avoid a trivial mapping from the given prices
and quantities to the respective bids. Any higher number that can be evenly divided
by the number of possible bids would suffer the same drawback, while any other uneven
number higher than three would complicate the transformation process needlessly.
Keeping this in mind, the market mechanism can be described as a procurement auction
with a discriminatory pricing mechanism. This means that bidders receive exactly the
price that they bid in case they are allocated. Costs are private information and increase
discretely for the quantity chunks. Each bid consists of a price and a quantity, which
can be chosen as integer numbers within the given limits. The highest price that can be
achieved is the reservation price, pR, which is set in advance and is commonly known.
In total, one or two bids may be submitted, but do not have to be submitted, i.e. the
quantity in either bid can always be set to zero. With regular repetition it is a repeated
game, which might set an incentive to collude, especially in the first rounds. Marginal
bids are accepted completely, i.e. without rationing.
In mathematical terms, this means there is a set of potential bidders I consisting of n
bidders. Each bidder i ∈ I can submit up to two bids bi,j , which are composed of a
price pi,j and a quantity qi,j . Each bidder knows his costs as a function of quantity ci(q).
Costs follow a discrete step function and are drawn from a common distribution, as are
available quantities. Let pi be the vector of prices that bidder i submits, and let qi be
the corresponding quantity vector. From there we obtain the set of all possible bids bi.
pi =
(
pi,1
pi,2
)
with pi,j ≥ 0, qi =
(
qi,1
qi,2
)
with qi,j ≥ 0 (4.1)
bi =
(
{pi,1, qi,1}
{pi,2, qi,2}
)
=
(
bi,1
bi,2
)
(4.2)
A bid can either be accepted or rejected. Both bids can be accepted at the same time,
and are, thus, not mutually exclusive. Acceptance is a binary variable described by
xi =
(
xi,1
xi,2
)
(4.3)
with xi,1, xi,2 ∈ {0,1}. Bidder i’s revenue in one round is, therefore determined by (we
leave out the “i” for simplicity):
∑
xjpjqj = x1p1q1 + x2p2q2 (4.4)
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The auctioneer needs to procure a fixed, predetermined quantity Q and tries to do so at
the lowest possible costs. This leads us to the minimization problem, where the binary
variable s indicates whether the total demand can be satisfied by all offers.
min
xi,j
⎧⎨
⎩
∑
i
∑
j
xi,jpi,jqi,j
⎫⎬
⎭
s.t.
xi,j ≥ 1− s ∀ i, j∑
i
∑
j
xi,jqi,j ≥ Qs
with
s =
⎧⎨
⎩0 if
∑
i
∑
j qi,j < Q
1 otherwise.
(4.5)
Note, that in case s = 0 due to the first constraint, all bids are accepted and the objective
function is constant in xi,j with value
∑
i,j pi,jqi,j .
4.3.1 Implementation in the experiment
As a result from the non-rationing rule, the above-mentioned formulation of the opti-
mization problem could lead to a situation where a bidder’s offer is rejected even though
his price is lower than the accepted price of an opponent. In that case, a bidder could
believe that his demanded price was too high, even if it was clearly not, and falsely
adjust the price downwards during the following auction round. To avoid sending such
false signals to the participants of the experiment, we altered the optimization process
in such a way that those rejected bids at lower prices are additionally accepted. Alter-
natively, one can imagine the bids to be ranked according to price, with (bi,j)1 being
the lowest offer and (bi,j)m representing the highest offer. Index k with k ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}
hereby denotes the rank of an individual bid among all submitted bids with m being
the number of all submitted bids. This means that in order not to provoke undesired
behavior and false signals, bids are strictly accepted according to their rank. As bidders
are relatively small, this does not impose any problems or exorbitant deviations in the
experiment. In a real-world market, this issue should be even less pronounced as bidders
are much smaller in comparison to the market size.
While non-rationing has been shown to lead to truthful bidding (Grimm et al., 2008),
we believe that our implementation further enhances this effect as misleading feedback
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is undermined. However, it is also possible that bidders feel less pressure to bid “ag-
gressively”, i.e. competitively, which would result in higher market prices. An opposing
effect emerges from the fact that the non-rationing rule absorbs some of the prevalence of
the price-quantity interdependence. Thereby, the focus is shifted to more price-oriented
competition, which again supports lower market prices.
4.3.2 Predictions: The cost-quantity rule
Solution concepts for equilibria in multi-unit auctions are quite complex and rely on
heavy assumptions. Especially in the context of electricity markets, the methods of
supply function equilibria (e.g. Genc and Reynolds, 2011) and bid function equilibria
(Crawford et al., 2007) have emerged. While the supply function approach requires
continuous functions, the bid function approach allows for discreteness in bids and units,
thereby accounting for important properties of the real-world electricity market, namely
discrete generators. There exists an extension to discriminatory pricing for the supply
function approach to accommodate reserve energy markets (Holmberg, 2009), but the
bid function approach is restricted to uniform pricing, making it difficult to apply it
to our chosen scenario. The major obstacle lies in the identification of a “price-setter”
and a “non-price-setter” (cf. Crawford et al., 2007), because in a discriminatory auction,
every bidder is his own price-setter.
In our scenario, we have n bidders and each bidder i disposes of total capacity Ki =∑
j κi,j with
∑
iKi =
Q
α . Hereby, α is the percentage of demand to supply. Bidder i
faces a total cost function of
Ci(κi) =
∑
j
κi,j · ci,j with ci,j < ci,j+1 (4.6)
with ci,j being the marginal cost of each generator j for bidder i. Due to the chosen
allocation rule without rationing, in the single-bid treatment it is obviously always op-
timal to offer the entire quantity that can be produced at costs that are at or below
the stated (bid) price. In the presented auction market, neither profit nor the alloca-
tion probability can be positively influenced by offering only part of a chunk. In the
multi-bid treatment, this cost-quantity rule can in principle be applied in the same way,
but bids can be truncated such that each represents one, two, or all three parts of the
quantity portfolio. Another option would be to construct a safe bid that is close to the
presumed market price and has a very high chance of being allocated, and a “gambling”
bid with a very high price and a lower chance of being allocated. This bid is then used
for an occasional profit boost, but also to gather information about the possible set of
prices which are still allocated. This kind of information cannot be obtained otherwise,
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Table 4.2: Possible distributions of capacity over bids
Single bid Multi bid
Bid one Bid two
1st chunk 1st chunk 2nd (& 3rd) chunk
1st & 2nd chunk 1st & 2nd chunk 3rd chunk
entire capacity entire capacity
because prices are not published during the auction process. When constructing such
bids, the “rule” of using entire lumps should, however, still be observed. Any other way
of distributing the quantities over the bids leads, ceteris paribus, to reduced profits on
some of the units. And again, a change in allocation probabilities cannot be reached
by such behavior, at least not when assuming symmetric behavior of all bidders. Ta-
ble 4.2 shows the possible distributions of bidder i’s capacity over bids in case of three
generators, which is the endowment of each bidder in all experimental treatments.
For predicting the bidding behavior, let us assume κi,1 = κi,2 = κi,3 =
1
3Ki and respec-
tive unit costs ci,1 < ci,2 < ci,3. His actual production costs are determined by the units
accepted in the auction process κ˜, multiplied with the costs of the respective generator,
resulting in Ci(κ˜) = κ˜i,1 · ci,1 + κ˜i,2 · ci,2 + κ˜i,3 · ci,3. To create a competitive setting,
we would usually set demand at 50% of supply. As marginal bids are not partially ac-
cepted, but completely, we here chose to set demand at 40% of supply. This does not
change the theoretical market price (ci,2), but spices up the competition, especially for
the numerical implementation.
From the cost-quantity rule, we know that in the single-bid case, qi = κi,1+κi,2+κi,3 and
pi ≥ ci,3 (also see Rosen and Madlener, 2013c). In the multi-bid case, several additional
options are possible:
qi,1 = κi,1 and qi,2 = κi,2 (+κi,3)
with ci,1 < pi,1 < ci,2 and pi,2 ≥ ci,2 (or ci,3)
or
qi,1 = κi,1 + κi,2 and qi,2 = κi,3
with ci,2 < pi,1 < ci,3 and pi,2 ≥ ci,3
(4.7)
From here, assuming symmetric behavior of all bidders, we can determine the expected
profits for the multi-bid case. The probabilities result from the chances of allocation in
each case, and prices are estimated to equal the costs of the adjacent, more expensive
chunk or the highest costs of the portfolio.
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πm,1 ≈ κ1 · c2 + 1
n
κ2 · c3
or
πm,2 ≈ 2
n
(κ1 + κ2) · c3
(4.8)
While for the single-bid case or when a bidder decides to submit only one bid in the
multi-bid case, the expected profit can be approximated by
πs ≥ 2
n
(κ1 + κ2 + κ3) · c3. (4.9)
Although these are quite some simplifications, it is easy to see that the expected profit
is higher when only a single bid that includes all units is placed. Comparing this profit
to the expected profits in the more price-oriented scenarios with lower quantities, it is
strictly larger, giving preference to quantity- over price-strategies. The bids resulting in
πm,1 should never be placed, because they have the lowest payoff. Theoretically, only
the bid resulting in the highest profits (πs) should be submitted. Note that the resulting
allocation is not efficient anymore, because more costly units would also be allocated.
Using these considerations and calculations, we can form some expectations for the ex-
periment. The different treatments exercise different amounts of competitive pressure
which lead to higher or lower levels of market prices. In the multi-bid environment,
bidders can react to this pressure by reducing the quantity in their first bid, and are
thereby able to offer lower prices as well, while maintaining their profit margin. Their
remaining (high-cost) capacity can still be offered at higher prices in the second bid,
which means it does not remain unused. In the single-bid environment, such an adapta-
tion to the market is not possible. As bidders will nonetheless want to use their entire
capacity, they cannot reduce their prices in a similar way. Therefore, we expect that:
• P1: For the multi-bid case, bidders will reduce their price for the first
bid, such that they cannot offer more than κ1 and κ2.
• P2: For the single-bid case, bidders will remain with the optimal bid
and offer their entire capacity (κ1 + κ2 + κ3).
Without knowing the market or being able to calculate an obvious bidding strategy,
there is a high chance that bidders behave arbitrarily at the beginning of the experi-
ment. Once they learn which bids get accepted and which bids do not, they can adjust
their offers accordingly. Market pressure develops as prices decrease slowly in the course
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of the auction rounds, while bidders compete for being allocated. Furthermore, partici-
pants need experience to understand, discover, and eventually apply the optimal bidding
strategies. The predictions for each treatment can, therefore, be expected to develop
and fortify over the auction rounds:
• P3: Due to learning over time, the tendencies will further materialize
over the auction rounds, such that total quantities will decrease in the
multi-bid treatment, but increase in the single-bid treatment.
• P4: The development of quantities is mirrored in the development of
prices.
The issue of learning and other effects of repetition are also further discussed and ana-
lyzed in Rosen and Madlener (2013c). As mentioned above, we evaluate a low and a high
competition scenario. In the high competition scenario, we double the number of bid-
ders, but also the demand, such that the competitive situation is theoretically identical.
Nevertheless, we expect the above-mentioned tendencies to be even more articulated.
When following (Tenorio, 1999), we would expect the single-bid treatment to result
in higher competition, i.e. lower prices and smaller quantities and, therefore, lower
auctioneer’s expenditures. In principle, in the multi-bid treatment, bidders can partition
their available quantity and reduce their offer in any way they like, resulting in numerous
possible outcomes (see Li and Tesfatsion 2012 for a discussion of different modes of supply
reduction in an energy context). In contrast, in the single-bid treatment, they can only
determine the amount from their total supply, but this induces many possibilities as
well.
4.4 Experimental procedure
In the experiment realized, 126 test subjects participated in four different treatments
(high competition multi-bid, high competition single-bid, low competition multi-bid,
and low competition single-bid). The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007), and was conducted in the AIXperiment Lab at the School of Busi-
ness and Economics, RWTH Aachen University. Participants were recruited using the
web-based online recruitment tool ORSEE (Online Recruitment System for Economic
Experiments) developed by Greiner (2003). Most participants were students and had
either an engineering or a business studies background, or both. It was only possible for
them to participate in the experiment once.
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Table 4.3: Cost and quantity pairs of the three bidders considered
Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3
Quantity Cost Quantity Cost Quantity Cost
10 6 12 6 14 7
16 10 14 12 16 12
23 15 18 15 17 15
When all participants had arrived at the laboratory, they were randomly allocated to
seats. Instructions were handed out and read aloud. Afterwards, there was ample time
for questions. To foster the understanding of the auction mechanism, a quiz containing
questions and calculation exercises had to be taken and only when all participants had
completed it successfully, the actual experiment began. To prevent any anchoring effect,
prices and quantities for the quiz differed from the prices and quantities of the experiment
by at least a factor of 20.
For each session, there were either ten fixed bidding groups consisting of three bidders, or
five groups consisting of six bidders. Bidders were seated in the same room in booths that
were protected on three sides by screens. In order to prevent collusion, they were neither
aware of how many competitors they had nor of who was in their group. Additionally,
group IDs were randomly distributed, meaning that any two participants seated close
to each other were unlikely to be competitors.
One session was composed of 20 identical one-shot auctions, which were called “rounds”
during the experiment. Settings did not change from round to round, so that quantities
and costs always remained the same. The individual supply capacity was in the form of
a portfolio of three quantities at three different prices. Table 4.3 indicates the available
quantities and costs to bidders in the three-person (low) competition case. For the six-
person (high) competition case, each portfolio is assigned to two bidders. Participants
were told that they could imagine these to be different generation technologies with
specific operating properties in an energy context. Using these endowments, bidders
could construct one or two bids (depending on the treatment), which could be the
sum of these three quantity chunks at a maximum, i.e. the maximum amount they
can produce in total. When they chose to sell less, and in the two-bid treatment, the
system automatically assumed that they would sell the lowest-cost quantities first, thus
maximizing their profit. The costs were calculated accordingly, beginning with the
lowest costs and subsequently adding further costs proportionally. The average costs
of one quantity-bid also determined the minimum price that could be offered, i.e. the
price could not be lower than the costs for the chosen quantity in the quantity bid. If
participants tried to bid below their costs, they faced an error message, but this hardly
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occurred after the test questions were successfully answered. This way, they could not
make a loss during the entire session. The profit was calculated in the same way, i.e.
such that the accepted bid - irrespective of it being the first or the second bid entered
- was assumed to have the lowest costs. In the case of two bids, the lower bid was
assumed to have the lower costs. The maximum price that could be entered was limited
by a reservation price of 100 ECU, which was common knowledge. For offers that were
accepted, however, this reservation price was non-binding. Payouts consisted of a show-
up fee of 10 e and the sum of all profits in all rounds divided by 1000.
Treatments differed in the number of bids that could be submitted. The goal is to
examine whether and how bidders behave strategically in terms of price and quantity.
In the first treatment, participants are only allowed to submit one single bid, whereas
they may submit up to two bids in the second treatment. The sum of these two bids may
not be more than the sum of the supply portfolio. This way, participants were given the
possibility to “fine-tune” their offers, in the sense that they could better adjust their bids
to their cost structure. Both treatments were conducted in a low (three bidders) and in
a high (six bidders) competition scenario, which allow us to disentangle the competitive
effects.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Total quantity bids
In general, the total amount offered was significantly higher in the multi-bid treatment
than in the single-bid treatment (Figure 4.1), in both competitive situations. In the low
competition scenario, quantities ranged from 15 to 49, with a mean of 43.7 (approxi-
mately 94 % of individual total supply) and a standard deviation of 6.9 for the multi-bid
treatment, whereas the single-bid treatment only led to quantities from 4 to 49, with a
mean of 37.3 (approximately 80 % of individual total supply) and a standard deviation
of 10.6. In the high competition scenario, quantities ranged from 12 to 49, with a mean
of 38.7 (84 %) and a standard deviation of 9.4 for the multi-bid treatment, whereas the
single-bid treatment only led to quantities from 0 to 49, with a mean of 34.8 (74.5 %)
and a standard deviation of 13.0. In each case there was excess supply at all times.
Quantities offered in the market slightly increased over time, especially in the single-bid
treatments, but quantities were generally on a higher level when the format allowed
multiple bids. As can also be seen in Section 4.5.5, this results from the strategy of
constructing a safe bid and using the remaining units for a gambling bid. In contrast,
the high competition scenario did not lead to larger amounts offered in the market. This
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Figure 4.1: Development of quantities in all treatments
means that stronger competition eventually leads to supply reduction. This should not
be confused with collusive behavior (along the lines of Back and Zender, 1993), but can
be explained with an increased efficiency in the market, meaning that high-cost supply
is displaced by lower-cost supply. As it stands, both effects are favorable: It is always
good to have all units thrown into the market as seen in the multi-bid format, but for the
sake of efficiency supply reduction is acceptable under the pressure of high competition.
The chosen experimental setting with 20 repetitions calls for important learning effects.
We test this statically by comparing the first ten rounds with the last ten rounds and
dynamically by determining the trend in the data. This can be done non-parametrically
using the Mann-Kendall test and, because the measurement points can be interpreted
as being equidistant, additionally with a simple linear regression analysis, which also
provides the magnitude of the trend.
Starting with the static analysis, the Wilcoxon signed rank test shows that in the multi-
bid high competition scenario, the bids in the first ten rounds and the bids in the last
ten rounds do not come from the same distribution (hypothesis rejected at the 1%-
level of significance in a two-sided test, p = 0.001). The same is true for the single-bid
high competition scenario with p = 0.0021. The Mann-Kendall test supports the visual
impression of a positive trend this with p = 1.34e−9 in a one-sided test. The regression
analysis quantifies the trend with a coefficient of 0.34, which means that the offered
quantities indeed rose over the rounds. In the multi-bid treatment, the Mann-Kendall
test reveals a negative trend with p = -5.38e−4 in a one-sided test. The regression
analysis supports this with a coefficient of -0.20, indicating a reduction in quantity
offers.
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In the low competition scenario, the bids in the multi-bid treatment do seem to come
from the same distribution in both parts of the experiment, at least when tested at
the 5%- significance level (though not at the 1%- level), with a p-value of 0.0354. The
Mann-Kendall test also weakly rejects the hypothesis of a trend with p = 0.1001 in a
two-sided test, while the regression analysis reveals a coefficient close to zero. In the
single-bid treatment, the first ten auction rounds and the last ten auction rounds do
not come from the distribution, the hypothesis is rejected at the 1%- level with a very
small p-value of 2.22e−9. The Mann-Kendall test shows that this is due to a positive
trend with p = 1.63e−18 in a one-sided test. Again, in the regression analysis we find a
coefficient of 0.52, pointing to a relatively strong positive trend in the data. From this,
we can conclude that with low competition, quantity bids increase only in the single-bid
treatment, whereas they decrease or do not significantly develop in either direction in the
multi-bid treatment. This is in line with our predictions in Section 4.3.2. As argued in
that section, a reason for this might be that bidders learn over time that they achieve the
highest expected profits by bidding their entire quantity in the single-bid treatment. In
the multi-bid treatment, the probability of having the most expensive quantity allocated
is very low, which might discourage bidders from offering that quantity. The test results
are further supported by a Kruskal-Wallis-ANOVA (Table 4.4), which shows that the
differences between multi- and single-bid treatments are significant in both competition
scenarios.
When comparing the results with the predictions of Tenorio (1999), we find that they
hold qualitatively and that quantities offered are indeed smaller in the single-bid treat-
ment. This also means that supply-withholding is more pronounced in the single-bid
treatments, but decreases over time.
Table 4.4: Quantities in multi- vs. single-bid treatments - Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA
table
Competition Source SS df MS χ2 Prob > χ2
High
Columns 2.55·e6 1 2552557.5 21.67 3.24·e−6
Error 1.39·e8 1198 115752.9
Total 1.41·e8 1199
Low
Columns 1.43·e7 1 14308257.6 122.99 1.40·e−28
Error 1.25·e8 1198 104485.7
Total 1.39·e8 1199
Note: SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square
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4.5.2 Price bids
Several distinct features influence the price development process. In a procurement
auction, bidders may be uncertain as to how much they can ask, especially when just
entering the market and being confronted with discriminatory pricing. This means that
they first get to know their environment and learn possible price regions in the first
couple of rounds. At the same time, competitive forces are at work that move prices
down, depending on their strength. As a last issue, in a divisible good auction there is
also interplay between quantity and price. In order to be able to interpret the results,
we thus need to consider all three simultaneously.
When analyzing the price development it is important to keep in mind that we are
looking at the prices entered into the bidding mask. The successful prices, i.e. those
that were accepted, might differ from these, and are captured in the profits (cf. Section
4.5.4), which is why we focus our attention on the entire set of price bids.
Figure 4.2 suggests that prices in the low competition single-bid treatment were much
higher than prices in the low competition multi-bid treatments. This graphical impres-
sion is also supported by a Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 4.5, part 2). The lowest prices are,
of course, those from the first bids in the multi-bid treatment. In the high competition
scenario, however, the second-bid price declines very rapidly, too, and comes close to
the first-bid price. Nevertheless, the prices in the single-bid treatment are not much
higher, such that the difference between the single-bid and the multi-bid treatments is
not statistically significant (Table 4.5, part 1).
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Figure 4.2: Development of prices (in ECU) in all treatments
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Table 4.5: Second price in multi- vs. price in single-bid treatments - Kruskal-Wallis
ANOVA table
Competition Source SS df MS χ2 Prob > χ2
High
Columns 0.96 1 1 8.15·e−6 0.9977
Error 1.42·e8 1198 118257.4
Total 1.42·e8 1199
Low
Columns 1.20·e6 1 1204283.5 10.28 0.0013
Error 1.39·e8 1198 116263.3
Total 1.40·e8 1199
Note: SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square
Speaking in numbers, prices ranged from 6 to 100 ECU in the first bids, with a mean of
14.7 ECU and a standard deviation of 7.5 ECU for the high competition scenario, while
the mean was 16.3 ECU and the standard deviation 12.9 ECU for the low competition
scenario. The second bids ranged from 10 to 100 ECU in the high competition scenario
(mean: 17.2 ECU, standard deviation of 8.7 ECU), while they ranged from 9 to 100
ECU in the low competition scenario (mean: 18.6 ECU, standard deviation of 13.0
ECU). In contrast, they spanned from 7 to 100 ECU in the single-bid treatment in the
high competition scenario, with a mean of 18.1 ECU and a standard deviation of 11.6
ECU. In the low competition scenario, prices have the same range, but a mean of 19.1
ECU and a standard deviation of 10.4 ECU.
In the low competition case, the Mann-Kendall test does not identify any trend in the
single-bid treatment with p = 0.5157, and also the regression analysis quantifies the
coefficient as close to zero. For the first bids in the multi-bid treatment a positive trend
with p = 1.26e−8 can be found (all tests two-sided in this paragraph). The regression
analysis supports this with a coefficient of 0.23. For the second bids in the multi-bid
treatment, the Mann-Kendall test finds a slightly negative trend with p = -0.0293. The
regression analysis, however, finds a slightly positive trend in the data with a coefficient
of 0.14. One should note that the p-value for this coefficient is 0.13, indicating that
it is not very reliable. As the p-value is also comparatively large in the Mann-Kendall
test, we can conclude that there is no obvious trend for the second bids in the multi-bid
treatment.
In the high competition case, there seems to be a negative trend for both treatments and
in the multi-bid treatment for both bids, with a stronger trend in the second bid. The
Mann-Kendall test confirms this with p = -8.36e−6 in the single-bid treatment, p = -
6.88e−4 for the first bids and p = -6.21e−43 for the second bids in the multi-bid treatment.
The coefficients from the regression analysis are -0.27 in the single-bid treatment, -0.17
for the first bids, and -0.31 for the second bids in the multi-bid treatment.
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Unlike our theoretically implied prediction in Section 4.3.2, in the high competition case,
bids do not only decrease in the multi-bid treatment, but also in the single-bid treatment.
In the low competition case, the predicted trend can only be confirmed for the second
bid. The reason for this is that the first bids already provide a reasonable solution
(cf. Section 4.5.5), whereas the second bids are used for “gambling” with low chances of
winning. In the resulting absence of success, bidders are inclined to reduce their prices to
increase their chances. This means that bidders followed a simple algorithm, such as the
learning-direction theory would propose (Erev and Roth, 1998), at least to some extent.
Another interesting observation is that although bidders increase their quantities in the
single-bid treatments in both scenarios, they lower their prices (or at least they do not
raise their prices), despite increasing marginal costs. This means that while following the
optimal strategy of offering the entire capacity, there are strong competitive forces that
impact the prices and profit margins. In the multi-bid treatments, the developments
are not that clear, but profit margins are already lower in the beginning. While both
quantities and prices decrease in the high competition scenario, prices increase in the
low competition case, but quantities remain constant. This means that profits increase.
Although they still remain within range (cf. Section 4.5.4), this can be interpreted as
a first sign of collusive behavior. It is not surprising that such behavior can only be
observed in the low competition multi-bid treatment, because bidders are much better
informed about the market than in any other treatment. Using their two bids, they can
gather quite accurate information about the market price and carefully increase their
bids. One should remember, though, that open signaling is not possible, which hinders
explicit collusion.
4.5.3 Auctioneer’s expenditure
The auctioneer has the goal of minimizing his expenditure. To this end, the multi-bid
format is preferable compared to a format where only one bid may be submitted irre-
spective of the competitive situation. In particular, in the single-bid treatment (Figure
4.3) the quantity-weighted expenditures ranged from 9.5 to 52.3 ECU, with a mean of
18.3 ECU per unit and a standard deviation of 6.1 ECU in the low competition scenario.
In the high competition scenario, the expenditures ranged from 12.3 to 25.8 ECU, with
a mean of 15.6 ECU per unit and a standard deviation of 2.5 ECU. The lower variation
in the high competition scenario is simply a result of the greater number of bidders
in one group, i.e. the higher amount that needs to be procured, which averages out
some of the more extreme values. It should be noted, however, that the extreme values
could only be observed during the first rounds; in later rounds, some convergence took
place, but full convergence could not be reached. In the multi-bid treatment (Figure
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Figure 4.3: Average expenditures (in ECU) per unit of the auctioneer in all treatments
4.3), the weighted expenditures ranged from 10.9 to 19.1 ECU for the low competition
scenario, with a mean of 14.3 ECU per unit and a standard deviation of 1.5 ECU. In the
high competition scenario, the multi-bid treatment produced values between 11.3 and
19.5 ECU, with a mean of 13.9 ECU and a standard deviation of 1.7 ECU. This means
that the multi-bid treatments exhibit considerably less variation in the results than the
single-bid treatments, which might be an important criterion for companies engaged in
the market. The stabilizing effect of multiple bids can also be observed in the bidders’
profits (which will be discussed in the next section), supporting the notion of a reliable
market environment.
Single-bid settings seem to be less advantageous for the auctioneer in terms of expen-
ditures in our procurement auction. Expenditures are more than 20% higher in both
(high and low competition) single-bid treatments and show more variation over time.
A Kruskal-Wallis test shows that the differences in the treatments are highly significant
(Table 4.6). Nevertheless, the absolute impact on average expenditures is the highest
for the single-bid treatment in the low competition case. Put differently, the effect of
the multi-bid format in absolute terms, though still significant, is less pronounced under
high competition.
4.5.4 Bidders’ profit
A more comprehensive variable for analysis might be the profits generated by bidders,
because they can be more easily compared across treatments than prices and quantities.
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Table 4.6: Auctioneer’s revenue in multi- vs. single- bid treatments - Kruskal-Wallis
ANOVA table
Source SS df MS χ2 Prob > χ2
High competition
Columns 168432.1 1 168432.1 50.28 1.33·e−12
Error 498217.9 198 2516.3
Total 666650 199
Low competition
Columns 1.54·e6 1 1540329.21 115.24 6.98·e−27
Error 3.79·e6 398 9530.08
Total 5.33·e6 399
Note: SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square
From Figure 4.4 we can already see that the single-bid treatments lead to higher profits
for bidders. The difference is large in the low competition case and significant at the
1%-level (Table 4.7, part 2). For the high competition case it is somewhat smaller, but
still significant at the 10%-level (Table 4.7, part 1). Similar to auctioneer’s expenditure,
the absolute effect of the single-bid treatment with low competition is most salient.
This means that for profits the competitive situation has again a higher impact than
the number of bids.
Profits ranged from 0 to 4155 ECU per person in the single-bid low competition case.
The mean was 209.8 ECU and the standard deviation was 365.8 ECU. As bidders could
not make a loss, this relatively high standard deviation is mainly a result from high
profits above the mean, which can also be seen from the range of obtained profits. This
range was much lower in the multi-bid case, with 0 to 340 ECU per person, and also
the mean was only 102.9 ECU with a standard deviation of 74.0 ECU. In the high
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Figure 4.4: Mean bidders’ profits (in ECU) per round and person in all treatments
Chapter 4. Multiple vs. Single Bids in Reserve Energy Auctions 99
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
High: Multi-Bid High: Single-Bid
Low: Multi-Bid Low: Single-Bid
Figure 4.5: Weighted standard deviations of profits in all treatments
competition scenario, the range was also smaller with 0 to 1744 ECU in the single-bid
treatment (mean: 111.7 ECU, standard deviation: 135.1 ECU), but larger in the multi-
bid treatment with 0 to 590 ECU (mean: 84.3 ECU, standard deviation: 72.6 ECU).
This hints again at two forces being present: The high competition scenario reveals a
competition effect which only allows low profits, and the multi-bid treatment induces a
balancing effect.
To further investigate the latter effect, which is shown to be significant, we decided to
look at the standard deviation in each case. Note that the standard deviation needs to
be constructed in a way that rules out the leverage effects imposed by the mere size of
the profits. The data have therefore first been normalized for each round and only then
used for calculations (Figure 4.5).
We find that single-bid treatments exhibit a significantly larger standard deviation with
a lot more variance over time than the multi-bid treatments. This means that the
possibility of submitting more than one bid levels out the market. This leads to a more
reliable market both for bidders and the auctioneer, as both can count on stable prices
and plan accordingly. While this might not be important to institutional bidders, it is
certainly a favorable attribute for markets with smaller bidders that do not have the
opportunity for hedging due to their size.
4.5.5 Optimal quantity bids
As we have shown in section 4.3.2, the optimal bidding behavior resulting from non-
rationing is to always bid the entire quantity that can be produced at costs lower than
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the price bid. This means that bidders should bid the first quantity, the first and the
second quantity or their entire available quantity, depending on the price chosen, but
never only a part of the respective stack. Taking the inexperience and possible insecurity
of the bidders into account, we allow a small deviation from the actually optimal bidding
behavior when testing it. In terms of quantity, bids with a reduction of up to 10% of
the predicted values are still counted as conforming to the optimal bids, while the price
bids for each chunk need to be strictly less than the costs for the following chunk and
for the last chunk strictly higher than the costs. It should be noted that the quantity
deviation could hardly be observed.
For the analysis, we only consider the last round of each treatment to evaluate the
structure resulting from market movements. In the low competition multi-bid treatment,
53% of the bidders bid such that they obtain πm,2 (equation 4.8, second part), i.e. they
bid their first and second stack in the first bid and the rest in the second bid. In the
high competition multi-bid treatment, only 40% of the bidders followed that strategy.
In both treatments, no other obvious strategy was followed with the two bids in the
last round, i.e. no bidder offered the first stack in the first bid and the second or both
remaining stacks in the second bid. When only considering the first bids in the multi-
bid treatment, we find that 60% of the bidders followed the optimal strategy with their
first bid in the low competition treatment, while 13% of the bidders offered their entire
quantity (Figure 4.6). Only 3% of the bidders offered only their first stack. In the high
competition treatment, 53% of the bidders bid according to the πm,2-strategy with their
first bids, while 3% of the bidders only offered their first stack and no bidder offered
the entire quantity available. It is important to note that the percentage of bidders
bidding according to the optimal strategy increases dramatically over the rounds, which
supports both P1 and P3 (cf. section 4.3.2).
In the low competition case, bidding in the last round of the single-bid treatment results
in 53% of the bidders offering their entire quantity, 23% of the bidders offering their
first and second stacks, and no bidder offering his first stack (Figure 4.7). In the high
Table 4.7: Profits in multi- vs. single- bid treatments - Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA table
Competition Source SS df MS χ2 Prob > χ2
High
Columns 440603.4 1 440603.4 3.76 0.05
Error 1.40·e8 1198 116873.3
Total 1.40·e8 1199
Low
Columns 4.23·e6 1 4234269.6 35.68 2.32·e−9
Error 1.38·e8 1198 115225.7
Total 1.42·e8 1199
Note: SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square
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Figure 4.6: Strategies applied for the first bids in the multi-bid/low competition
treatment (percentage of all bidders)
competition case, a very different picture results with 50% of the bidders following
the πm,2-strategy and 37% of the bidders following the πs-strategy (equation 4.9). This
means that P2 is supported only to some extent, because, as suggested in P4, competition
drives down prices and thereby quantities such that bidders cannot sustain the πm,2-
strategy.
Comparing the treatments, it becomes clear that the single-bid treatments are ex-post
less efficient than the multi-bid treatments, especially in the low competition case. For
the high competition case, the difference is much less obvious. When looking at the
equations in section 4.3.2, one sees that the πs-strategy has strictly higher expected
profits. An important characteristic of the πs-strategy is that bidders offer the entire
quantity they are able to produce. In the multi-bid setting it is possible to divide the
total quantity into two bids, and as soon as the first bids accumulate sufficient supply,
the second bids are not allocated anymore. As the latter include the more expensive
units, this means that only the cheaper units are allocated. In the single-bid treatments,
such subdivision of supply quantities is not possible. Therefore, when trying to maximize
the quantity offered by bidding the total quantity available, less efficient (because more
expensive) units are automatically included. However, competition seems to be able to
cure this loss in efficiency to a great extent.
4.5.6 Evaluating the predictions
The first prediction (P1, Section 4.3.2) was that in the multi-bid treatment, a decrease in
prices will force bidders to offer less in their first bids. More precisely, the decrease will
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of all bidders)
be in such a way that only the first and second quantity chunks enter the first bid. This
is confirmed with the majority (53% - 60%) of bidders offering the first and the second
quantity stack in the first bid. It should also be noted that the observed supply reduction
is not a result of collusion, but of increased efficiency, because high-cost generators are
driven out of the market. While the quantity expectations are fulfilled in all cases, the
foreseen price development can only be discovered in the high competition scenario.
This means that the general intuition holds, but the low competition scenario gives the
bidders an opportunity for increasing prices, and thereby profits.
The second prediction (P2, Section 4.3.2) was that in the single-bid treatment, bidders
will submit the optimal quantity bid, which includes the entire capacity. The reason
for this was that even in case of high competition, bidders would want to offer their
entire capacity. When no second bid is available, this can only be done in one bid.
This prediction is only supported to some extent. In the low competition scenario,
the majority of bidders (53%) does indeed follow this bidding strategy. In the high
competition scenario, one can observe a decrease in prices over the rounds. This seems
to force a large portion of bidders (50%) to resort to bidding less, i.e. the first and the
second chunk.
The third prediction (P3, Section 4.3.2) said that bidders learn over time, and, as a result
of this, the tendencies put forward in P1 and P2 accelerate over the course of the rounds.
Specifically, we predicted that quantity bids decrease in the multi-bid treatment, but
increase in the single-bid treatment. This seems to have come true, both when evaluating
the total quantity bids and when observing the development of the optimal quantity bids.
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The multi-bid treatments exhibit either a negative or no trend at all, while the single-bid
treatments both exhibit a positive treatment. When looking at the optimal bids, which
can be described as the micro-level, participants also learn to bid more profitably over
the rounds.
The fourth prediction (P4, Section 4.3.2) claimed that the developments of the quantity
bids would be mirrored in those of the price bids. This means that for a negative trend
in quantities, we would expect the same negative trend in prices, and vice versa. The
evidence hereby is mixed. In the high competition scenario, quantity bids decrease in the
multi-bid treatment and increase in the single-bid treatment, while price bids decrease
in both treatments. In the low competition scenario, the quantity bids remain on the
same level in the multi-bid treatment and increase again in the single-bid treatment,
while the price bids remain (on average) on the same level. With the exception of the
high competition multi-bid treatment, all other cases seem paradoxical, but in fact only
show the influence of competition, which reduces overly large profit margins. It can be
interpreted as a healthy functioning of the market.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an experiment on the impact of different formats when
submitting bids in a divisible good auction. We investigated a multi- and a single-bid
treatment in both a high and a low competition scenario.
We expected that bidders reduce prices and quantities in the multi-bid treatment, while
they increase quantities in the single-bid treatment. During the experiment, quantities
indeed developed as predicted, but prices only decreased in the high competition sce-
nario. In the low competition scenario, they even increased for the multi-bid setting.
This can be explained by the amount of information bidders are able to gather relative
to market size.
It has been shown that a format where multiple bids may be submitted is, in terms
of auctioneer’s revenues, much more favorable than a format where only one bid may
be submitted. In the multi-bid format higher quantities were offered, which could be
evidence for a reduction in the theoretically predicted supply-withholding effect. In our
case, however, this was not found to have an impact on prices, as competition seems
to be strong enough to compensate possible strategic behavior. Bidders’ profits were
diminished by competition and by the multi-bid format, although the latter also led
to smaller fluctuations and thereby more reliable income streams. Furthermore, in the
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multi-bid treatments bidders coordinated on a more efficient solution than in the single-
bid treatments, at least in the low competition case. In the high competition case, multi-
and single-bid treatments show some convergence to the same solution.
Resorting to the most simple way of testing the model of Tenorio (1999), namely com-
paring a situation with one bid to a situation with two bids, our laboratory experiment
is also suitable for validating his finding. However, we can only confirm his results in
terms of quantities, not in terms of prices. There might be two reasons for these diverg-
ing outcomes: First of all, he assumes rationing, which is not possible in the investigated
market due to technical reasons, and, therefore, not in our experiment, while this fact is
explicitly communicated to bidders in the instructions. They can therefore not be afraid
of being rationed with behavioral consequences. Tenorio interpreted competitive price
bidding as a result of the fear of rationing, which cannot be found in our set-up.
Our findings suggest that in divisible good auctions, wherever possible, multiple bids
should be preferred to single bids. They support efficiency, a reliable market envi-
ronment, and auctioneer’s revenue. Further research is needed to validate this with
different auction formats, especially with uniform pricing, and to further examine the
optimal number of bids, which might be more than two. Another aspect is the cost
or valuation schedule, which should be altered or resolved to study the robustness of
our findings in different settings. Lastly, when considering other markets (such as the
Treasury bond auctions), it might be worthwhile to implement different rationing rules
and analyze their effect on the outcome.
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Chapter 5
Epilogue: Overarching Lessons
Learned
Although laboratory experiments are known to produce very reliable and replicable
results, they can still be influenced by the human participants and their individual
behavior. The research presented in this thesis already surpassed the assumptions of
traditional economic theory and the homo oeconomicus by embracing a behavioral eco-
nomic approach. Some of the most important concepts in this field are the influence
of bounded rationality, emotions, social preferences, and limited cognitive resources. In
Chapter 2, these ideas can be found in the modeling of bidding agents that use the
available information differently and can be “satisfied” or “not satisfied”. Even more
importantly, the feedback is used for learning, and for adjusting the behavior accord-
ingly. While being an integral of behavioral economic theories, another human aspect
becomes apparent when evaluating the experiments in Chapters 3 and 4: Every person
is an individual with specific characteristics and abilities, using different approaches and
heuristics. This results in a wide spectrum of auction outcomes. It is therefore worth-
while to get to know the participants somewhat better to understand the sources of
these differences. This can be done with a questionnaire (see Appendix C), which each
participant was asked to fill out after the experiment in addition to answering the usual
debriefing questions. The difference hereby is that the debriefing questions were included
in z-Tree and only concerned issues that were directly linked to the bidding process. In
Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3, the answers to these questions have been used to explain some
of the observed strategies as well as anchoring and (unsuccessful) signaling processes.
The paper-based questionnaire was meant to assess the chances of success of the intro-
duced local market in a real-world setting, and to provide some further background to
the results observed during the experiment. After asking socio-demographic questions,
the first block of items concentrated on the auction process and the market idea. The
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second block investigated the participants’ experiences during the experiment and the
third block their earlier experiences with online auction markets. The questionnaire uses
a 5-point-Likert scale with the extremes “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree”. It
was pilot-tested and assessed by experts in advance of using it in the experiment. In
total, 251 participants filled out the questionnaire. The evaluation is also structured
in three parts, which are a general analysis, a gendered analysis, and an analysis with
respect to educational background.
5.1 General results
Since most participants were students from RWTH Aachen University, 90 % of the
bidders were between 19 and 29 years old. 172 respondents were male, while 79 were
female, which means that both groups were large enough to justify the use of a t-test.
The general part reveals that participants enjoyed bidding in the auction (mean: 1.55,
standard deviation: 0.81), although most participants stated that they did not engage
in any kind of online trading (mean: 2.81, standard deviation: 1.50), particularly not
in selling (mean: 3.41, standard deviation: 1.51), in real life. They found the market
mechanism transparent (mean: 2.27, standard deviation: 1.00) and easy to understand
(mean: 1.76, standard deviation: 0.88). Also the written instructions were found to
be easy to understand and complete (mean easy: 1.95, standard deviation: 0.97; mean
complete: 1.78, standard deviation: 0.94). In terms of usability, interfaces as well as
input and output masks were rated very highly (mean input masks: 1.30, standard
deviation: 0.55; mean output masks: 1.64, standard deviation: 0.86). This can also be
seen in the boxplots in Figure 5.1 on the left-hand side. These are important factors for
the internal validity of the experiment and imply that the results are not random, but
are really produced by the market mechanism.
Whether the proposed market will be successful in a real-world setting depends on
the acceptance by prospective participants. One of the motivations for conducting the
experiments was to evaluate the market functioning with human bidders. For assessing
whether participants were satisfied with their own performance, the two items “efficient
strategy” and “success in the market” can be combined to form a scale for successful
bidding with a mean of 2.34 and a standard deviation of 0.83. Along these lines, 65%
of the participants in the experiment evaluated their own bidding as successful. As a
second step, a similar procedure can be applied to the items “own participation” and
“recommendation to others”, which then form a scale for the success of the real-world
market. Since the market design tested during the experiments fulfills the criterium of
eliciting a satisfactory performance, the introduced market can be seen as fair for all
Chapter 5. Epilogue 107
stakeholders. When looking at the 65% who stated that they performed well in the
market, the evaluation of the market acceptance reaches a mean of 2.62 with a standard
deviation of 1.02. When only including those participants who evaluated their own
success as above-average in the entire sample, the assessment of the real-world market
becomes even more positive with a mean of 2.46 and a standard deviation of 1.02 (see
Figure 5.1, right-hand side). The external validity, therefore, seems to be given by
the well-functioning of the market mechanism already. A next step for examining the
external validity, especially when it comes to a roll-out of the proposed market, would
be to conduct an appropriate survey among prospective real-world participants.
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Figure 5.1: Evaluation of usability (left) and market acceptance (right)
5.2 Socio-demographic differences in bidding: Gender
Some surprising differences appear when comparing questionnaire results for each sex.
While males evaluated bidding in the auction (mean: 1.88, standard deviation: 1.01) and
participating in the experiment (mean: 1.75, standard deviation: 0.94) almost equally
with r = 0.77 and p ≈ 0.00 , females also showed a significant, albeit much weaker
correlation between these two items with r = 0.53 and p ≈ 0.00 (mean bidding: 1.91,
standard deviation: 0.87; mean participation: 1.85, standard deviation: 0.83). That is,
when participants liked bidding in the auction, they liked participating in the experiment
even more. Comparing the answers to these two items directly, no significant difference
between the sexes can be found in a t-test (p bidding: 0.87, p experiment: 0.30). Another
interesting difference in the gendered evaluation is that males liked participating when
they found the remuneration scheme motivating, shown by r = 0.61 and p = 0.00 with
means for joy of participation of 1.70 (standard deviation: 0.87) and for money-based
motivation of 2.39 (standard deviation: 1.27). For females, this correlation is again
significant, but weaker with r = 0.50 and p ≈ 0.00 (mean joy: 1.84, standard deviation:
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0.84; mean motivation: 2.38, standard deviation: 1.20). In the context of experience
with other auction formats, we find that they use auction platforms like eBay and others
when they have fun buying things on those platforms (r = 0.72 for females and r = 0.71
for males, p ≈ 0.00 for both).
While the difference between the sexes in joy of buying things on eBay and other auction
platforms is significant only at the 10% level (p = 0.06), the difference in use of those
platforms as sellers is significant at the 5% level with p = 0.04 (mean males: 3.17,
standard deviation: 1.55; mean females: 3.62, standard deviation: 1.66). This might
also result from the higher amount of pleasure males experience from selling (mean
males: 2.71, standard deviation: 1.31; mean females: 3.13, standard deviation: 1.42).
The difference thereof is highly significant with p = 0.02.
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Figure 5.2: Boxplot of profits for females and males (left) and the mean and standard
deviation for the adjusted sample
In total, males performed better than females in the experimental auction. The boxplot
in Figure 5.2 (left-hand side) illustrates this for 75% of each group (upper and lower per-
centiles are left out). However, the difference is not significant (p = 0.21). One reason
for the observed tendency might be that males generally found the market mechanism
easier to understand, which is significant with p ≈ 0.00 (mean males: 1.59, standard
deviation: 0.76; mean females: 2.10, standard deviation: 1.00). When including the
educational background of the largest subgroups in the analysis, the difference between
the sexes reduces. When adjusting for outliers though, such that the 12.5% percentiles
from below and from above are not included in the analysis, the difference between male
and female participants becomes highly significant with p ≈ 0.00 (see also Figure 5.2,
right-hand side). These results might suggest that the two populations could exhibit
different variances. This also means that there is further need for research on the in-
fluence of socio-demographic factors on bidding behavior. This is especially true since
the samples sizes differed largely between the groups, such that a future study should
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include equal sample sizes not only for the two sexes, but also for different types of
educational background.
5.3 Socio-demographic differences in bidding: Education
Altogether, 145 participants, thereof 21 females, had a technical background (i.e. engi-
neering), 85 participants, thereof 41 females, had a background in business administra-
tion or economics, and 21 participants had a different background, such as geography,
natural sciences, or medicine.
As already mentioned in the preceding section, these educational differences also lead
to diverging results in the evaluation of the experiment and of the market itself. Par-
ticipants with a technical background are much more inclined to participate in such a
market in reality than participants with a background in business economics with p =
0.02 (mean technical: 2.47, standard deviation: 1.18; mean business economics: 2.87,
standard deviation: 1.26). At the same time, they also claimed to have better under-
stood the market mechanism with p = 0.03 (mean technical: 1.63, standard deviation:
0.79; mean business economics: 1.88, standard deviation: 0.93) and found the written
instructions more comprehensible with p = 0.04 (mean technical: 1.82, standard devi-
ation: 0.91; mean business economics: 2.09, standard deviation: 1.04), which might be
an explanation for their more positive attitude towards participating in reality. Inter-
estingly, there are some similarities to the tendencies found in the gendered analysis,
there mostly at an even higher level of significance. The reason could be that there were
relatively more male participants with a technical background, and more female partic-
ipants with a business economics background. In the educational subgroup of business
economics, the sample size was actually balanced.
5.4 Concluding remarks
In this thesis, a market design for local (reserve) energy markets has been developed
and analyzed using a simulation and two laboratory experiments. The agent-based
simulation already showed that feedback information can have an important short-term
as well as long-term impact on the bidding behavior in the market, such that the price
convergence takes longer and higher prices are sustained indefinitely. This design variable
was further scrutinized in a laboratory experiment with human bidders. The results from
the simulation analysis could be confirmed, i.e. participants achieved higher prices when
no information was available and when competition was lower. On the other hand, higher
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competition and information also had a positive effect on efficiency, because high-cost
generators were driven out of the market. Furthermore, bidders exhibited behavior that
was in line with the learning direction theory in most cases, but there were also attempts
at signaling and collusion, which remained unsuccessful. Another important variable on
prices and their development has been proven to be the number of bids that can be
submitted. In a second laboratory experiment, it could be shown that multiple bids
have a calming effect on the market, making revenues more predictable. They also have
a positive effect on competition and increase the market efficiency in a similar way to
information. These design choices are even more relevant in the initial phase of a local
market, when the number of participant might be rather small. A balance needs to be
struck to attract more bidders, while keeping the market efficient and the auctioneer’s
expenditures within affordable limits. The optimal market design for a local reserve
energy market should, therefore, provide the bidders with as much feedback information
as possible and allow them to submit multiple bids.
While this thesis used a behavioral economic approach, which explains observations di-
verging from standard economic theory, this chapter aimed at discerning the individual
differences observed during the experiments. The questionnaire showed that participants
had very specific socio-demographic characteristics, which might have an influence on
their bidding behavior. It could further be revealed that the experimental results should
have a high internal and external validity. The internal validity is given by the high
ratings for the usability items as well as the comprehension of the market mechanism
itself. External validity can expected to be reached by the right amount of background
information and an appropriate communication strategy towards prospective users. Fur-
thermore, this procedure can enhance a quick and wide diffusion of the described market.
This diffusion is necessary for two reasons. On the one hand, with the coming phase-
out of the feed-in tariff scheme, new - and preferably market-based - mechanisms are
needed to remunerate electricity produced by private households. On the other hand,
there is a need for mechanisms that enable the integration of renewable, decentralized
electricity generation into the existing infrastructure without jeopardizing a reliable grid
operation. With an increasing share of such generation capacities, the introduction of
those mechanisms becomes all the more urgent, also with respect to the policy goals for
the energy turnaround and against the climate change. The results of this research are
meant to be the first pieces of a puzzle for reaching these targets without endangering
the security of supply, and thereby enhancing the societal well-being in a sustainable
future.
Appendix A
Instructions for Single-Bid
Treatments
Welcome to Aixperiments @ FCN – Experiments in energy
economics!
Imagine you live in a household with several possibilities of energy generation and stor-
age. Your equipment consists of three different technologies such as solar panels, micro-
CHPs (small combustion engines for heat and power) and storage batteries (e.g. for
self-produced power).
THE MARKET
You now have the possibility to participate in a market where your own and other
households can sell their self-produced energy. This happens in an auction in which
there is a single, central buyer with fixed demand, who of course tries to procure as
cheaply as possible. This means that starting with the lowest offer, the buyer accepts
bids until his demand is fulfilled. In the case where there are several offers with the
same price, the winner is determined by lottery. The buyer accepts as many bids as are
at least necessary to satisfy his or her demand. If the last (marginal) offer is greater
than his or her residual demand, it is nevertheless fully accepted. For that matter, only
the price decides about acceptance, not the quantity that is still required. Demand
remains constant over all 20 equal auction rounds.
The capacity that is at your disposal also remains constant in each auction round. You
can see it on the left-hand side of your screen (cf. the screenshot on the next page).
It is composed of three parts that are not meant to be offered separately, but can be
combined into a single bid at your will. Every part of the capacity corresponds to one
of the three available technologies. All technologies have different underlying costs,
which are displayed right next to the quantity as production costs per kWh. Costs are
only incurred for the amount of an accepted bid.
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Available quantity Costs
A a
B b
C c
BIDDING PROCEDURE
On the right-hand side of the screen, you will find one input field for the quantity and a
corresponding input field for the price. Here you can enter your bid. The bid consists,
thus, of a price stated per kWh, and the quantity which you want to offer. Please
note that bids can only be entered as integers.
Your bid is confirmed by clicking the “OK” button.
Please note that you cannot make offers below your production costs, and
quantity-wise not more than your total capacity (A+B+C). It is assumed that
you always want to sell the least-expensive amount first (which is A), then proceed with
B, and only in the end offer C. This means that when determining your production
costs, the lowest are assumed first, and higher costs are added proportionally. If, for
example, quantity A is offered completely with half of B in the first offer, the production
costs per kWh amount to: (a*A + b*B/2)/(A+B/2). This weighted average price is
the lower limit for the price bid, which is also submitted per kWh. If the bid is too
low, an error message pops up. Since there is a reservation price of 100 ECU, above
which bids are not accepted, an error message also appears if the bid is too high.
If you decide not to bid, please enter your minimum price in the price field and zero in
the quantity field.
Once all market participants have submitted their bids, the screen displays whether your
bid has been accepted and how much profit you have made during the current round.
It is calculated according to the following formula:
Profit = (Price – Costs)*Quantity
This procedure is repeated in each round.
Your compensation is your total profit in Euro (summed over all rounds) divided by
1000 plus a fixed payment of 10 Euros.
We will now start with a couple of test questions that are meant to improve your un-
derstanding. These have completely different values from those that are used in the
actual auction. An error message only appears when your answer is wrong. As soon
as everyone has answered all questions correctly, the experiment will begin. First, the
picture below will appear in order to prepare you for the structure of the input fields.
Here you only need to click “OK”.
Appendix B
Instructions for Multi-Bid
Treatments
Welcome to Aixperiments @ FCN – Experiments in energy
economics!
Imagine you live in a household with several possibilities of energy generation and stor-
age. Your equipment consists of three different technologies such as solar panels, micro-
CHPs (small combustion engines for heat and power) and storage batteries (e.g. for
self-produced power).
THE MARKET
You now have the possibility to participate in a market where your own and other
households can sell their self-produced energy. This happens in an auction in which
there is a single, central buyer with fixed demand, who, of course, tries to procure as
cheaply as possible. This means that starting with the lowest offer, the buyer accepts
bids until his demand is fulfilled. In the case where there are several offers with the
same price, the winner is determined by lottery. The buyer accepts as many bids as are
at least necessary to satisfy his or her demand. If the last (marginal) offer is greater
than his or her residual demand, it is nevertheless fully accepted. For that matter, only
the price decides about acceptance, not the quantity that is still required. Demand
remains constant over all 20 equal auction rounds.
The capacity that is at your disposal also remains constant in each auction round. You
can see it on the left-hand side of your screen (cf. the screenshot on the next page).
It is composed of three parts that are not meant to be offered separately, but can be
distributed over your two bids at your will. Every part of the capacity corresponds to
one of the three available technologies. All technologies have different underlying costs,
which are displayed right next to the quantity as production costs per kWh. Costs are
only incurred for the amount of accepted bids.
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Available quantity Costs
A a
B b
C c
BIDDING PROCEDURE
On the right-hand side of the screen, you will find two input fields for the quantity and
two corresponding input fields for the price. Here you can enter your bids. The bids
consist, thus, of a price stated per kWh, and the quantity which you want to offer at
that price. Please note that bids can only be entered as integers.
Bids are confirmed by clicking the “OK” button.
Please note that you cannot make offers below your production costs, and in
total (i.e. as the sum of both bids) not more than your total capacity (A+B+C).
It is assumed that you always want to sell the least-expensive amount first (which is
A), then proceed with B, and only in the end offer C. This means that when deter-
mining your production costs, the lowest are assumed first, and higher costs are added
proportionally. If, for example, quantity A is offered completely with half of B in the
first offer, the production costs per kWh amount to: (a*A + b*B/2)/(A+B/2). This
weighted average price is the lower limit for the price bid, which is also submitted per
kWh. If the bid is too low, an error message pops up. Since there is a reservation price
of 100 ECU, above which bids are not accepted, an error message also appears if the
bid is too high.
If you decide not to bid, please enter your minimum price in the price field and zero in
the quantity field.
Once all market participants have submitted their bids, the screen displays which of
your bids have been accepted (maximum of two) and how much profit you have made
during the current round. It is calculated according to the following formula:
Profit = (Price – Costs)*Quantity
This procedure is repeated in each round.
Your compensation is your total profit in Euro (summed over all rounds) divided by
1000 plus a fixed payment of 10 Euros.
We will now start with a couple of test questions that are meant to improve your un-
derstanding. These have completely different values from those that are used in the
actual auction. An error message only appears when your answer is wrong. As soon
as everyone has answered all questions correctly, the experiment will begin. First, the
picture below will appear in order to prepare you for the structure of the input fields.
Here you only need to click “OK”.
Appendix C
Questionnaire
THE MARKET Strongly
agree
Agree No
opinion
DisagreeStrongly
disagree
Bidding in the auction was fun for
me
    
The auction mechanism was trans-
parent
    
The bidding procedure was moti-
vating
    
I tried to maximize my profit dur-
ing the auction rounds
    
I could imagine participating in a
real electricity market of this kind
    
I would recommend participation
in a real electricity market of this
kind to others
    
I succeeded in applying an efficient
bidding strategy
    
I participated in the market with
success
    
The market mechanism was easy
to understand
    
The market helps to protect the
environment
    
The market supports sustainabil-
ity
    
Imagine such an electricity market existed in reality and you already possessed the
necessary generation equipment to participate in the market. Would you do it?
 yes, because
 no, because
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THE EXPERIMENT Strongly
agree
Agree No
opinion
DisagreeStrongly
disagree
Participating in the experiment
was fun for me
    
Written instructions for the bid-
ding procedure were easy to under-
stand
    
Written instructions for the bid-
ding procedure were complete
    
Input fields for entering the bids
were well-arranged
    
The payout system was motivating     
The display of the results after an
auction round was easy to under-
stand
    
The time consumed by an entire
auction round including the dis-
play of results was reasonable
    
AUCTIONS IN GENERAL Strongly
agree
Agree No
opinion
DisagreeStrongly
disagree
I use auction platforms (e.g. eBay,
hood.de, centgebote.de) as a pri-
vate buyer
    
I use auction platforms (e.g. eBay,
hood.de, centgebote.de) as a pri-
vate seller
    
I have fun selling something at
auctions
    
I have fun buying something at
auctions
    
How often do you use auction platforms on average?
 once a week or more
 two to three times a month
 once a month
 every two months
 once a year or less
 never
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This thesis proposes and evaluates a local market design for reserve energy in 
which private households can trade their self-generated energy. The market con-
ceptualization builds upon the idea of a microgrid connecting households with 
and without power generation equipment. The notion of balance groups can be 
seen as the current administrative groundwork, with the balance group respon-
sible party acting as an auctioneer. Such a mechanism helps to better integrate 
distributed generation and acts as an alternative incentive scheme once the fixed 
feed-in tariffs are abandoned. The market has some definite characteristics that 
result from the specific technologies and their users. The predominant attribute 
is the involvement of private households, i.e. retail customers – now in the role of 
producer-consumers (“prosumers”) – without much expertise in the field of ener-
gy trading. Hence, trading rules need to be simplistic to create something like an 
“energy-eBay“. While the growing presence of renewables imposes challenges on 
the current energy system, the local market concept for reserve energy proposed 
in this thesis can foster the security of supply and a reliable grid operation.
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